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Clay v. State
883 S.W.2d 822
Ark.
1994
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*1 122

the trial court must consider the meritorious defense before deny- the motion to set aside the ing default This judgment. argument Canvas, has been addressed already Maple v. Rogers, Inc. Leaf 171, (1992). 311 Ark. 842 S.W.2d 22 relief Seeking from default Leaf judgment, had Maple argued meritorious defense and that prejudice no resulted to the We appellees. responded: contends that no resulted to the

Appellant prejudice and that it has a appellees meritorious defense. Appellant however must satisfy the court that a threshold rea- first son exists denying judgment. reason it pre- for default not sents is The failure to answer the convincing. com- ., due seems more . . plaint carelessness a result not to business. attending emphasis.] [Our reiterate, To we are not the view renouncing that favored, default are not judgments that on the merits judgments so, are Even preferred. issue involves the sound discretion Chalmers, of the trial court 284 [Cammack 680 (1984)], S.W.2d 689 and where the record is bereft of explana tion failure to to a we are hard respond complaint pressed hold an abuse of discretion occurred.

Affirmed.

Michael CLAY v. STATE of Arkansas CR 93-1262 S.W.2d Court of Arkansas

Supreme delivered Opinion October [Rehearing denied October 1994.*] Glaze, Corbin, JJ., * Hayes, grant rehearing. would *4 Harris, Terri L. for appellant. Holt, Gen., G. Asst. Att’y Kent by: Bryant, Att’y

Winston Gen., for appellee. stands convicted Justice. Michael Newbern, David life which he was sentenced to imprisonment murder for

capital a he made to police He contends confession without parole. have been incarcerated should suppressed while he was authorities him. We disagree admitted into evidence against and not intel- of his Miranda was not rights that his waiver his argument invol- and that his statement was executed and knowingly ligently however, must, and remand the case We reverse given. untarily as it was should have been suppressed because the statement Crim. in violation of Ark. R. an unnecessary delay, after 8.1, the time he was taken before Mr. arrest and Clay’s P. between for rever- raises an additional point a officer. judicial evidence that he which we find no error. He claims escaped sal in We have been admitted. discuss should not custody from waiver of and voluntariness well as the ones on point the Trial Court retrial. for the benefit of upon confession 1990, 14, Wallace was found body Glynda On It was later Macedonia Road Gilmore. in an area alongside a had died as the result of gunshot determined that Ms. Wallace 1990, Wallace’s the burned shell of Ms. wound. On August in rice located field. automobile was received an The Crittenden Sheriff’s County Department vic- had been seen driving that Michael Clay anonymous tip invited Thursday, August tim’s car. On in Crittenden for County question- to the Sheriff’s Department initialed each of his theft of the car. Mr. Clay ing concerning were read to him and signed on a form as they Miranda rights oral, He made an the form at the bottom. exculpatory not detained. 23, Mr. picked up Later in the evening August ini- He and returned to the Sheriff’s Department questioning. made tialed and another form signed subsequently recorded, statement in which he claimed rather convoluted tape *5 uncle the fact that the victim’s car from his despite he bought Mr. for theft title to the car. was arrested Clay his uncle had no on 24. custody Friday, August He from receiving. escaped He rearrested. again Mr. was Clay August On Saturday, further and was questioned form rights initialed and signed Ms. Wal- and the murder of the vehicle about possession in statement made another recorded tape That afternoon he lace. Ms. Wallace he in the car with he claimed that was which were to get He thought they going Robert Turner. his friend Wallace. He said when Robert shot Ms. was car but surprised car. later him the Robert gave and was held in the Crittenden County jail

Mr. Clay 26. He initialed Sunday evening, August again questioned recorded form and another gave tape another yet signed he had to say stopped in which he changed story statement him give a flat tire and she had agreed Ms. Wallace change help let him out of the car He said she declined to a ride to town. off,” “went the shooting him his gun implying was hitting when car, his friend He he took her but that was was accidental. said was arrested for murder. who burned the car. Mr. Clay Robert with Officer John who Mickey Strayhorn, along Officer in testified that on Mon- Murray investigation, participated from the Sheriff’s Mr. took officers day, August Clay depart- 28, Mr. Clay ment where On “things Tuesday, August happened.” examination where he taken to Jonesboro for a polygraph Charles Beall of the Arkansas State a statement to Officer gave statement, mur- In this Mr. confessed that alone Clay Police. dered Wallace and burned her car. Prior to the writ- signing Ms. ten to Officer Beall on Mr. version of initialed and another signed rights form. trial, the Trial At the outset of Court was informed the made to introduce statements Mr. proposed prosecution held and a outside Clay, hearing presence jury determine their Officer testified that he did admissibility. Murray time) (19 Mr. at that or that he had been a not know Clay’s age at the where had education student school finished high special testified, 12th He as did Officer that no Strayhorn, grade. were used to obtain the statements or the writ- coercive measures Mr. of his which Officer ten acknowledgments by “indicated he understood.” said Murray about the taking Officer was asked Murray *6 128 rear- officer. He testified that after

before judicial 26th, he remained in the Saturday, rested on August custody 27th, 28th, he the was taken to Jonesboro and on which day he made the statement had killed Ms. Wallace to admitting get her car. He remained in all custody day Wednesday 29th He have was taken to court that said would day. normally taken a arrested weekend for a “bond during hearing” person which would have been 27. Monday, August following He did not do so in this case because he said he “was instructed Hale the next Prosecutor James to continue to court by Deputy date evidence this case.” involving

Defense counsel moved to last two of cus- suppress todial statements made Mr. on the basis their of invol- untariness and the fact that were due obtained to an unnec- they before a after essary delay bringing officer judicial arrest. The in limine defense also moved the State prohibit from evidence Mr. 23 using Clay’s from the escape Crittenden County jail.

1. the statements Suppression of a. Voluntariness and knowledge clear, it is not of Mr. lead Although parts Clay’s arguments that he us to conclude contends both that his waivers of the right remain were silent to counsel not voluntarily, knowingly, as well as that his were intelligently given statements invol- in the were untary they sense coerced force or promises. weAs out in v. 831 S.W.2d pointed Mauppin 309 (1992), there are two issues the waiver of separate regarding Miranda rights: if the of the circumstances

“Only ‘totality surround- reveals both an uncoerced choice and ing interrogation’ level of a court requisite comprehension may properly that the Miranda have conclude been waived.” Moran Burbine, (1986) 475 U.S. at 421 Fare v. (citing C., (1979)). 442 U.S. Michael “totality the circumstances” review mandates into appellate inquiry education, an evaluation of “age, experience, background, and into whether he intelligence, has capacity him, understand the the nature of his Fifth warnings given those waiving and the consequences Amendment rights, Thus, at the total- a court must look Fare at 725. rights.” that a if the State proved the circumstances to see ity *7 waive level to had the of comprehension defendant requisite Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. a criminal defen of the of validity Consideration and the to coun right waiver the to remain silent dant’s of right be divided into an giving may sel prior inculpatory State, 314 Ark. 862 S.W.2d two See Bryant components. waiver, of the (1990). The first is the voluntariness component choice, made a free and it concerns whether the accused has We uncoerced the to waive his discussed that rights. police, in the case above. second involves Mauppin quoted component whether the defendant made the waiver and intelli knowingly waiver, and the then focuses on if the gently, inquiry determining case, as we said in the made with full “a aware Mauppin ness of both the nature of the abandoned and the right con being the decision to abandon it.” sequences issue, In addition to two of the waiver we aspects statement, must decide if confession or inculpatory given occurred, after a waiver of rights has was itself made. voluntarily weAs use similar standards to review whether very both a waiver was valid and whether a statement was volun subsequent we tarily, sometimes do not take the time to out dis point State, But the tinction. distinction is there. See Shaw v.

274, 773 S.W.2d 827 (1989), in which we discussed whether a waiver was and knowingly, made but intelligently, voluntarily declined to consider the voluntariness of the statement which because issue was not raised at the trial. applied of the considering totality circumstances sur both the waivers Mr. rounding and his Clay subsequent statements, education, we look to his age, intelligence, detention, of his length or repeated use prolonged questioning, mental or physical the advice or lack of advice punishment, to his constitutional Shaw v. respect rights. supra.

The circumstances in this were case these. As noted above, Mr. was 19 and had Clay years age graduated from school where he in high was enrolled education classes. special the time he was first on Thursday, August From questioned the written statement to Officer Beall on Tuesday, until gave he was six times. interrogated Except August released, when Mr. and then picked questioned, up theft arrested for again prior being by receiving, questioned he was once a each he was in interrogated just day day custody. There evidence that he threatened in is no or punished any on the way days question.

There is whether the inter- conflicting testimony concerning officers advised Mr. of his constitu- rogating adequately tional At the testified that rights. hearing, suppression was told to statement of form “if he did not sign understand his that his was needed in order rights,” signature the Sheriff that the had him. to show officers talked to On the other hand, Officers testified read Murray Strayhorn they *8 form, from the and that he initialed each rights directly right read him. was to of the None sessions were for extended questioning periods time, food, of and there is no evidence Mr. Clay deprived or other necessities. The were sleep, repeated interrogations obvi- due, in to the in the ously inconsistencies two statements part, and the given Thursday, August one given Saturday, August circumstances, 25. Given the totality of we conclude there was no coercion used to obtain the statements.

Nor can we the State failed to bear its say burden of there showing voluntary, knowing, intelligent waiver Mr. that he rights. Clay’s the statement of testimony signed forms because he was told rights indicated signature only the officers had talked to him or that he did not understand must also, be considered on matter of waiver as must his testimony (the officer) that one of the officers told him he awas lawyer, that he was the lawyer to whom Mr. was entitled. implying All of these Mr. were denied allegations by the officers. by

The recorded between Mr. and the officers colloquy statements, detail, who took his which we have read in reveals which have led the nothing might officers to conclude Mr. Clay was too slow or unintelligent understand which had been to him. explained

On when Mr. statement to Clay gave Police, Officer Beall of the State he made Arkansas Officer Beall aware that he could not read write or well. statement he exe cuted himself to Officer Beall writ ultimately inculpating ten down Officer Beall and Mr. The Officer signed by Clay. testified the words wrote were those after spoken he had been informed of his there is rights. Again, nothing coerced, that the show statement was and the State’s evidence that, was sufficient to show despite Clay’s age, proba I.Q., ble low he was informed of his adequately under stood them.

b. Delay and Rule 8.1 case in which a nearly every criminal defendant has sought of a suppression confession or other inculpatory officers while in police we are custody confronted with con- match,” flicting testimony, sometimes called a “swearing the defendant saying or she was coerced or did not under- stand and the ance, there police saying was no coercion an appear- least,

at on the understanding of the part defendant. As we out in pointed Duncan v. 726 S.W.2d (1987), LaFave, W. citing Criminal (1984), Procedure 6.3§ the reason rule requiring authorities to assure a prompt before a appearance of a judge under person arrest is that the i.e., other safeguards, the voluntariness and knowing intel- determinations, ligence can be illusory. We quote following again:

Since “the use the of tactics is . . . third-degree difficult to there prove because is the always word of the police against accused; the word of the and the of testi- prestige police mony carries the usually the day,” which safeguards upon the traditional confessions rules rest have been called aptly The main “illusory.” thrust of the McNabb-Mallory rule States, v. United 318 U.S. 332 (1943); [McNabb Mallory States, v. United 354 U.S. (1957)] ... is to bypass conflicts over the nature of the secret interrogation to minimize both the and the “temptation” to “opportunity” Kamisar, obtain coerced confessions. Id. at Y. citing, Police Interrogation (1980). Confessions rule we have minimal

The adopted provide pro is Rule subjected interrogation tection to arrested persons of Criminal It 8.1 the Arkansas Rules Procedure. provides: of who is not released citation or other by “An arrested person be taken a officer judicial lawful manner shall before without unnecessary delay.” an gave only

The Duncan case us not to dis- opportunity the the rule but to indicate to cuss reason for police prose- we would it. We a test. The apply adopted cutors how three-part must have been the evidence must be delay dicial, unnecessary, preju- the evidence must be related to the reasonably delay.

i. Unnecessary The before a was unneces- delay taking judge There is no but that he could have been sary. question presented 27. The that did Monday, only on reason not occur was the order of the to “continue to the next court deputy prosecutor date for evidence this case.” The State noth- involving presented to show that Mr. could not have been taken a ing before 27. judge Monday, August In County Riverside 500 U.S. 44 McLaughlin, of

(1991), the United States Court dealt with the Supreme Fourth Amendment of a cause to be held requirement probable hearing a for arrested without warrant. It held that if person such hours, does not occur within 48 the hearing burden shifts to the the to show existence of a faith government good or emergency other extraordinary circumstances. the course of discussing here, that matter which is similar the very one presented Court said: are Supreme unreasonable “Examples delay delays for additional evidence purpose gathering to justify arrest, a motivated ill will delay against arrested individ ual or sake.” delay delay’s case, was,

In the Duncan one of the reasons for reversal “The record shows the and that delay purposeful prose- cutor made a deliberate decision Duncan in to hold detention and ignore in the prompt appearance requirement.” case now before us was not only unnecessary, was apparently deliberate we same sort as encountered in the Duncan case which should be countenanced. not

ii. Prejudicial on Sunday, August Mr. Clay gave the statement “went off’ while he was struggling his alleged gun statement, it was but That was a very prejudicial Ms. Wallace. him before a judi unnecessary delay taking given prior state We considered whether subsequent cial officer. have error, thus not have harmless prejudicial, ment been might It harmless In the was not error. in view of earlier statement. one on given August on unlike the given August statement 26, which all the elements the offense with Mr. admitted is, during committed a homicide ultimately charged, (a)(1) of a Ark. Code Ann. 5-10-101 robbery. (Repl. the course § 1993). not more The statement could have been prejudicial.

Hi. Related delay We between the statement can see no relationship Mr. and the in tak Clay August subsequent delay a That be used him him before statement ing judge. may against is, however, retrial. statement a different August upon matter.

It is clear that each time Mr. a statement to author- Clay gave 23 he August ities after initial ones of took further step himself in the murder of Ms. Wallace. The toward implicating of the Mur- Officer deputy prosecutor, reported that he should before a offi- delay taking judicial ray, case,” evidence cer “for this makes that the involving appear was ordered with the that Mr. do would expectation did, i.e., what he admit to murder. ultimately capital that, however, that, Short of we can with assurance if say had been taken before officer on judicial August officer have Ark. R. P. 8.2 would followed Crim. judicial which to assure that an accused has counsel requires judge if he cannot afford one and not waive does choose to appointed to counsel defend him. been Had counsel right appointed, it most have unlikely is statement made on would forthcoming. been were, doubt,

The facts of Duncan case far no more egre- than the now before Duncan was held “incom- ones us. gious *11 134 least, for

municado” three He was at days. verbally, undoubtedly abused officers. He asked “do y’all lawyers,” but the appoint continued. He was interrogation interrogated long of periods short, time. In there evidence that he was was to what subjected LaFave and Professors Kamisar would call the “third degree.” evidence, however, All of that went more to the issue of the vol- of the untariness statement Duncan than to the ultimately gave effect We of the said: delay.

The State urges confession was under the voluntary circumstances, of the totality but we not do regard in a reasonable and fair approach appropriate seeking res- said, of the olution of this we rule. As have application assurance of is voluntariness not the Of only concern. equal is the mechanism of the first importance appearance that that the guarantees accused’s constitutional will be “Indeed, protected implemented. rights afforded [the under Rule are basic and fundamental which 8.1] our state federal constitutions secure every to arrestee.” 718, Bolden (1978). 561 S.W.2d 281 Furthermore, if under the exclusion rule rests on a volun- standard, tariness we are faced with again a swearing-match, the rule was avoid. designed to

The three and one-half Mr. Duncan day was period was, held taken prior being judicial before officer dura tion, 25, similar to the between period Saturday, August August in this case. When Wednesday, we realize that the the Duncan point of case not the fact that Duncan was was sub abuse, him, but that of what jected much includ happened ing his would not have had he self-inculpation, occurred been taken a judicial before officer without unnecessary we delay, have no difficulty the same conclusion here as we reaching reached there. The statement given by Tuesday, on August related to the violation of Rule 8.1. As the the evidence unnecessary, was prej udicial, and the of it was related obtaining to the delay, reversible error not to exclude August statement.

2. Evidence escape contends that testimony concerning escape 23, 1990, been have should on county jail from the rel- had no testimony independent He asserts that the excluded. value unfair prej- meet versus did not the probative evance and Rules of Evi- the Arkansas test of Rule balancing udice no merit. dence. The has argument is discre evidence relevancy

A ruling *12 abused unless the Trial Court will not be reversed and tionary State, 44 Ark. 783 S.W.2d Walker v. 301 its discretion. determining Court has discretion in (1990). The Trial also against evidence in its value probative relevance of gauging State, Ark. S.W.2d 156 Gunter 857 unfair v. prejudice. denied, (1993). (1993), USLW 3319 cert. trial, there was that Mr. testimony Clay escaped

At with 23. receiving Although theft being charged after unclear, that the testi is seems assert argument because value the murder concerning charge lacks mony probative theft at he was flight only charged the time of his from jail, State the theft receiving charge The by receiving. argues An incarceration escape was linked to murder from charge. is as circumstantial evidence of Centeno guilt. admissible (1976). We should agree 537 S.W.2d 368 the jury in as to have the circumstantial inference difficulty no weighing to the state of mind with Clay’s respect relationship two The evidence to the offenses. separate escape escape received. properly

Reversed and remanded. Corbin, JJ., Glaze, dissent.

Hays, view, Justice, dissenting. my majority Glaze, Tom himself, The reflects that Clay, is record wrong. clearly opinion And from delayed by escaping jail. initially arraignment rearrested, Clay hours he was found and within after twenty-four Wallace, that he had and had Glynda admitted shot him evidence needed to convict shown the authorities enough words, if murder. In other even had been arraigned capital he had knowingly within a hour forty-eight period, already needed not all the cause voluntarily given police probable they him, well. Nonethe- arrest and him but to convict charge only less, court reverses this case based needlessly upon the majority a confession which does no more than confirm the evidence the view, had. From the police already state’s the only purpose Clay’s final confession served was his concession that no one had assisted him in killing Glynda Wallace.

First, I note the trial court’s when it ruled following findings that all of Clay’s statements were admissible: was not a case of a

[T]his continuous team tag inter- viewing through day night until finally broke and made an I admission. assume the end results there must be here,

something I inculpatory assume. But the defendant abused, mistreated, was not in any way no force or coer- cion, threats or intimidation either the defendant upon or members of his was used in family these interviews even were though they over several . . . days were not unduly or prolonged long nature.

The record thoroughly the trial supports court’s findings. chronology of events follows: *13 -

Tues., 14, victim, Aug. Wallace, 1990 Glynda was found dead. -

Thurs., 23, 1990, Aug. at 1:10 p.m. interviewed and released. -

Thurs., 23, 1990, Aug. at 7:20 p.m. Clay arrested for theft by receiving victim’s car. state- Clay gave ment his Uncle Andrew sold him car and Glynda’s Andrew said that purportedly Robert Turner had title. - Fri., 24, Aug. 1990 Clay from escapes jail. -

Sat., 25, found, Aug. is rearrested and gives statement at 3:10 a p.m., Robert implicating Turner who said stole car and Glynda’s shot her. He his acknowledged at crime presence scene. - Sun., 26, 1990, Aug. at 5:10 State p.m. charged Clay with murder capital after he gave statement admitting he had ride, asked Glynda Wallace a she had refused, so a Clay pulled she gun; him a ride gave car, and when he departed went gun off. He mentioned Robert Turner came appeared, to the car and did not he He said road. down gravel Wallace kicked car. Glynda’s who burned know - where to site authorities Mon., takes Aug. found. burned purse car had been - 28, 1990, Tues., Clay gives 10:20 a.m. at Aug. no one else Wallace and Glynda that he shot

relating car Glynda’s where he took He involved. stated gun. threw away where he burn it and events, caused initially clear Clay it is foregoing From from jail prevented His escape in his arraignment. the delay on Sat- after his recapture until him arraigned from having state date, volun- second gave On this 1990. urday, different, Glyn- on his involvement bearing account but tary, a third Sunday, gave The next day, vehicle and death. da’s account, Wallace. he shot Glynda time he admitted but this 26th that Clay’s August the record shows A fair reading statements) causally were not (and earlier 28th statements or actions or that the police in his delay arraignment related to any that delay. contributed to (1987), 726 S.W.2d 653

In Duncan not confession should the rule that a defendant’s we adopted evidence unless that confession be excluded from automatically Duncan court adopted delay. was related to Specifically, (2) the (1) unnecessary, must be test three-part rea- (3) the evidence must be be evidence must prejudicial, Duncan, this sonably delay. (My emphasis). related to the defendant ini- existed because held a causal connection court statements, held him *14 but after police only exculpatory tially gave detention, he incrimi- in incommunicado three and a half days retarded, Also, had asked Duncan was mildly himself. nated made to which the officers if they lawyers authorities appointed had a waiver evidence showed Duncan signed no no response, form. of it a far from Duncan. From beginning,

This case is cry theft by to the that existed tying is undisputed ample proof car; but he thereby pre- Wallace’s Glynda escaped, receiving — arrest for after his day any arraignment Friday venting theft. When Clay was rearrested on Saturday, immediately Robert Turner as the one who implicated Glynda, shot but also himself, well, his at implicated by acknowledging presence the crime. the next admitted that he had By Sunday, day, seen on her and Glynda, pulled shot her. gun subsequently

From the time was rearrested and in on Sat- custody urday, he signing forms and stories telling that impli- himself, cated in varying degrees, murder. Unlike Glynda’s Duncan, in the record here Clay’s shows and numerous escape voluntary statements served to his show involvement and in guilt statement, murder. final Glynda’s 28th, Clay’s August on Tuesday, confirmed merely his earlier Sunday statement conced- shot ing having His final 28th Glynda. August — merely disclosed he acted alone fact that the had police already determined by other independent investigation.

Today, opinion majority effectively adopts automatic that, rule if a defendant is not within arraigned forty-eight hours arrest, from his no statements the defendant given by that during can be admitted at trial. period That is not Arkansas law. Nor is under required Court decision in River- Supreme County of side McLaughlin, (1991), 500 U.S. 44 which our court fol- in lowed Duncan. even if Again, Clay had been within arraigned (which hours after his forty-eight rearrest would have expired 27th), sometime Monday, August Clay had already voluntarily cause, more, hold, given authorities probable charge short, convict him of Glynda’s murder. In Clay’s 28th confession was not related to the short in his arraignment. confession, instead, His evolved naturally from own actions least, statements. even prior At if it is said that Clay’s confession resulted from the brief delay Clay’s arraignment, trial court’s admission of the August 28th confession was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of his This guilt. court should the trial uphold court’s all ruling admitted evidence, Clay’s statements into and affirm murder con- Clay’s viction.

Hays JJ., join this dissent. Corbin,

Case Details

Case Name: Clay v. State
Court Name: Supreme Court of Arkansas
Date Published: Oct 3, 1994
Citation: 883 S.W.2d 822
Docket Number: CR 93-1262
Court Abbreviation: Ark.
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