delivered the opinion of the Court:
The appellants contend the decree should be reversed, and the bill dismissed; upon various propositions of law and fact.
1st. It is insisted: “ The complainant has laid no ground in bit." bill for equitable relief. Neither the agreement itself, as alleged in the bill, nor any of the collateral circumstances, being of a nature to call for a specific performance in equity.”
The doctrine of specific performance has reference, ordinarily, to executory agreements for the conveyance of lands, and 'is rarely applied to contracts affecting personal property. 2 Story’s Eq. 26, 36. Nor is relief sought by the complainant on this head of jurisdiction. To encumber the case made by the pleadings with doctrines foreign to the subject matter litigated, would tend to confo.und principles in their nature dissimilar and separate. . The relief prayed, is the delivery to the' complainant of instrumentsi to which he is entitled. 2 Story’s Eq. 12. Not the execution'of an executory contract, fur *188 ther than to 'decree the amount he hás been compelled to pay to Clagétt.and Washington; which is an incident to the exercise of jurisdiction that coerces the delivery of the instruments'.
So material a part of the transaction being clearly within the jurisdiction of the Court, it will of course end'the cause; without sending the parties to law as to part, having granted relief for part.
2d. It' is assumed: “ But whatever the terms, or the naturé of the composition, and however fit-it may be, m its own nature, for specific performance iii equity, the whole of the complainant’s equity is repelled-by a countervailing equity in defendants; from his promise. as one of their concomitant inducements to the composition to pay the full amount of the debt, when able to do so; and from the fact, both averred arid proved, that he was able to pay the whole debt. Did the complainant, White, promise to pay the full amount of the. debt when he was able to-do so; and, by this means, .nduce the respondents to make a composition then to receive seventy cents in the dollar, as partial payment? .■ If this was the. cohtract, and the . complairiant was able to pay the full amount at the time, he was immediately bound for the thirty cents in the dollar in addition;'and the respondents are entitled either to have the bill dismissed, so that .they may enforce the contract at law, for the balance due; or they must have administered to them iri equity the same relief, by a decree for the thirty per cent.;, founded ón the familiar rule, that he .who seeks equity, must, as a condition, do equity to the respondents, before the relief can be granted. We must, therefore, inquire what the contract was, .The bill, in substance, alleges that- the aggregate amount secured by the riotes prayed to be surrendered,.'was seven ■ thousand' one hundred and forty-one dollars and forty-two cents; that the notes were riot due when the composition was made; that the parties entered into an agreement to anticipate the period of credit on them, by which White undertook to deliver to Clarke and Briscoe, and they agreed to receive of White, goods and merchandise, in full payment of the sum due, at the rate of seventy cents, in the dollar, estimating the goods then in White’s store, at.the prices marked on them as cost prices'; that- the goods were delivered in .discharge of the debt; and the notes, as evidences of it, were to be' surrendered to White, ón the delivery of. the goods.
To-this specific allegation, it is answered: “These defendants denjt that they did make the agreement with complainant respecting the compromise of their claim against the complainant; and the *189 cancelling pf said notes in the* terms, and upon the ccmditions set} forth in-said bill: but they admit and aver, that about the tjme mentioned in said bill, in consequence of hearing the complainant had failed in business, and was compromising with his creditors, a conversation and arrangement did take place between the defendant, Clarke, and the complainant; in which ,-said defendant asked him upon what terms, the complainant would settle, the whole -claim of the defendants, not merely on what terms he would settle the amount of said notes; upon which complainant offered."to settle if'at sixty cents in the dollar, and pay in goods. Said defendant, Clarke, answered that he understood complainant had compromised with other of his creditors at seventy cents in the dollar, and hoped complainant would not think of putting off the defend ants-with less; and complainant at length agreed to pay defendants,;in -goods, the -whole amount of their claim, at the rate of seventy cents in. the dollar, and pay the balance, viz. thirty per cent, when .he was able: but insisted that they should táke the goods in masses, without selection, as they lay upon the shelves; which was finally- agreed to by defendant, Clarke: nor was it till after the arrangement had been so agreed on. between themselves, that any thing was said between them about the defendants’ getting up and cancelling the complainant’s notes: but afterwards, they admit a conversation on that subject did ensue between defendant, Clarke, and the complainant, in which it wa's understood and arranged between them, that upon the settlemént of the defendants’ whole claim, by paying the same in goods'at.the raté of seventy cents in the dollar; the1 defendants should get in and cancel said notes; not upon the settlement in that mode of the amount of the notes merely; such was not the understanding of the parties, at least of either of these deféndants: but the true amount of. their just claim , against the complainant; the amount understood by defendant, Clarke, at the time, was not the aggregate amount- of the notes merely, but of the original invoice, in liquidation of the amount of which, with a deduction of five per cent., the notes had -been given; and inasmuch, as that deduction had been allowed upon the faith ánd confidence alone of the complainant’s said pledge and assuranoe to pay the said notes, punctually, as aforesaid; ■ and as he had totally failed to comply with said pledge’ and assurance, these defendants considered that, in equity, indeed, in strict justice, they' were entitled to the amount of the invoice, without such deduction?”
Whether the thirty per cent., in addition, is due to the appellants' *190 by the contract, depends on the evidence: the: answer admits the agreement, of composition to be truly set out in the bill, so far as it is set forth; but insists, that so much of it as stipulated for the full payment of the notes when the complainant was able, is omitted. The rule in such cáse is: “ If the answer of the defendant admits a fact, but insists on.matter by way of avoidance, the complainant need not prove: the fact admitted, but the defendant must prove the matter in avoidance.” Dyer,. 108. The defendants adduced no evidence, tending in the slightest degree to establish the statement in the answer. The complainant, however, proceeded to prove -the contract by, different witnesses, to.be such (and no other,) as the bill, alleges it to have' been. We give. extracts from the depositions of .two of his witnesses. . , '
“ Do you or do yoú not remember-a compromise made between the complainant' and the defendants, Clarke and Briscoe,'relative to the payment of a certain debt due from the said complainant to the said defendants? ■ If yea, state the subject of the said compromise, and the terms of it.”
“To the second. Ido. The claim was for the original purchase made of Clarke and Briscoe, by complainant, in 1832; and the agreement was .to pay the notes given for that purchase, by giving them goods at seventy cents in the dollar, at the prices which they .were marked as having cosj;. Mr. Clarke made the-agreement. He was to commence at any part of the store he chose, and take the goods as. they came, till his claim Was satisfied. Some of the notes had beén passed away by Clarke and-Briscoe. These they were to take up, and return with'the other notes, to Mr. White, as soon after the goods were d elivered as he. could. get them. There were no engager ments, so far. as I know, to pay the balance of thirty per cent, at any time. . I w^s present when the bargain was made. They took the goods upon those terms, to the full amount of their claim, except one dollar and forty-one cents.”
“ To' the second. I recollect Mr. Clarke’s coming into Mr. White’s store, and* wishing to know in what way they would settle. The result.of their conversation was, that Mr, White should give him seventy cents in the dollar, in goods, for the amount of his claim. The claim was for the balance due to Clarke and Briscoe, for the purchase of a stock of goods made of them by Mr. White, in 1832. The terms of the compromise were, that Mr. Clarke should commence at any part of the store where he chose, and go on taking *191 all the goods as they came, till he got the full amount of his claim; at seventy cents in the dollar, at the price which the goods* were marked to have cost. Mr. Clarke was to deliver up to Mr. White the notes which remained unpaid for the purchase in 1832.”
The assumption, therefore, that the complainant’s equity is repelled by the countervailing equity of the defendants, because.of the promise to pay the full amount of the debt when complainant was able; cannot be sustained.
Tt is, third and fourth, assumed, that A composition of. a failing trader with, his creditor, being strictissimi juris, must be fulfilled by the debtor to the letter; and any failure in complying with its terms, in a minute particular on his part, however far he may go m part performance, vitiates and annuls the whole -eemposition.
“ According to the complainant’s own showing, he has failed to fulfil the composition in terminis':; and he has, to this day, something, further to do in order to fulfil it; yet he has not even been decreed to fulfil it.”
It is generally true, in cases of composition, that the debtor who agrees to pay á less sum in-discharge of a contract, must pay punctually; for, until performance, the creditor is not bound. The reason, is obvious; the creditor has the sole right of modifying the first contract, and of prescribing the conditions of its discharge; if’the agreement for composition stipulates for partial payment, and the debtor fails to pay, the condition to take part is broken, the second contract forfeited, and no bar to the original cause of action. 16 Ves. 374.
It will be necessary to examine whether any question is raised to which the principle can be applied. We have seen there is no evi dence sustaining the claim for thirty per cent, on the seven thousand one hundred and forty-one dollars forty-two cents, adjusted by the composition; but it is also insisted by the answer; that if White failed toy pay punctually for the goods"purchased from C. and B. in 1832, he then contracted, to pay five per cent, in addition, on the invoice in liquidation of which the notes were given.
! The averment is, independent of any allegation in the' bill, very improbable in itself, and not sustained by the slightest proof. We take it, therefore, no such agreement was made.
At the time the goods were delivered, through inadvertence, one dollar forty-one cents remained due to Clarke and Briscoe. When White discovered it, he offered to pay the amount, which the respon *192 dents refused to receive. The fact is set forth in the bill, /b noticed in the answer. If, however, an issue had been taken upon it, we think the mistake of a character too trivial to déserve notice: the defendants disregarded it when- the goods,were in a course of delivery, and admitted the contract of. composition, to thé amount of seventy cents in the dollar, to be discharged: and .so this Court holds.
White’s compliance will, therefore, bear the test of all the legal strictness, supposed in argument to apply,in cases of performing contracts of conxposition.
. Fifth and sixth, it is insisted:
<c There is no evidence in. the cause competent and sufficient to overrule so much of the. answer .as denies the agreement for composition, alleged in the bill; and avers a materially different agreement.”.
“Taking the terms of the. composition to be such as the answer avers and ¿uts in the place of wna it denies, there appears a still more important, palpable, and fatal breach of its terms on the part of complainant.”
We reply, that the. evidence is competent, and amply sufficient to overrule the parts of the answer responsive to the bill; and that the terms of the composition were not such as the _ansWer avers.
Seventh, it is insisted:
“ The actual frauds which the- answer charges, in the elaboration of the scheme Of artificial and feigned failure and insolvency, for defrauding the creditors of their dues, and overreaching them with unfair compositions, under deceitful pretexts, are fully made out in ptoof; and are sufficient, and more than sufficient; to set aside the complainant’s composition with the defendants, and, every composition with his other creditors.”
•This being the gr ound upon which most reliance was placed to make out the defence, it is due to the. argument that we examine the point in the form it has been presented for the appellants; and consequently, that some attention be bestowed on the evidence tending to prove fraudulent conduct in the appellee, without nicely discriminating,how far it applies to the cause made by the .pleadings.. It is contended, that the correspondence, the attempts at composition with the .Baltimore merchants, and the agreements with them and others, furnish evidence of a fraudulent intent in the appellee to alarm and oyerreaeh- his creditors generally, thereby to draw them into com *193 positions at low rates, by deceitful pretexts: which position, it is assumed, is fully made out in proof: and- that the appellants were victims to- the common fraud and subterfuge is a fair inference; at all events, if actual fraud does not appear, that it is evident the complainant did not come into Court with an unaffected conscience; in which case he cannot call upon the active power of the Court for relief; that,'in the phrase of early times, the complainant must come.' into equity with clean hands.
If any deception was practised whereby the appellants were drawn, into a losing bargain, and a sacrifice of thirty per cent, of their just demand; the> Court could not, consistently with the principle referred to, afford its active aid to the complainant. But,, if it be. assumed that a court of equity can refuse relief because the complainant; in settling with other creditors, imposed op them, and hence his conscience's affected, the assumption must be rejected as unsound. Such extraneous dealings are not within the issue, and do ,not belong to the eause, further than they can be connected with the transaction as evidence of a connected system of fraud, to produce alarm and action on the part of these particular creditors.
, To press further the principle, that a complainant must come into a court of equity, when he asks its aid, with a clear conscience; would be assuming ah unlimited arid undefined discretion to dismiss the bill, hot for want of equity in the allegations and corresponding proof, but because of the bad conduct in life and character of the complainant.
The ti i rule is: “ If the person, agáinst whom, fraud is alleged, should be proved to have been guilty of it in any number, of instances; still, if the particular act sought to be avoided, be not shown to be tainted with fraud, it. cannot be affected with the other frauds; unless-in some way or other it be connected With or form a \riart of them.7'' Conard v. Nicoll,
Testing the force and effect of the-evidence, with this explanation of the rule, in virtue of which it is sought to give it effect; ánd what does it establish? For years before the fall of 1833, when the transactions we are investigating took place, the complainant, White, had been a retail dry goods? merchant in Washington city, of reputed-opulence, and decidedly’good credit. In 1833, the city business was depressed, and the sales reduced, compared with- former years; the retailers generally bought- light stocks for the fall trade, predicting pressure in the money market, and difficult times. White, on the contrary, purchased much larger than usual, asserting it as his opinion, *194 that trade would assume its usual vigour, and that the ordinary quantity of goods would be needed during the then approaching long session of congress: his fall purchases amounted to near thirty-four thousand dollars, and added to those of the spring made forty-seven thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven dollars. In the previous year (1832) he had purchased thirty-three thousand eight hundred and ninety-two dollars’ worth of goods for his stores; having one in Georgetown also. It is insisted that these large purchases were made with-a prospective view to a failure, and compositions at thirty and fifty per cent, discount; the complainant at the same time being perfectly solvent in fact. That purchasing largely was an elaborated scheme, with a view to future and feigned insolvency, designed, on the part of White, to overreach his-creditors, it is difficult to believe. ■His exertions to maintain his credit after his first notes were dishonoured, and to quiet the Baltimore creditors, whose suspicions had been awakened from his heavy purchases in September, could not well have been more earnest, active or ingenious; and this, up to the time when the Baltimore creditors, by a bill of. injunction, restrained complainant from proceeding in his business; and which prostrated his credit and character to such a degree as to render á failure inevi-: table had the means'of payment been ample as they are asserted to have been.'
It is probable that the appellant Was insolvent, and knew the fact to be so. when he made the fall purchases of 1833; and that he incurred the dangerous risk of so large an overtrading in the hope that chance and a desperate -effort might save him: that if he must fail, it would not be material for what amount he failed, if he had the goods oh hand, or their proceeds, should they be solchwhen the event, happened. This, certainly was bad faith, if true, in reference to the creditors from whom the stock of goods, for 1833, had been purchased; but how it could affect the respondents, who had the previous year trusted White, on long credits, cannot be perceived;- they réceived payment out of the goods thus obtained to the amount of seventy per cent.; and in this aspect of the. alleged fraud, by complainant on the wholesale dealers, the appellants súrely have no- just grounds to complain.
But the merits of the defence, it is earnestly urged, rest on the question whether the-appellee was solvent and able to pay his whole débts at the date of the composition and contract to take a part. On this head the evidence is tolerably satisfactory: an account of White’s *195 means and-liabilities was demanded of him by the Baltimore creditors ■as early as the 3d of December, 1833, which was furnished, and is no doubt substantially correct; at'least so the creditors treated it, and nothing is found in the record to disprove the statement. That he owed the debts there set forth is certain; and that he had the means to meet them' is very improbable, as the creditors instituted and exercised a scrutiny not likely to overlook secreted property: and money, there can be no doubt, there was none, for the complainant, in good faith, seems to have discharged many of his bank debts, with others, to the extent of all the cash he could command, amounting to twelve thousand dollars, during the months of October and Novémber, 1833.
This brings us to the debts and méans of payment. On the 3d of December, the complainant .owed in Baltimore fifteen thousand one hundred and fifty-five dollars; in Philadelphia fourteen thousand four hundred and sixteen; in New York ten thousand seven hundred and sixty-four; and in Washington city nine thousand two hundred and fifty-one; in all forty-nine ..thousand five hundred .and eighty-six ..dollars.
The means of payment were the stocks of goods in Washington and. Georgetown, twenty-six thousand five hundred dollars; good debts, two thousand four hundred and forty-six; doubtful debts, two thousand five hundred and thirty-three: the aggregate of active means thirty-one' thousand four hundred and forty-nine dollars.
Real estate four thousand dollars; household furniture one thousand seven hundred and fifty; these items added to the goods and debts, make thirty-seven thousand two hundred and twenty-nine dollars’ worth of property.
Then there .were exhibited bad debts, due .to the complainant, amount, ten thousand one hundred and sixty-five'dollars. On theáe desperate debts no business man could place any reliance; and they are, therefore, disregarded by the Court when estimating the availa-1 ble property of the appellee: and the same might, with something of safety, be assumed of the item consisting of household goods;- the idea that the wealthy wholesale dealer will strip the 'family of his unfortunate retail customer, of their beds, furniture, and utensils, has no place in the mercantile transactions of this country. Retaining this item, however, and the complainant had twen-ty-fiye per cent, less property than the amount of the demands against him; and of course could not have paid more than seventy-five per cent. The fourth of *196 forty-nine' thousand five hundred and eighty-six dolíais, (the aggregate of the debts,) is twelve thousand three hundred and ninety-six; the property in hand {thirty-seven thousand two hundred and twenty-nine dollars) deducted from the indebt'm'ent, shows an excess of debts over means of twelve thousand three hundred'and fifty-seven dollars.
This state of facts had been exposed to the'creditors of the appellee, on the 3d of December; and Glarke and Briscoe ¿pplied fob an adjustment^ on the 29th of the month: of course, they were familiar with it;,they made no inquiry for- information, ahd no demand for more than seventy- per cent.-.
The notes of appellants were not-due, and theywére obviously and very justly impressed with the belief, that the debt would be lost if White did not compound it; he was urged by-them tó deliver goods to cover seventy per cent.; this he at first' declined, and offered sixty; but, on being remised that .others hád received payment át the rate of-seventy per cents, he, with obvious reluctance, assented.
But more than seventy per cent, was received by Clarke & Briscoe,, .because their notes werenot then due: They pressed tire debtor tó the highest rate, of composition he was'able to pay, consistently with his duty-to the other creditors; and, considering the nature of his means, and that he ■ discharged this, demand with the most available means, it was probable -that equal justice could, not he done to others.
These prominent! and controlling facts repel the idea .of a feigned insolvency; or that that the appéllants were overreached by deceitful devices.
The evidence tending to prove unfair, conduct on the part of the'appellee, in reference'to his creditors in Baltimore, &c. had little influence on the appellants, as we apprehend;, how far it extended, it is difficult to ascertain. Be this however, as- it may, they having received their full proportion of the appellee’s property, have no. right to resist the prayer for relief, even- had the composition been .made in subservience to an unfair but extraneous influence, growing' out of the transactions, with-the other'creditors, who were, separately seeking payment. ,In equity, as at.law, fraud and injury must concur to. furnish ground for judicial action; a mere fraudulent intent, unaccompanied'by any injurious act, is not the subject of judicial cognizance. Truly, there are strong grounds of suspicion; but fraud «tight not to he conceived; it must be proved, and expressly found. Conard v. Nicoll,
*197 Again, it is Contended that the appellants did not receive their due proportion, of the means of payment at the appellee’s command, when the composition was made; because he held a lot with valuable improvements thereon, in Washington city, in the name of his brother, by a conveyance purporting to be in trust for appellee’s three infant children; which deed, it is insisted, is pretence, covinous and void, both in law-.and fact, in so far as it affects the appellants apd other creditors: that being thus void, it furnishes almost conclusive evidence of an intended fictitious failure, at the-time the goods were purchased from the appellants, in 1832, and for which the notes sought to be injoined were given.
-Much stress has beendaid upon this transaction, as somewhat of an independent ground -of defence in the pleadings, and also in the arguments presented for the appellants; we therefore deem it a duty to bestow upon this particular question, a corresponding degree of attention.
■ The facts it rests upon, appear by the trust deed, and the deposition of the grantor,-John A. Smith.
The lot was formerly the property of Daniel Brent, and was sold early in 1829, as parfiof his property, by John A. Smith, appointed trustee of Brent’s estate, under an insolvent act; at which sale, William G. W. White became the purchaser, at the price of one thousand five hundred and thirty-two dollars and thirty-four cents, on a credit of one, two and three years; the lot being sold at auction-for a full price, and the sale notes paid at maturity, no doubt' exists of the appellee’s former equity therein. He took possession immediately after the purchase in 1829, and commenced improving by erecting buildings thereon; the lot having been vacant at the date of the purchase.
On the 14th of January, 1832, John'A. Smith, at the request of William G. W. White, conveyed the premises to James L. White, in trust for. the three infant children of William G. W. White, in.foe. Between the date of -the purchase in 1829, and that of the conveyance iá January, 1832, William G. W. White made improvements on ■ the premises; to -the value of about three thousand dollars; and added 'to them .others, costing twelve or fifteen hundred -dollars, after the date of the deed, and before his failure in December, 1833.- The property, at this date, was wmrth about six thousand dollars.
Another attendant circumstance is strongly relied on, to show the fraudulent intent of the appellee. The deed of the 14th of Jánuaryr *198 1832, was not delivered to the clerk tp be recorded; until the 13th day of July thereafter, and within one day of the expiration of the time prescribed for such delivery., by the statute of Maryland, which is six months; and-the notes sought to be surrendered, are 'dated the 2d of-July, 1832.
In reference to this conveyance it' may be remarked, that by the common law, it was valid without registration; and' where register acts require deeds to be recorded, they are valid until the time prescribed by the statute has expired; and if recorded within the time, are as effectual from the date of execution, as if nó register act existed. The deed from Smith to James L. White is, therefore, unimpeachable, for the- reason -that it was delivered for registration on the last day of the six months; nor is fraud.,predicable of the mere circumstance of non-registry, as against William G-. W White, who was not the grantee, nor entitled to the possession of the deed. How far fraud in fact might be inferred from not -putting the deed of record, taken in connection with other circumstances, is a question involving the rights of thirdvpersons not before the Court; and which we do not take into consideration, further than to ascertain whether the appellee used the deed as a means of deception in thé transaction before us. If White represented the property as not belonging to him, and settled with his creditors- on this basis, when it did belong to him; the.question then is, can the appellants reverse the decree and dismiss the bill, and be let in at law upon'the property; and this presents another aspect of the effect of the conveyance: as a legal title, it is not open to imputation; William G-. W. White never had any estate in the premises recognised at law, or subject to execution; the title passed directly from Smith to James L. White: .consequently, if the deed were pronounced void, the title would be adjudged in Smith: it is one of those conveyances, where there was clearly a bona fide grantor, arid which is not within the statutes against fraudulent conveyances; as was holden in M‘Niel v. Brooks, in 1 Yerger’s T. Rep. 73; which case followed that of. Crisp v. Pratt, in Croke, 548. If the conveyance is open to imputation, it is so at common law, and because of fraud in fact'; and involves substantially the same inquiries that did the case .in this Court, of Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat.; and Hinde’s Lessee v. Longworth, 11 Wheat. We will not say but that qri a. proper case being made, and fraud in fact proved to have been the moving cause of ordering to be vested in trust the premises in the name of the appellee’s brother, that the *199 latter wi aid not be decreed to 4$old as trustee for the creditors of William G. W. White, he having paid the consideration; but then the property would be treated and applied .as a trust fund, and be so declared in equity, on the sole ground that the transaction was fraudulent in fact. 'No case is before us fairly to raise sueh a question, or. to justify speculations affecting injuriously a title valid at law, and prima facie.good in equity; when those most interested in it are not before the Court.
There is‘another reason why the appellants cannot challenge the validity of the title made by Smith to James L, White; it is this: they made the composition with a full and perfect knowledge of the facts attending the conveyance, and subsequent improvements of the property; then they continued silent, and took the full benefit of their contract, and cannot now be heard to speak. He who purchases unsound property, with knowledge of the unsoundness at the time, cannot maintain an action. So if one compounds a debt, or makes any other contract, with a full knowledge of all the facts, acting at arm’s length upon his judgment, and fails to guard against loss; he must abide the consequences. Neither fraud nor mistake can be imputed to such an agreement.
Eighth, it is contended:
The inequality alone in his various compositions with his creditors, (all the other circumstances of fraud being out of the question,) is-a fraud, per se, both at' law and equity; and sufficient of itself either at law or equity, to vitiate and set aside each and every of the compositions, from the lowest to the highest.
If upon failure or insolvency, one creditor goes into a contract of general composition common to the others, at the same time having an underhand agreement with the debtor to receive a larger per cent., such agreement is fraudulent and void; and cannot be enforced against the debtor, or any surety to it.
The rule cutting off underhand agreements in cases of joint and general compositions, as a fraud upon the other compounding creditors, and because such agreements are subversive of sound morals . and public policy, has no application to a case like the present; where each creditor acts not only for himself, blif; in opposition to every other creditor, all .equally relying upón their vigilance to gain a •priority; which, jf obtained, each being .entitled to have satisfaction, the payment cannot be questioned. The debtor may prefer one creditor, pay him fully, and exhaust his whole property, leaving nothing for others equally meritorious. Yet their case is not remedial: .and why may not'debts be partially paid in unequal amounts? If those-who receive partial payments are willing to give releases, it is their own matter; and, should a third person interfere, debtor and creditor could well say to him, you are a stranger, and must stand aside.
Thé case of the-appellee presented a fair instance of the propriety of- paying some of his debts fully, and others partially. He owed bank debts, secured by the endorsements of friends, whose kindness WTas the only motive to incur the liability; to relieve whom he did pay, and ought to have paid, large sums during October and November, 1833.
The notes passed off to Clagett and Washington were transferred before maturity, and before the contract of composition took place; and of course their right was not affected by it. As to them, the decree dismissing the bill was proper; as it is in all other respects, and must be affirmed.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of. the record from the circuit court of the United States for the District of Columbia', hold'en in and for the .county of Washington, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is decreed and ordered by this Court, that the decree of the said circuit court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.