[¶ 1.] Kelly Clausen appeals a circuit court order affirming a decision by the South Dakota Department of Labor denying his claim for workers’ compensation benefits. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶ 2.] In January 1994, Clausen suffered the first in a series of work-related injuries to his back. Clausen was working for Northern Plains Recycling аnd he filed a claim with Northern’s insurer, Fireman’s Fund Insurance. Clausen received workers’ compensation benefits for his injury. In August 1998, while working for Able Construction Company, Clausen suffered a flare-up of his old injury. This time, he filed a workers’ compensation claim with Abie’s insurer, Milwaukee Insurance. Milwaukee paid fоr Clausen’s medical bills resulting from the injury and Clausen received no further benefits.
[¶ 3.] In May 2000, Clausen began work for Gil Haugan Construction Company. 1 Gil Haugan is insured by Regent Insurance Company. On August 8, 2000, Clausen experienced some discomfort in his back while shoveling concrete shards on a job site. He told co-еmployee Dave Beckman that he was experiencing a sore back. The next morning, Clausen did not show up for work. Clausen claimed that he attempted to call his supervisor, Jim Sammons, on Jim’s cell phone sometime before 8:00 a.m. that morning. He also claimed that, after telling Sammons of the pain in his back, he was cut-off before Sammons could respond. Clausen did not try to call Sammons back and Sammons had no recollection of receiving a phone call from Clausen on that occasion. 2
[¶ 4.] Clausen testified that, on August 10, he called Gil Haugan’s office and sрoke to Chris Biren, an engineer with no supervisory capacity. Clausen further testified that he told Biren that his back was still painful and that he would not be coming to work that day. Biren has no recollection of the conversation. Clausen also claimed that he called Gil Haugan on August 14 and spоke to the bookkeeper, Sue Peterson, telling her that he had a flare-up of his back condition. Peterson did not remember speaking to Clausen on that occasion. 3
[¶ 5.] On August 16, 2000, Clausen called Sammons, told him about his back *687 and that it was possible that it had been injured while he was on the job. Gil Hаu-gan contended that this was the first point at which it had any notice of the injury. Clausen then began to get treatment for his back and eventually brought a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against Gil Haugan and it’s insurer, Regent. 4
[¶ 6.] At the administrative hearing, Department found that Clausen failed to show thаt Gil Haugan or any of its representatives had notice of his injury within the three business-day period required under SDCL 62-7-10. Department also ruled that Clausen failed to demonstrate good cause for his failure to timely notify any Gil Haugan representative of this injury. The case was then appealed to the circuit court which affirmed Department’s decision. Clausen now appeals to this Court.
ISSUES
Whether Department erred when it ruled that Gil Haugan did not have actual notice of the work-related nature of the injury as required by SDCL 62-7-10.
Whether Department erred when’ it ruled that Clausen failed to establish good cause for his failure to notify Gil Haugan of his injury under SDCL 62-7-10(2).
We hold that there was no error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 7.] This Court reviews administrative decisions in the same manner as the circuit court.
Schuck v. John Morrell & Co.,
Department’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Sudrla v. Commercial Asphalt & Materials,465 N.W.2d 620 , 622 (S.D.1991). Mixed questions of law and fact are also fully reviewable. Fiegen v. North Star, Ltd.,467 N.W.2d 748 , 750 (S.D.1991).... Claimant still retains the burden of proving all facts essential to compensation. Day v. John Morrell & Co.,490 N.W.2d 720 , 724 (S.D.1992).
Miller v. Lake Area Hosp.,
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶ 8.] Clausen had the burden of proving that he providеd timely notice of his injury or that Gil Haugan had actual knowledge of the injury. SDCL 62-7-10;
Miller,
[¶ 9.] SDCL 62-7-10 requires a claimant to provide written notice of an injury within three business days of the injury. 5 According to the statute, that notice must be given directly to the employer or one of employer’s representatives. SDCL 62-7-10(1). It is undisputed that Clausen began to experience pain in his back sometime during the afternoon of August 8, 2000. However, he did not tell his supеrvisor, Jim Sammons, about the pain at that time.
[¶ 10.] Clausen claimed that he called Sammons’ cellular phone before 8:00 a.m. on the morning of August 9, but Sammons had no recollection of the call. Also, Sam-mons’ cellular phone records showed no incoming call before a quarter to еleven that morning. Clausen insisted that he also called Gil Haugan’s business office and spoke to Chris Biren, one of Gil Hau-gan’s engineers. However, Biren also had no recollection of any call made by Clau-sen. It was Gil Haugan’s contention that it did not have any notice of the injury or its work-related nature until an August 16 call from Clausen to Sammons. Department found Biren and Sammons’ testimony credible and we are in no position to substitute our judgment for that of Department.
[¶ 11.]
Miller, supra,
provides insight as to what is considered proper notice under SDCL 62-7-10.
Miller
involved a hospital worker who filed a workers’ compensation claim due to chronic elbow pain aggravated by work.
Miller,
[¶ 12.] In Miller, considerable reliance was placed on the following facts: claimant was told by her physical therapist some four years earlier that the рain in her elbow was work-related; claimant received prior treatment for her injuries; and, claimant testified five years earlier that she sought medical treatment for her elbow because it was aggravated at work. *689 This Court upheld Department’s findings and held that claimant should have given Lake Area notice in 1987 of the work-related nature of her injuries. Since she did not do so, this Court held that she was precluded from recovering any workers’ compensation benefits.
[¶ 18.] This Court also adopted a reasonable person test in Miller for determining when a person should know that their injury requires attention and that the notice time limit has commencеd running. The proper test is:
“The time period for notice or claim does not begin to run until the claimant, as a reasonable person, should recognize the nature, seriousness and probable compensable character of [the] injury or disease.” 2B Arthur Larson, Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 78.41(a) at 15-185-86 (1995). This reasonable person test does not place an affirmative duty on Claimant to continue seeking medical advice where further treatment is not warranted and there is no suggestion that the condition may have a work-related component.
Miller,
[¶ 14.] Clausen is а knowledgeable man. There is evidence in the record that he obtained his GED and spent some.time in the military. He also submitted workers’ compensation claims in the past. On two separate occasions, working for two separate entities, he submitted claims for injuries to his back. His wife testified under oath that when he got home on the night of August 8 he told her that he had hurt his back at work. Also, he testified under oath that he felt a sharp pain in his back while he was shoveling the cement shards that afternoon at work. As a reasonable person, he should have recognized the serious and compensable nature of his injury on August 8.
[¶ 15.] In its decision in
Vaughn, supra,
this Court had yet another chance to look at the notice issue.
Vaughn
involved a John Morrell worker with limited verbal and math skills who believed that her plantar fasciitis was caused by her standing at work for prolonged periods of time.
Vaughn,
[¶ 16.] As noted earlier and in contrast with the claimant in Vaughn, Clausen is a knowledgeable person with experience filing workers’ compensation claims. The record indicates that he suffered a work-related injury to his back in 1994 and again in 1998. His 1998 injury was referred to as a flare-up that resulted in no new disability or impairment.
[¶ 17.] At the hearing before Department, Clausen testified that he began to experience sharp pain in his back after he got home from work and showered. However, in his answers to interrogatories and in his earlier deposition he claimed that he felt a sharp pain while he was shoveling the concrete shards. His testimony, corroborated by testimony from his wife that he told her right after work on August 8 that he hurt his back at work, was binding on him.
*690
[¶ 18.] A claimant cannot “assert a better version of the facts than his prior testimony and ‘cannot now claim a material issue of fact which assumes a conclusion contrary to [his] own testimony.’ ”
Loewen,
[¶ 19.] “SDCL 62-7-10 requires the written notification to include allegations of ‘when, where, and how the injury occurred.’ ”
Vaughn,
[¶ 20.] Clausen argued that Gil Haugan was notified as to the work-related nature of his injury when he told a coworker that he had a sore back. 6 In the alternative, he argued that Gil Haugan should have had adequatе notification when he placed a call to his supervisor the next day or to the office on the day after. Department did not agree. 7
[¶ 21.] “It is true that ‘[workers’ compensation statutes are liberally construed in favor of injured employees.’ ”
Vaughn,
[¶ 22.] For the reasons stated above, we hоld that Department did not err in determining that Gil Haugan did not receive actual notice of the work-related injury until August 16, 2000. This was clearly outside the three business-day maximum dictated by SDCL 62-7-10. Furthermore, we hold that Department did not err in determining that Clausen failed to show evidence of good cause for failing to give notice within the three-day period.
[¶ 23.] Clausen had the burden of proving all facts essential to compensation. We agree with Department’s ruling that Clausen failed to prove these facts and the *691 evidence in the record supports Department’s findings.
[¶ 24.] Affirmed.
Notes
. The record indicаtes Clausen has worked for ten different employers in thirteen years.
. Sammons brought his cellular phone records to Department’s hearing on this issue. The records indicated that no call was received by Sammons’ cell phone before 10:45 a.m. that morning.
.Peterson did concede that she spoke to Clausen on August 23 and that she told Clau-sen to fill out a first report of injury form with regard to the incident of August 8, 2000.
. It is important to note that this case only involves Gil Haugan and Regent in regard to the notice issue to be discussed. The decision in this appeal has no effect on the rights or claims оf any other party to this lawsuit. We make no assumption as to the validity or invalidity as to the claims against any other party.
. SDCL 62-7-10 reads:
An employee who claims compensation for an injury shall immediately, or as soon thereafter as practical, notify the employer of the occurrence of the injury. Written notice of the injury shall be provided to the employer no later than three business days after its occurrence. The notice need not be in any particular form but must advise the employer of when, where, and how the injury occurred. Failure to give notice as required by the section prohibits a claim for compensation under this title unless the employee or the employee’s representative can show:
(1) The employer or the employer's representative had actual knowledge of the injury; or
(2) The employer was given written nоtice after the date of the injury and the employee had good cause for failing to give written notice within the three business-day period, which determination shall be liberally construed in favor of the employee.
. One of Clausen's claims was that Gil Hau-gan was on notice of the injury when hе told Dave Beckman that he was experiencing pain in his back on August 8, 2000. Department found that Beckman was not a foreman or representative of Gil Haugan and that Clau-sen had no good faith reason for believing that Beckman was a foreman or supervisor. The evidence shows this to be true and we agree with Department.
. Department did not find that either of these calls occurred. Both Biren and Sammons had no recollection of the calls and Sam-mons’ telephone records showed no incoming calls to his cell phone at the time Clausen claimed he called. Department found Clau-sen not to be credible.