Clаssie Scott appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Secretary’s denial of her application for disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 423. We reverse and remand.
Scott, born in 1945, has a high school education and training in clerk typing. She worked as an insрector on an assembly line. On October 20, 1986, Scott sustained an on-the-job injury to her back and leg. She was diagnosed with a bulging lumbosacral disc.
Scott changed job positions at her company, but reinjured her back in February 1988. After a three-month absence, she returned to her job and worked until February 17, 1989, the onset date of her alleged disability.
In June 1990 Scott filed for Title II disability insurancе benefits and Title XVI supplemental security income benefits. The applications were denied initially and on recоnsideration. A hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) who found that Scott had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, and thus was not disabled. Scott’s request for review by the Appeals Council was denied, and the ALJ’s determination became the Secretary’s final decision. In the district court, the magistrate judge recommended granting the Sеcretary’s motion for summary judgment, and over Scott’s objections, the district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s recommеndation. Scott appeals.
DISCUSSION
On review, we determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidenсe supporting the ALJ’s findings, and whether the ALJ followed the proper legal standards.
Selders v. Sullivan,
The ALJ found that Scott could not perform past relevant work, but had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work with certain limitations. 1 Specifically, the ALJ found that Scott must have the option to sit or stand, as needed; cannot do repetitive twisting, bending, stоoping, or any kneeling or crawling; and must use good back mechanics and be able to use a TENS unit or roll pillow as needed. To provide adjudicative guidance when a claimant’s limitations do not meet a defined exertional capacity, the Secretary issued a “Program Policy Statement.” In SSR 83-12, the Secretary stated:
In some disability claims, the medical facts lead to an assessment of [residual functional capacity] which is compatible with the performance оf either sedentary or light work except that the person must alternate periods of sitting and standing. ... Such an individual is not functionally capable of doing either the prolonged sitting contemplated in the definition of sedentary work ... or the prolonged standing or walking contemplated for most light work.
Because Scott must alternate between sitting and standing as needed, Scott’s exertional capabilities do not fit within the definition of sedentary work.
See Wages v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
We have held that the Secretary may rely on the medical-vocational guidelines to establish that work exists for a claimant only if the guidelines’ “evidentiary underpinnings coincide exactly with the evidence of disability aрpearing on the record.”
Lawler v. Heckler,
[M]ost jobs have ongoing work processes which demаnd that a worker be in a certain place or posture for at least a certain length of time to accomplish a certain task. Unskilled types of jobs are particularly structured so that a person cannot ordinarily sit or stand аt will. In eases of unusual limitation of ability to sit or stand, a [vocational expert] should be consulted to clarify the implicаtions for the occupational base.
Thus, the ALJ erred in applying the guidelines in this case.
See Gallant v. Heckler,
The ALJ misapplied the guidelines in another respect. Although the ALJ rejected Scott’s allegation of disabling pain,
2
he acknowledged that Scott’s complaint has a basis in the record and that Scott might have slight, occasional breaks in concentration or attention due to pain. Pain may constitute a nonexertional factor that can limit the range оf jobs a claimant can perform.
Carter v. Heckler,
The ALJ did correctly avail himself of the testimony of a vocational expert. We cannot conclude, howevеr, that the ALJ properly considered the vocational expert’s testimony given only the ALJ’s vague and confusing referenсe to that testimony in his findings.
3
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proper consideration of the vocational еxpert’s testimony.
See SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Notes
. In evaluating a disability claim, the Secretary must determine sequentially whether: (1) claimant is not presently working; (2) claimant’s ability to work is significantly limited by a physical or mental impairment; (3) claimant's impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in the appendix of the regulations; (4) impairment prevents claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) claimant сannot presently perform relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404-. 1520(b) — (f);
Selders,
.
The ALJ’s finding that Scott's pain was not debilitating is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ rejected Scott’s subjective complaints of constant pain, and we defer to that credibility determination.
See Wren v. Sullivan,
. The ALJ discusses the vocational expert’s testimony, but with respect to past relevant work. Other than a passing reference, the ALJ does not discuss the vocational expert's testimony when determining whether Scott has residual functional capacity for sedentary work.