Claude Bennett appeals from the order of the District Court 1 denying his motion, filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b), for relief from the summary judgment entered by the court in favor of Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc. (DPSU), on Bennett’s claims of racial discrimination in employment. We affirm.
Bennett, acting pro se, filed his employment discrimination complaint in April 2000. After discovery had closed, DPSU filed a motion for summary judgment on June 1, 2001, the last date for filing dispos-itive motions according to the District Court’s Case Mаnagement Order. Under local rule, Bennett’s response was to be filed on or before June 26, 2001. On June 21, 2001, counsel for DPSU sent Bennett a letter asking if hе would agree to a continuance of the trial date, then set for August 13, 2001. On July 1, Bennett telephoned opposing counsel and left a message that he would be meeting with his attorney on some matters within the week and would have some response to the request regarding the continuаnce after that. On July 5, Bennett telephoned DPSU’s counsel again, leaving word that he had consulted his attorney and would not agree to a сontinuance. DPSU filed a motion for continuance that same day, noting that its motion for summary judgment had been filed on June 20 and that Bennett had not responded.
On July 9, 2001, Bennett met with his present attorney, who told Bennett he should have responded to the motion for summary judgment. Not until July 16 did Bennett call the сhambers of the judge to ask for an extension of time to file a response; neither he nor the attorney filed a written motion requesting an еxtension. The District Court granted DPSU’s summary judgment motion on July 17, 2001, and dismissed Bennett’s case. Bennett formally retained counsel on August 3, 2001, who filed a motion on August 6 under Fеderal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) seeking relief from the judgment. The court denied the motion and Bennett appeals. We will reverse a district court’s ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion only if there was a clear abuse of the court’s broad discretion.
Roark v. City of Hazen, Ark.,
Bennett argues that relief from judgment is warranted here for “excusable neglect,” noting his status as a pro se litigant and the District Court’s failure to tell him the date on which his summary judgment response was duе.
See
Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). The District Court found that Bennett was represented by counsel through the proceedings on his charges of discrimination before the Equal Emрloyment Opportunity Commission, just after which his attorney died. Bennett then sought and received the advice of his former counsel’s partner, for which he paid on an hourly basis. Acting pro se, Bennett filed his complaint, a motion to amend, and an amended complaint; actively participated in discovery and mediation; and played a role in pretrial scheduling activities. Further, Bennett admitted, he consulted severаl attorneys while DPSU’s motion for summary judgment was pend
We first reject Bennett’s contention that the District Court was — or should hаve been — responsible for advising him, as a pro se litigant, of the date by which he was to respond to DPSU’s motion for summary judgment. Our Circuit does not havе a requirement that such affirmative notice be given.
See Beck v. Skon,
Bennett’s “pro se status did not entitle him to disregard the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” even without affirmative notice of the application of the rules to his cаse.
Carman v. Treat,
Bennett also argues that he is entitled to relief from the decision granting summary judgment because he “established ‘reason’ under Rule 60(b)(6).” Br. for Appellant at 1; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) (“[T]he court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment ... for ... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the oрeration of the judgment.”). According to Bennett, his failure to file a response resulted in a judgment rendered on an incomplete recоrd, that is, a judgment that was not on the merits. This, he contends, is a “reason” under Rule 60(b)(6) for relief from the judgment, and the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to grant it. Wе disagree.
The obligation to point out genuine issues of material fact that would preclude judgment as a matter of law for DPSU lay with Bennett, not with DPSU.
See
Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e) (“When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth sрecific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”). “Like any other civil litigant, [Bennett] was required to respond to [DPSU’s] motion[ ] with specific fаctual support for his claims to avoid summary judgment.”
Beck,
In addition, we note that the court’s order granting summary judgment to DPSU was nоt made to punish or to sanction Bennett for his failure to file a response to the motion. It was not a default judgment. It is clear from the court’s thorough opinion that it reached its summary judgment decision on the merits of Bennett’s claims as set forth in his complaint. Cf
. Canada v. Union Elec. Co.,
In sum, the District Cоurt’s decision to deny Bennett post-judgment relief was not “based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessmеnt of the evidence.”
Richards v. Aramark Servs., Inc.,
Notes
. The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.