Clаssic Restorations, Inc., the plaintiff below, specializes in the restoration of vintage homes. Dixie Bean, the defendant, purchased a home in Inman Park with the intent of restoring it. On November 29, 1977, following a fire at her residence, Mr. Floyd — the sole stockholder in Classic Restorations, arrived in the same car as the insurance adjuster — Mr. Morrison. Flоyd provided her with an estimate of repair which was later placed in contract form on December 7, 1977.
Defendant testified that “Mr. Morrison guaranteed [Floyd’s] work, recommended him, informed me that if I used anybody else, I wouldn’t get a penny over that.” Mr. Morrison also told her “he would guarantee the work would be done the way I wanted it, to restоre the house back to the way it was prior to the fire; that if Mr. Floyd did not perform the work and finish it, he would not be paid a penny until the work was done and done to my satisfaction.” Mr. Floyd told her “ [o]n November 29th, in that same conversation, he said 30 days, he could have it done in 30 days, have me back in the house by Christmas.”
In April of 1978 Bean ordered Classic Rеstorations off the property. She was dissatisfied with the rate of progress of the work and the quality of the work that had been done. Classic Restorations brought this action for $6,914 on open account and the defendant Bean counterclaimed — alleging damages of $7,000. The jury returned a verdict of $5,200 for the defendant. The plaintiff brings this appeal. Held:
1. Plaintiff has objected to various questions asked of several witnesses and to the refusal of the trial court to permit certain questions of other witnesses. The scope of examination and cross-examination is not unlimited, but the scope of permissible examination lies within the sound discretion of the court
(Clark v. Board of Dental Examiners,
One question involved a hypothetical situation based on facts not in evidence, i.e. “if... you ran ten people through to loojr at [“a job”], you could possibly have ten different opinions about what was satisfactory or not?” No error appears here in the court’s refusal to permit the question to be answered.
Wells v. Alderman,
One objection involved an alleged inconsistent statement of the witness. Credibility of a witness is a matter for the jury
(Wilson v. Professional Ins. Corp.,
Plaintiff objected to defendant answering the question: “You describe what you observed about the way they repaired your bookcase.” Quality of workmanship was one of the primary issues. This question was permissible of a nonexpert witness to establish the foundation for her opinion on the quality of workmanship of the plaintiff. Green, Georgia Law of Evidence 263, § 110; Code Ann. § 38-1708 (Code § 38-1708).
It is alleged that the trial court erred in failing to require the defendant to answer the question: “Did you curse a lot of people?” Plaintiff had stated оn direct examination that it was “very possible” that she cursed becausé she “was very excited” and “may have been more graphic in person.” We find no reason for reversal as it was tacitly admitted that defendant used profane language. Without detailing defendant’s specific complaints, she testified that the contract was to be completed in 30 days and that statement was made in November and the following April — after boarding out her dog and cats, and living in a motel until the insurance company terminated her living expenses, and witnessing the lack of progress in the repair of her home and the quality of the repairs made — she testified: “the house is undone ... There is more work to be redone. Moldings have been taken away and tossed away, apparently ... It will cost me more to take them out and have them duplicated. In my opinion, Mr. Floyd did more damage to the house than the fire did.” The defendant and her expert testified as to paint “flaking off the ceiling,” 9 boards — running the length of the room, of tongue and groove ceiling had been “cut out” — “Cut is readily apparent. There was no attempt at caulking or puttying that... paint not adhering”; the cabinets between the living room and dining room were not sanded or well fitted, “it was plain raw lumber, not stained, varnished or painted . . .”, the bookcase between the living room and dining room — left door not hung properly, had rough pine shelving which would not permit the door to close, it was partially painted, “unfinished wood showing through... they haven’t been sanded,” the
Mr. Floyd testified that “I probably did tell her it would take about 30 days.” He admitted that the tongue and groove ceiling was not repaired properly. His assessment of the painting job was that “I didn’t think paint would be peeling off the walls, but it wouldn’t be a jam-up job, either . . . No, I wouldn’t like it in my house.” The standard for repair of the bookcase was to “ [u]se finished lumber... it doesn’t look good inside the cabinet.” He also admitted that he “didn’t get as good a job [on the parquet type floor] as we wanted to.” He commented on the paint that “because of the failure of the surface, the job did not go back like it was before. I would not have aсcepted that particular standard of work.” Given Mrs. Bean’s admitted predilection for invectives, we understand Mr. Floyd’s observation that “Mrs. Bean is a very profane woman ...”
Plaintiff cites the failure of the court to permit him to question Mrs. Bean as to “when that lien was filed” that she testified Mr. Floyd had placed on her house. Counsel stated that he wanted to know when she found out about it. Mrs. Bean had testified that she attempted to get a loan to complete the repairs on her house but Banks “won’t talk to you at all in the city, when there is a lien [on your house] about loaning money.” Although this was a proper matter for cross-examination we find no prejudicial error in the curtаilment.
In summary, there is no merit to enumerations of error 1 through 7.
2. The plaintiff contends the trial court erred in denying admission to its exhibit No. 5. Plaintiff describes it as “an invoice submitted to Mrs. Bean after we were ordered off the job ...” Mrs. Bean admitted that she received it. Defendant objected to its admission as “self-serving.” The court refused to admit the exhibit beсause of its reference to “Code” work, and what was required by the Code was not introduced. Plaintiff’s brief does not address this basis for denying admissibility. The brief merely restates the enumeration of error. This is nothing more than plaintiff’s contentions, unsupported by citation of authority or argument — thus under Rule 15 (c) (2) of this Court this enumeration is abandoned.
O’Neal v.
3. Objection is mаde to admission of defendant’s exhibits 3, 6, 7, 8, 15, 17, and 18. At trial plaintiff stated he had no objection to exhibit 15. Its admissibility may not now be contested at the appellate level. See
Velkey v. Grimes,
Exhibits 6, 7, and 8 show how plaintiff stored defendant’s property during the repair work and the condition the house was in on plaintiff’s departure. These photographs have littlе relevance to any issue except the general manner in which plaintiff executed the contract. In any event the plaintiff must show harm as well as error and prejudice has not been exhibited.
Continental Nut Co. v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co.,
4. It is alleged there was not “sufficient legal grounds” for admission of defendant’s exhibits 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37. Defendant testified, without objection, that D-31 was a recеipt for $450 it cost to have the floors redone in her house, D-32 was a repair bill for “packing” for the bath tub because the plaintiff had not properly cared for it; that D-33 was a bill she paid for repair of the toilet; that D-34 was a bill she had to pay to put a lock on the door which plaintiff had broken; D-35 was a receipt for reрairs to the washer and dryer which had been broken by the plaintiff when he moved them; D-36 was for a plumbing bill of March 7; and D-37 was a piece of oak she purchased for the plaintiff to use in repairs on the floor of her house.
Materiality of the piece of oak wood to prove a disputed fact is non-existent. Defendant has not filed a brief to assist us and we are unaware of any basis for such offer. However, we discern no harm or prejudice to plaintiff in showing defendant purchased a piece of oak wood which was to be used in repair of her house — but evidently was not.
Plaintiff cites
Printup v. Mitchell,
Secondly, the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony
A court does not err “in admitting testimony that [a party] had paid [сertain bills] ... since on the question of such payment the act itself rather than the manner of payment was the essential fact, and on that question either oral testimony or writing to show payment, such as a receipt or check, would be admissible.”
Hicks v. Hicks,
5. The court refused to charge, at the request of the plaintiff, that “the reasonable value of the services rendered, if not fixed by contract, would be of or the amount that is generally сharged by building contractors for the same or like services in the same community and under the same or similar circumstances or exist in the case now on trial,” and “ordinarily, when one renders services or transfers property to another which the latter accepts, a promise is implied to pay the reasonable value thereof.”
a. The plaintiff concedes that both of these instructions apply to “implied” contracts. However, plaintiff introduced evidence of an “express” contract. Plaintiff’s exhibit 1 was titled, “Proposal/Contract” and identified the parties as “Dixie Bean” and “Restorations, Inc.” (later changed to Classic Restorations) and called for the contractor “to furnish all material and labor necessary to install, construct and place the improvements described herein
“To constitute a valid contract, there must be parties able to contract, a consideration moving to the contract, the assent of the parties to the terms of the contract, and a subject-matter upon which it can operate.” Code Ann. § 20-107 (Code § 20-107). Plaintiff’s exhibit 1 identified the parties, the general work to be performed, the manner of performance, and the place where the work was tо be performed. Plaintiff’s exhibit 2, dated December 6,1977, listed each specific item of work to be performed — room by room, and stated the specific amount to be charged for each line item. The offer of Classic Restorations was accepted by Dixie Bean by her signing the document, and by Classic Restorations by beginning perfоrmance of the contracted work. There was a stated subject matter and a specific consideration. We find a simple contract was entered into by the parties. Such contracts may be express or implied. See generally 6 EGL 65, Contracts, § 3. “An express contract is one where the intention of the parties and the terms of the agreement are declared or expressed by the parties, in writing or orally, at the time it is entered into.”
Thomas v. Lomax,
b. Another valid reason lies for lack of error in the refusal of the trial court to charge this instruction. It failed to set forth the proper method for computation of damages in the breach of a construction contract by the contractor. See
Kendrick v. White,
6. The trial court, under the facts of this case, did not err in charging the jury if they found that Classic Restorations breached their contract with Mrs. Bean, the proper measure of damages “would be the difference in the fair market value of her home as remodeled by Classic Restorations and the fair market value of Mrs. Bean’s home as it ought to have been remodeled by Classic Restorations under the contract between the parties.” This is an acceptable method of computing damages where an express contract is breached by a contractor.
Kendrick v. White,
We ask that members of the bar note the distinсtion between the measure of damages where the jury finds an express contract has been breached by the building contractor, as stated above, and where the contract has been breached by the owner — as stated in
Crankshaw v. Stanley Homes,
7. We have examined the remaining enumerations of error and find them to be without merit.
Judgment affirmed.