7 W. Va. 348 | W. Va. | 1874
This is an action of debt brought in the circuit court oí the county of Greenbrier, by the plaintiff against the
It appears by bill of exceptions No. 2, that the defendant, by his attorney, after the evidence was closed, asked the court to give to the jury the following instructions, viz: 1st. That the order of the county court of Greenbrier county made on the 26 th day of October, 1863, and the same read to them, cast the administration of the estate of John Marcus Alderson on Malinda S. Alderson, and she thereby • became the administratrix of said estate, and so continued unless she was removed therefrom ; and that she was not removed from her office of administratrix, aforesaid, by reason of the order of the Recorder of Greenbrier county, made on the 16th day of December, 1868, and the same read to the jury.
2d. That if Malinda S. Alderson, was appointed ad-ministratrix, of the estate of John Marcus Alderson, she was not removed by the effect of the order of the Re-
3rd. If the jury believe -from the evidence, that on the 26th of October, 1863, MalindaS. Alderson was appointed administratrix of the estate of John Marcus Alderson, and she had not been legally removed from her said office, on the day this suit was instituted, then she was the rightful administratrix, and Wallace Robinson was not the administrator of John Marcus Alderson, and the jury must find for the defendant, on the plea of never administrator:
All of which three instructions so asked by the defendant, the court refused to give. *
For convenience I will first consider if the circuit court erred in refusing to give the instructions asked by the defendant. To determine this question properly it is necessary to recur to the time this State became a separate State of the Union, the state and condition of things within her limits, and especially in October, 1863, when Malinda Alderson is claimed to have been appointed administratrix of Alderson, deceased, by the county court of Greenbrier. It is also necessary to consider parts of the Constitution and laws of this State in force before, and at the time, of such appointment of Mrs. Alderson-The Constitution of this State under which she became a separate State, took effect on the 20th of June, 1S68, and on that day the government of the State became organized, and operative. The fifth section of article seven of the State Constitution, then in force, provided, that the voters of every county should elect a Recorder, and that he should hold his office for two years. The sixth section of the same article provides, among other things that the Recorder shall have authority to appoint and qualify personal representatives under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. There was, at the time of the formation of this State, and for many years before, county courts in each county of Virginia, which had authority to appoint personal representatives, and
The constitution and laws of this State were not, and could not be, for the reasons above stated, extended over and enforced in the county of Greenbrier until about the time or after the surrender of General Lee’s army at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. Hence it is there was a county court held in the county of Greenbrier in October in 1863, and it was that court that appointed Mrs. Alderson administratrix of Alderson, deceased. As I stated, the county court in Greenbrier was held and maintained contrary to the Constitution and laws of this State. An administrator is the mere creature of law, and is not a public officer. As Mrs. Alder-.son was appointed administratrix, as above stated, only, she cannot be considered or held to have been appointed administratrix in pursuance of the laws of this State. But as such administratrix, thus appointed, her acts from public policy and necessity, on the authority of the case
This brings me to the consideration of the instruction asked by the plaintiff and given by the court. While I do not think that this instruction propounds the law correctly, when taken altogether, still I am clearly of the opinion, under the views above expressed, that the
It further appears by bill of exceptions No. 1, that the plaintiff, to sustain the issue on his part, gave in evidence to the jury, the bond in the declaration mentioned, which is for $375, dated 9th day of August, 1859, payable at its date, with interest from date, and signed and sealed by J. Marcus Alderson and T. B. Patton, and af-terwards the defendant, to sustain the issiie on his part, gave in evidence to the jury a receipt in these words, viz: “Received of J. Marcus Alderson, $496, payment in full of all demands,” dated October, 15th, 1860, and signed with the name of Thomas G. Clay, and attested, by Lewis Miller. And thereupon, the plaintiff who denied the genuineness of said receipt, and the signature thereto, purporting to be his, after having proved that the body of said' bond was in the hand writing of plaintiff, (the evidence as to the genuineness of said receipt being conflicting,) called and had sworn, as a witness, James Montgomery, and asked him “what his occupation had been,” and the question was objected to by defendant, and the objection overruled and the defendant excepted; and the witness answered that “he had been for ten years teller in the Bank of Lewisburg, and
The only question pi’esented here, is whether the court erred in permitting the evidence of James Montgomery, to go before thejury. Montgomery in his evidence, does not pretend to be acquainted with
It might also be different if the body of the bond was admitted to be in the hand writing of the plaintiff or the defendant was estopped to deny the fact,, or the bond belonged to the witness who was himself previously acquainted with the party’s hand-Avriting; and perhaps other cases may arise Avhere such evidence would be admissible and cases also which should be held to be exceptions to the rule, but as to this it is iioav unnecessary to express an opinion.
The plaintiff having introduced witnesses to impeach the character of Lewis Miller, for truth and veracity, Avho-it seems Avas a Avitness introduced and examined by the defendant in support of the issue, on his part, the defendant introduced a witness, and asked him if ho knew the character of Lewis Miller, for truth and veracity, among his neighbors, and he replied: “I cannot say L
In 1 vol. of Green on Ev., sec. 461, it is said, “after a witness has been examined, in chief, his credit may be impeached in various modes besides that of exhibiting the' improbabilities of a story, by a cross-examination. (1.) By disproving the facts stated by him by the testimony of other witnesses. (2.) By general evidence affecting his credit for veracity. But in impeaching the credit of a witness, the examination must be confined to his general .reputation, and not be permitted as to particular facts, •* * The regular mode of examining into the general reputation is to inquire of the witness whether he knows the general reputation of the person in question, among his neighbors, and what that reputation is. In the English courts the course is further to inquire, whether ■from such knowledge the witness would believe that person, upon his oath. In the American courts the same course has been pursued, but its propriety has, of late, been questioned, and, perhaps, the weight of authority is now against permitting the witness to testify. In an
As before stated the rule in Uhl’s Case permits the impeaching witness to say, on his oath, that from his knowledge of the general character of the witness sought to be impeached, he would, or would not, believe him on oath; but he is not permitted to state whether he would, or would not, believe him on oath until he has first stated on his oath that he knows his general character among his neighbors and acquaintances, and also his gen.eral character for truth among his neighbors and acquaintances, whether upon oath or otherwise. As before stated the rule in Uhl’s Case has been generally sanctioned and adhered to, substantially, by the courts of Virginia, and of this State, in an attempt to impeach the character of a witness. But it is maintained that this rule should be relaxed in cases where the general character of the witness for truth and veracity, has been assaulted, and an attempt is made to sustain the character of the witness thus assaulted, and that the sustaining witness notwithstanding he is unable to state that he knows the general character of the assaulted witness, and is also unable to state that he knows his general character for truth and veracity among his neighbors and acquaintances, but states that he has known the assaulted witness for four or five years, and that he resided four or five miles from him, and that he had never heard a word against him as
The pleas in this case were a general plea of payment, and that the defendant was never administrator, &c.; to each of which there was a general replication and issue. On this state of the pleadings the plaintiff was entitled to open and conclude the argument of the case.
I have considered all the questions presented by bill of exceptions number one; and bill of exceptions number two is taken to the judgment of the court in overruling the defendant’s motion for a new trial. The bill does not profess to state all the evidence or facts proven before the jury. And I have already considered several questions presented, and, indeed, all that I deem of any importance.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment rendered in this cause, by the circuit court of Greenbrier county, on the 24th day of June, 1873, must be reversed and annulled, the verdict of the jury set aside and a new trial awarded, with costs in this Court to appellant, and the cause must be remanded to said circuit court for further proceedings therein to be had according to law.
Judgment Reversed, Yeedict Set Aside, New Triad Awarded AND Cause Remaeded.