Clay v. Magone

40 F. 230 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York | 1889

1 j ACOMBE, J.,

(charging jury.') The method of fixing rales of duty, by varying them according to the uses to which articles imported may be put, is, no doubt, a very philosophical and logical way of classifying articles for duty under the tariff, but in practice it is at times extremely inconvenient; so much so that, unless the language of the tariff clearly indicates a plain intent on the part of congress that the article legislated upon should be classified according to its use, a court should be cautious in determining the rate of duty by the application of such test. Of course congress does repeatedly legislate in that way. Thus we have a provision for substances of all kinds used for manure, and one for animals imported for breeding purposes; and there are a number of other instances in the statute where imports are classified according to their use. But, unless the language of the statute plainly requires the test of use to applied to a particular article, the dutiable character of any particular importation is not to be determined by an inquiry into its ultimate use. In the case at bar we have a word, or a phrase rather, which, as used, leaves it somewhat uncertain as to whether congress did or did not mean to apply the test of use. The phrase is “garden seeds.” This may mean either seeds intended for use in the garden, or the class of articles known commercially as “garden seeds.” There is testimony in the case that there was a distinct trade meaning of the phrase “garden seeds,” known in trade and commerce of this country, and that congress adopted the phrase and put it in the tariff act. With regard, however, to the determination of the question whether or not we should interpret that phrase here as meaning the same thing as “seeds used or to be used for the garden,” there is nothing left for this court to decide. That question has been considered by the supreme court in the case of Ferry v. Livingston, 115 U. S. 542, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 175, and the rule there laid dowm is, of course, controlling here. There, this same section being before the court, and the question being whether certain seeds then under consideration were to be considered as “garden seeds” or as “agricultural seeds,” the court held, indeed, that it would not be sufficient, to show that they were not “garden seeds, ” to show that they were used both in the garden and in the field, but they went further, and indicated that if it appeared that the seeds in question (the particular cabbage seed then before the court) belonged to a variety not intended to be used to raise cabbages to be consumed by man, then they could not b6 regarded as “garden seeds.” Nowr the same construction is to be applied here; and if we find (and that is the question which goes to you for your determination) that the celery seeds imported here were of a variety of celery seeds which was not intended to raise celery to be consumed by man, then it is not within the provision for “garden seeds,” and your verdict must be for the plaintiff.

Verdict for plaintiff.