*1 Paul A. Clarke Regents, Of West By Corporation A Statute, Created G. Hardway, President And Wendell College Fairmont Of State 14773) (No. April 1981.
Decided *2 Gallagher Spencer R. F. appellant. and Samuel for Stone Chauncey Browning, Attorney General, Gregory H. Bailey, Attorney General, appellees. W. Assistant McGraw, Justice: upon appeal judgment
This case comes before us from a County of the Circuit Court of Kanawha which affirmed Regents Virginia decision of the upholding West Board of appellant, Clarke, the dismissal of the Paul A. from his teaching position College. tenured at Fairmont State Dr. president, college’s Clarke fired Wendell G. Hardway, May 29, A effective 1978. examiner’s completed report, year later, one almost confirmed the procedures Dr. dismissal. Clarke claims that the dismissal process. violated his constitutional to due His primary assignments of error are that the notice of his vague properly dismissal him was too to allow defend himself findings and that examiner’s were too general questions to allow for effective review. He also propriety post-deprivation hearing. aof Virginia
Denied Regents, relief the West Dr. petition Clarke filed for a writ of certiorari in the Circuit County against Court of Kanawha both Board and Hardway President to obtain a review of effecting employed reviewing his dismissal. After denied the relief procedures, the lower court dismissal upholding of the Board prayed the decision for and affirmed Hardway. adverse It is from this the actions of President appeal. this We find merit ruling that Dr. Clarke takes appellant’s and reverse contentions two of the ruling. the lower court tenured, full-time, professor
Dr. Clarke was taught College. He there for education Fairmont State tenure, teaching for years, gained and continued three 22, 1978, Hardway years. eight President more On March he would fired at the letter that informed semester, May The letter was sent end 1978. Policy Bulletin 36 of the West accordance with No. Bulletin], Regents The Bulletin [hereinafter Board of only or more provides that be effected for one dismissal can grounds specifically enumerated therein.1 President of five *3 Employment Tenured Personnel Dismissal and Termination of of faculty a member with A. for The dismissal of Causes Dismissal: specified faculty period tenure, any of before the end of a or member only pursuant appointment, be to the of shall effected only any following provided policies, for the and of causes: these (1) incompetence dishonesty performance or in the Demonstrated professional of duties. (2) substantially impairs individual’s which the Personal conduct responsibilities. of fulfillment institutional (3) by legitimate by to reasonable Insubordination refusal abide Regents. of or the directions the administration (4) disability faculty making Physical the member or mental certainty by degree unable, medical and within a reasonable opinion, perform assigned reasonably duties. determined medical to (5) neglect duty. and manifest Substantial president the institution For Cause: The C. Notice Dismissal faculty by giving proceedings a the member written shall institute mail, by registered which dismissal notice notice or certified dismissal shall contain: (1) charge charges complete relied and statements the or Full upon, (2) regulations governing copy any pertinent the rules and a rights, faculty and member’s (3) faculty a statement the member has the to elect to hearing Hearing have the conducted either the a Committee or Hearing Examiner. days receipt D. Answer and Service: Within 30 from the date of the faculty may the dismissal notice the member file a written answer to charges. filing period may the The for the answer extended the good president request for cause. The answer shall also contain a for hearing by Hearing Hearing either a Committee or Examiner. If faculty timely answer, member fails to file a the notice of dismissal shall be final. Hearing s: impartial hearing, faculty In order to assure a fair and a dismissed member shall a receive written notice of as hereinafter provided may following avail himself of either one of the two hearing procedures: Hearing year faculty A. Committee: Each of each institution shall faculty representative elect thirteen members of the various ranks in Hearing who institution shall be known as the Panel. In event vacancy any faculty vacancy. of a for cause the fill shall request Hearing If the is for a before the Committee: (1) president faculty member, writing, The shall furnish the a list faculty Hearing of nine of the thirteen members of Panel as herein forth, set with instructions to strike four names and return the list to president working days. any faculty within five for If reason the strike, president working days member fails to shall within five strike a sufficient number to reduce the members five shall which Hearing constitute Committee. (2) president promptly notify, writing, The shall the five members Committee, Hearing of their selection as the and of their need select membership chairperson, designate from their a and shall a time and place meetings for their a make such selection and to date set for charge charges. or (3) chairperson give The shall notice certified mail to the parties place charge concerned time or days which time shall be not than ten less nor more than twenty days from the date of the notice thereof. request Hearing Hearing If B. Examiner: a is for before Examiner: (1) president notify Regents, so shall the Board of which shall duly appoint qualified attorney Hearing disinterested at law as Hearing Examiner and shall submit the name and address of such president Examiner to the the dismissed member. *4 (2) Hearing place The Examiner shall determine the time and for a give by to be held and shall notice certified mail to the parties. days concerned Such date shall be not less than ten twenty days appointment nor more then from the date of of the Hearing Examiner.
Hardway’s for the dis- enumerated three causes letter support and listed fifteen reasons of Dr. Clarke missal support of the listed in the of the reasons causes. Some duplicitous apparently were included charges seem but charge. they to than one President because can relate more copy Hardway’s a of the Bulletin and letter also included days which he that he had 30 within informed Dr. Clarke charges. respond to the could Hearing shall be Conducted as Follows: C. (1) proof will such of facts as The Committee or the Examiner hear may proper investigation reasonable and make such be deemed and justify the and as the facts and enter such recommendations may require. circumstances (2) delay possible. little The will be conducted with as (3) right advisor, faculty an but The member shall have the have faculty person not than a member of the such advisor shall be a other by by institution, specifically permitted name the or of the unless staff or Examiner. Committee the (4) in the form will be examined under oath manner and Witnesses designated the the Committee or the Examiner. order (5) hearings. apply evidence shall not in such Formal court rules of (6) transcript Testimony recorded, a thereof shall be shall be prepared. (7) testimony together copy transcript copies of A the of the with member, charge, faculty no to the exhibits shall be furnished request. upon his (8) practical the Commitee or As soon as after president copy of the record of the Examiner shall deliver to the Committee or Examiner and with recommendation of the faculty provide copy of recommendation to the member. shall shall, twenty days receiving president after the record within faculty recommendation, writing issue a decision in member faculty mail, be final unless certified and such decision shall Regents appeal an the Board of under member institutes procedure set forth hereinafter. allegations pleadings are not D. Technical forms and Amendments: supplemental or statements to be amendments observed and may Hearing or filed discretion of the Committee be made and at the Hearing Examiner. Regents: Appeal to the Board of president appeal A. An as of from final decision by filing may university college taken member or Regents appeal within 10 notice intent with written president. days receiving final written decision of after *5 by timely response charges either Dr. filed a to the Clarke by to state indicating that the failed denial or proper raised the grounds for dismissal and that time principal notice, issue which is one of his of defective requested hearing assignments before of error here. He a options hearing a in with the set out examiner accordance Bulletin, May 18, 1978, Regents in and on the Board of the appointed attorney hearing Dr. an to act as examiner. 1978, post May 29, less Clarke was dismissed from his hearing 7, than weeks his scheduled on June two before two-day hearing, testified, 1978. At sixteen witnesses the including parties represented Dr. Clarke. Both were evidentiary rules. counsel and made informal use The transcript hearing completed 324-page was until the not 9, 1978, by counsel, it was November and when reviewed By agree and noted. numerous errors inaccuracies were parties, ment the both counsel revised the record and retyped. hearing had It was to the examiner on it delivered 17, provided January also the 1979. Counsel summarizing their views of the examiner with memoranda evidence. 16, February 1979, filed
On the examiner seven-page found that President recommendation which Hardway pursuant the dismissed Dr. to Clarke for cause. Bulletin the dismissal was listed in the and impressive testimony faculty Citing only other the testifying support firing, of the members not factual basis his examiner did reveal designate charges which he recommendation nor did he petition days appeal, filing B. after of intent to Within 30 the notice Regents containing a statement shall be filed with Board of together why president with the final of the in error reasons decision proceedings. complete record of Regents days appeal, receipt C. after the Board Within may appeal take such submitted and shall consider the on the record proper in all circumstances and action it deems and as reasonable responsibilities under law. to all of its answer essence, D. in the event member fails Time is of the appeal appeal petition and the notice of intent file the section, provisions “A” this the decision of the and “B” of president final. shall be supported found were the evidence. Dr. Clarke contends specify the failure of the examiner his findings illusory on the record rendered his of review. 1979, Hardway, pursuant
On March President Bulletin, writing informed Clarke in was he adopting findings examiner affirming requested the dismissal. Dr. Clarke was granted appeal Regents. Board, an before the April 6, resolution dated affirmed President Hardway’s Clarke, finding dismissal Dr. that due was accorded Dr. and that dismissal not arbitrary capricious. reviewing or After record and *6 case, pleadings in the the circuit court affirmed the Board Regents’ of resolution.
While this has never Court before had occasion to address question procedural safeguards by required the of what are process2 dismissing professor, due when a tenured we have 2 concerning concept process Some the of it observations due was as initially present conceived the that state of constitutional appropriate. early process, seem Our Court stated on that due III, provided constitution, for in Article Section 10 of state our meant condemns; proceeds upon enquiry “a law which it hears before which only judgment Kitzmiller, and renders after v. trial.” Peerce 19 W.Va. 564, (1882) citing Cooley, 352, quoting Constitutional Limitations very reading III, pays Daniel Webster. This literal Article of Section 10 proper language requires deference to the of that section which “due added.) process judgment peers.” (Emphasis of law and [one’s] the of years Peerce, however, opportunity A few after the had the to Court question provision really language the discuss of whether of that says. Relying English law, means what it of Court constructions language judgment peers” read “and the “or of to mean judgment added) peers” (emphasis of his and labeled the insertion the word “and” be “a instead word “or” to mere clerical error.” Jelly 267, 275 (1885). Dils, Jelly undoubtedly represents v. 27 W.Va. original Any equivocation. sin of constitutional taken construction English obviously any sensitivity from law is devoid to our owm (now revolutionary history. Harshbarger Justice) As Justice Chief so cogently really sanctity English observed: there “Is much as it law very people shooting Englishmen existed at the time we as a were way government denying we because were distressed their rights?” Markey Wachtel, 45, 437, civil v. us 164 Va. 264 449 W. S.E.2d (1979) dissent). (Harshbarger, dissenting; McGraw, joining J. J. in the importantly, justification resorting More is no there rational to a
709
procedural safeguards
several occasions the
discussed on
deprive
one of an interest
when the state seeks to
Morton,
upon
v.
has
him. State ex rel. McLendon
it
bestowed
(1978);
431,
v.
919
Civil Service
W.Va.
249 S.E.2d
Waite
(1978); Snyder
Commission,
154,
The a claim that threshold process denied due is an individual has been the individual rises whether the interest asserted “liberty” protected by “property” or interest level Waite, supra. III, Article 10 of our constitution. Section III, language This Court of Article Section 10. “construction” noted, construction, recently statutory while in the context of has may may “or” for “and” there be occasions when court substitute intent, necessary give legislative such a when effect to clear language provision is when the construction will not obtain (No. 10, 1981). City Wheeling, Cogan Feb. clear. analysis upshot The convoluted constitutional of this equivocations propounded process become so riddled with has contemporary definition of it is result-oriented courts that clear aimlessly Instead, through virtually impossible. ritual we meander balancing that, right, through approach this this recitations of one, predict against point that no man can interest concept rights has he of due been which is entitled. manipulated plain language of constitution so far afield from the *7 deprive person liberty judgment without a of that we can now of upon Markey, supra. Jury peers. it is trials are frowned because Markey, empanel juries”, supra, (Harshbarger at 449 to “troublesome property dissenting) expansive of and and our notions J. because jury by liberty protected process are that “a trial interests due such virtually hearings if Article administrative would be in all supra III, literally.” Markey, 441. While we were at Section 10 taken interests, liberty freely property we take our citizens with endow protections safeguard away designed to those constitutional economy. judicial would not One wonders if we interests in the name of by following populace simply the constitution as it serve the better which, by applying interpretations words rather to was written than clear, themselves, terse statements foundations stand as Nevertheless, this case under our current freedom. we must evaluate standards.
710
question
easily
case,
This
is
in
decided
the instant
as both
agree
Regents
Roth,
sides
that under Board
v.
408 U.S.
564,
2701,
92
(1972); Perry
S.Ct.
33 L.Ed.2d
548
v.
Sinderman,
2694,
593,
U.S.
S.Ct.
said
before
a student
can be
from a
state-supported
university,
he is entitled to a “formal
charges;
opportunity
written
prepare
notice of
sufficient
charges; opportunity
to rebut
to have retained counsel
any hearings
charges,
accusers,
to confront his
present
behalf;
evidence on his own
an unbiased
hearing tribunal;
adequate
proceed
and an
record of the
(in
ings.” Syl. pt.
part),
criteria,
In we principles summarized some broad relating scope of that would given be made available cases.
“The process protection extent of due affordable property requires for a interest consideration first, three private distinct factors: interest action; second, that will be affected the official deprivation the risk of an property erroneous of a *8 used, through interest and the value, any, probable if of additional or substitute finally, procedural safeguards; govern- interest, including ment’s the functions involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that procedural requirement additional or substitute would entail.” 5, Waite,
Syl. pt. supra. also, Eldridge, supra; Mathews v. See Morton, supra. ex rel. State McLendon v. already
We have noted that the interests asserted Dr. property liberty subject Clarke are interests to due process protection. applying In the first factor enunciated Waite, apparent protectable it is that interests very Dr. asserted Clarke are of a substantial nature. Waite, temporary suspension Unlike which involved a of a employee, civil service classified the instant case involves acquired right. once It “[t]enure [which] substantial except that ensures the teacher cannot be dismissed for the defined reasons which are set out in the Bulletin and then process hearing not until a has been held”. ex State full added). Morton, supra, 926, (emphasis rel. McLendon v. Realizing that Dr. Clarke has what we have termed “a property interest”, McLendon, supra, substantial we must safeguards imposed if determine here were adequate protect that interest.
I appellant’s first contention is that he was denied due inadequate in that the notice of his dismissal was apprise fully against him him. He forcefully argues adequate notice is an essential any process. Relying element North standard of due Regents, supra, where we said at West syllabus point part, “the more valuable safeguards sought deprived, to be the more will be interposed”, rights contends that since the Clarke substantial, being deprived which he is are the notice to Although him meet must strict constitutional muster. appear notice of dismissal sent to Dr. contains what fairly which, specific allegations if to be of acts found true, justify provisions would removal under
Bulletin, he
maintains
the notice of dismissal
lacked
requisite
specifics
Snyder
laid out in
v. Civil Service
Commission,
(1977),
160 W. Va.
[w]here act of misconduct is in a notice dismissal, by date, it specific should be identified approximate, or unless the characteristics are so singular that there is no reasonable doubt when it If persons occured. an act of misconduct involves or property, these must be identified to the extent employee that the accused will have no reasonable identity. doubt as to their Snyder involved the employee dismissal of a civil service falsifying expense report. for a travel The notice to the employee did particular not indicate which expense travel report had been falsified. The notice was defective because alleged it an act identify of misconduct but failed to the act. Snyder, however, distinguishable is from the instant case alleged because the misconduct attributed to Dr. Clarke pertains continuing more to a conduct, and, course of such, susceptible is being expressly less detailed. For example, the letter of dismissal recites that Dr. Clarke spend refused “to a sufficient campus amount of time on responsibilities meet position.” of [his] Such an allegation hardly susceptible being is particularized, Hardway meticulously unless President clocks Dr. Clarke’s year. hours over the course of a letter, however, The dismissal allegations does contain specific acts which are not detailed dates or names. For example, charge one is that accept Dr. Clarke refused to revised teaching except 1977-78 protest schedule under that he also failed to familiarize himself with the course material teaching for the assignment. revised charge, This while it does not detail the course with which Dr. Clarke allegedly familiar, refused to become singular is so nature that there can activity be no doubt as to the question. question While there is no supplying that dates names, specific where misconduct, relevant acts of burdensome, alleged preferable and not where the acts is charge, singular are as to leave no doubt about so Snyder is satisfied.3 test
Moreover,
protested
that
Dr.
in his answer
while
Clarke
vague, he
set forth in the dimissal
letter were
every ground
or
dismissal either
denial
addressed
testimony fairly
reflects
answer. The cold record of
alleged
which
he
in fact aware of the acts of
misconduct
was
by any of
gave
surprised
was not
rise to his dismissal and
charges.
apply
we
the second and third factors
When
formula,
say
notice
we
the dismissal
cannot
Waite
deny
process of law.
deficient as to
Dr. Clarke due
so
particulars
documenting
in the notice all the
burden
period
alleged
would
misconduct
over
of time
case,
and,
greatly
in this
the administration
at least
burden
It
provide
protection.
no
would
increased
appears
knew the
from the
record
charges against him
what
and that
substance
“[ultimately,
Snyder, supra,
requires.
law
As we
stated
*10
sufficiency
depends
rote
the
on the
the notice
not
standard,
employee
following
on
the
of some
but
whether
certainty
precision of
was
with
and
informed
reasonable
the
of his removal.” 238 S.E.2d
844.
cause
inadequate
not find
of dismissal so
While we do
the notice
process,
and
as
due
do note that
the format
to violate
we
exemplary and
clarity
are far from
of the dismissal
letter
meet
it would
failed to
but for the facts
this case
have
Ideally,
process
the
standards.
minimum
sufficiency
appear
face. In this
of the
should
on its
notice
dealing
directed
cases from other courts
We have been
to several
case,
In
v. Buncombe
with
notice.
one
Weber
the exactitude
(1980),
Education,
N.C.App.
County
the
S.E.2d
quite
similar to the letter
held sufficient a letter of dismissal
court
made more
that
the notice was
the instant case. While that case stated
hearing process,
specific through
hold
the court did not
a bifurcated
validity
the bifurcated
that
of the notice turned on the existence of
(5th
1980),
Downing Williams,
proceedings.
close case we have been forced to review the transcript testimony prior on our notice in decisions part order to reach a Such a result. review of a court necessary. Compliance not should with the notice requirements course, of due should be a matter protracted litigation. not a matter of
II Dr. Clarke’s second substantial contention involves the hearing report. argues examiner’s He that his illusory by was review rendered virtue the failure of the hearing examiner to state the reasons for his recommen- upon and the hearing dations evidence which he The relied. seven-page report mostly examiner’s consists of a recita- procedure tion case, along facts and the with excerpts relevant page from the Bulletin. It until is not report begins an evaluation of the evidence and charges. analysis The substance Clarke discharged cause, upon was based “the evidence which came from other tenured members ... [which] particulary impressive.” There is no indication report examiner’s which as to against Dr. specific or were sustained evidence upon which the reaching examiner relied in justified. conclusion that Dr. Clarke’s dismissal was required by examiner is not statute to make findings law,4 written of fact conclusions of nor does the specifically require Bulletin him to state on the record the specify for his reasons decision or to the evidence which supports does, those however, reasons. The Bulletin require examiner “enter such recommen- justify as the may dations circumstances facts added). require.” (emphasis Clearly the Bulletin contem- plates examiner will make reasoned supported by determination which is the evidence adduced *11 hearing. very least, hearing at the At the examiner findings should make some sort of on the record and 4Proceedings Regents exempt of the Board of are from the provisions § of our Administrative Act. Procedures W.Va. Code 29A-1-2 (1980 Vol.). Replacement supporting findings indicate evidence those order obligations demonstrate that he has fulfilled as a fact his arbitrarily capriciously finder and has not acted reaching his conclusions. decision maker should “[T]he state the for reasons his determination and indicate (citations omitted) on, though evidence he relied his opinion statements need not amount to a full or even Goldberg findings formal of fact and conclusions of law.” v. Kelly, 254, 271, 1011, 1022, U.S. S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d adequate hearing
The need an for statement of the examiner’s reasons for his determination evidence supporting reviewing them is obvious. Our function as a court is to review the record to determine if the evidence hearing supports findings hearing adduced at the of the examiner and whether his conclusions follow from those findings. rely logic upon We must on the facts and which the ruled, Branch, examiner 364 F.2d Johnson Cf. (4th 1966), 1003, 87 706, 17 cir. cert. denied 385 U.S. S.Ct. (1967), erroneously L.Ed.2d 542 and determine whether he applied reaching them in final If the his determination. proceeding record of the administrative below does not ruling reveal those facts which were determinative logic ruling, powerless or the behind the we are to review position the administrative are action. We thrust into judgment of a trier of fact and are asked to substitute our for that of the examiner. That we do. cannot Equally important placed is the burden on the individual seeking review of the administrative action. Where the adequate findings examiner to make fails conclusions, appellant support cannot record to grounds allege assert his for review. He cannot error with particularity he is to determine where the because unable Where, here, proceeding error was committed. ground dismissal, party involves more than one seeking review is unable to discuss which of those supported examiner found to evidence. The failure of the examiner to state on adequate the record reasons for his determination and the upon infringes upon evidence he relied *12 716 meaningful of the review
party to have an effective against of due him in violation administrative action taken 1209, Patterson, 605, 87 Specht process. v. 386 U.S. S.Ct. See Louisiana, 157, (1967); v. 368 U.S. L.Ed.2d 326 18 Gardner 207 82 S.Ct. 7 L.Ed.2d hearing only examiner here statement made that, “particularly in view of was his conclusion members, impressive” testimony of other pursuant to the for cause and Clarke’s dismissal was Regents. procedures This comment of the Board conclusory pronouncement nothing more than a question hearing the ultimate examiner’s decision on nor Dr. is informed before him. Neither this Court specific conclusion nor the evidence of the reasons for the proper examiner’s relied on. A statement which he indication of the evidence on reasons and clear myriad they especially important are relied is where testimony. report charges pages In the and hundreds of recommendations, findings examiner supported by specific charges found to be should list provide some evidence adduced at findings. supporting In to the evidence those reference above, we conclude that the failure view of our discussion record the examiner to state on the supported against which were found to be Dr. Clarke evidence constitutes reversible error. remedy
Logically,
appropriate
for reversible
proceeding
process procedural defects in an administrative
appropriate
with
remand the case to the
tribunal
is to
administrative
institution
directions
to order
Thomas,
Ferguson
remedy
v.
the defect. As stated
(5th
case,
1970),
analogous
an
federal
F.2d 852
Cir.
if
reviewing
should first determine
court
appears,
proper. “If a
deficit
followed were
should,
point, be remanded to the institution
matter
at that
supplementary
compliance
minimum federal or
for its
with
also,
academically
standards.”
430 F.2d
858. See
created
1971).
(5th
Woodbury McKinnon,
v.
Accordingly court we remand the case to circuit with hearing examiner to state the directions to order the upon reasons for his recommendation and evidence purpose for the which he relied. The remand not hearing holding hearing. The in this case was a new hearing adequate. report examiner was not. The
III case,5 however, troubling aspect and one A more of this process alleges of due Dr. Clarke also several other violations only briefly He contends that he should be which we need discuss. hearing have hand in the selection of the the examiner. entitled to a having Policy provides Bulletin Dr. Clarke with the choice of faculty committee, from a list of which he selects before may faculty supplied him choose to have members or he available by hearing gives The Bulletin no indication his case heard examiner. any say will have in the selection of member nothing constitutionally improper about this examiner. We find unbiased, process procedure. long examiner is due As 1011, 25 Goldberg Kelly, 254, 90 L.Ed.2d v. 397 U.S. S.Ct. is satisfied. Regents, (1970); 160 W. Va. North v. Board West squarely confront, question
which we must involves the post-deprivation hearing whether the afforded Dr. Clarke adequate protect was his interests. He maintains that payroll college since he removed was from the some prior two weeks to the dismissal and some ten prior adoption months to the examiner’s Hardway, deprived recommendations President he was property liberty of substantial interests without due of law and contravention of the Board’s own policies.
We look first to Dr. Clarke’s
assertion
the Board
policies
affording
violated its own
in not
him a
before his dismissal became final. The
set forth
Regents
in the Bulletin indicate that
the Board of
(1977).
also,
Long County
Educatio6n,
S.E.2d 411
See
Owen
647, 266
245 Ga.
S.E.2d 461
delays
proceeding
Clarke also contends that
violated
process.
dismayed
proceedings
While we are
to find that
in this
year,
case took
almost
we are unable to find that Dr.
prejudiced by
delays.
part,
delays
For the most
were caused
party
largely
no fault of either
but were
the result of the need for
typing
amending
the record.
complains
adversary
Dr. Clarke further
nature of these
particular
proceedings
process protection. Specifi
violated his due
cally,
objects
evidentiary
he
to the use of
rules
to President
Hardway’s representation
A
counsel.
review of the record reveals
advantage
opportunities
that Dr. Clarke’s counsel
took
of several
object
testimony and,
fact, extensively
to certain
exercised his
*14
comports
to cross-examine witnesses. This
with the standards
for such
hearings
Goldberg Kelly, supra;
North, supra.
also,
out in
v.
set
and
See
Poe,
404, 257
(1979).
App.
Baxter v.
42 N.C.
S.E.2d 71
We fail to see how
prejudiced
Hardway
Dr. Clarke was
because President
retained
light
also,
counsel
in
of the fact that Dr. Clarke also had counsel. See
Trustees,
(6th
1980)
State,
Frumkin v. Board
Kent
719 faculty in contemplated dis- pre-deprivation a Bulletin, a According the dismissal of to the missal cases. procedures, faculty not final until all member does become Policy hearing, or waived. including the are exhausted § D;§ Bulletin, Appeal D. Yet Dr. Clarke was Dismissal college payroll two weeks before removed from the year nearly President a before dismissal adopted Hardway the recommendations fact, name, if was in not examiner. Dr. Clark’s dismissal only served final at that time and dismissal already opportunity had been permit him an to undo what done. involving case teacher transfers
We have held in a
strictly
regulations
personnel
and laws are to be
“[s]chool
Syl. pt. 1, Morgan
employee.”
v.
in favor of the
construed
(1979).
Pizzino,
454, 256
have also
163 W.Va.
S.E.2d 592
We
body must
abide
“[a]n
held that
administrative
properly
it
to conduct
establishes
remedies
723,
Syl. pt. 1,
Brown,
v.
160 W. Va.
238
its affairs.”
Powell
(1977).
a
The effective dismissal
220
S.E.2d
contemplated
prior
member without a
policies
unquestionably
error.
reversible
Board’s own
process argument, we
regard
note
to Dr. Clark’s due
With
Supreme
in earlier
the United States
Court
that while
post-deprivation
presumption against
review
cases found
balancing
approach,
hearings
test
within the traditional
67,
1983,
see, e.g.,
Shevin,
92
32
407
S.Ct.
Fuentes v.
U.S.
Burson,
535,
(1972);
91
Bell v.
402 U.S.
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d 556
254,
(1971); Goldberg Kelly,
1586,
U.S.
v.
397
State in pre-deprivation a person presents when “continuing danger a persons property or ongoing or an disrupting threat of academic ..." North v. West Board of Regents, supra, 417, citing Lopez, 565, Goss 419 U.S. 582, 729, 740, S.Ct. 42 L.Ed.2d
The interests
entitling
asserted
Dr. Clarke as
him to
predeprivation
property
are his
interest
in his
salary
liberty
and his
pursuing
in
occupation.
interest
his
Regents
The Board of
compelling
asserts the
interest of the
college
protecting
in
its students
from
disruptive
effects of Dr.
alleged inability
Clarke’s
cooperate
with
performance
administration
and the
in the
of
his duties. The
strikingly
situation here is
similar
to that
in
Regents
Peacock v. Board
University
and State
College Arizona,
(9th Cir.),
jurisdiction
involving
faculty
to review decisions
tenured
sovereign
thereby
immunity.
waive
In
rel.
State ex
(Tenn.
Chapdelaine
Torrence,
1976),
v.
that “as termination ... was without minimal process and, therefore, wrongful, plaintiff is entitled pay discharge] back [the from date of his ... until University completes complying with [due process]. F.Supp. Soni, coupled 293. rule in with pronouncements Burks, supra, our should control *17 pay back issue this on case remand. opinion,
For the reasons set forth in this we conclude that appellant, Clarke, Dr. A. deprived Paul was liberty property substantial and interests without law virtue of the failure report adequate examiner state in his reasons for his determination that Dr. dismissed from his teaching position tenured College at Fairmont State for cause supported and to indicate the evidence which and college conclusions of the virtue failure of the prior him administration to afford to his Accordingly, judgment dismissal. we reverse County, Circuit Court Kanawha which affirmed the Regents, decision of the Board of and we remand the case to that proceedings court for further consistent with the principles enunciated herein.
Reversed and remanded with instructions. dissenting: Neely, Justice, two-day hearing firing
At the Dr. Paul A. Clarke sixteen witnesses testified. Fifteen witnesses testified against Clarke; self-serving testimony his own was the only dissent to the unanimous conclusion that he deserved fired. be hearing examiner, obviously persuaded by who was overwhelming against professor, evidence con- cluded that “the evidence from which came other tenured particularly impressive.” members... was As the opinion notes, majority examiner is not required by findings statute to make written of fact and law, conclusions nor should his statements “amount opinion findings a full or even formal of fact and Goldberg Kelly, conclusions of law.” 397 U.S. against Yet the face of the massive evidence
professor, our Court has examiner specific charges provide evidence, list reference hurdle demanded neither statute nor case law. heart, its proposition
At this case for the stands that a professor university tenured cannot fired unless regulations precedures a maze follows of technical single slip. system without a endless Our creation an “Simple May procedure I” Simon” “Mother has virtually college primary president’s removed the method ensuring competence among college professors: our power to fire.
Certainly protects professors against tenure narrow political firings, provide complete it not but intended to job security permits employee nothing an to do but everyday collect his check. At a time when we read public system, failures of our education the continued employment incompetent teachers should be eliminated. *18 Undoubtedly today’s majority furtherdestroy will decision remaining among college professors morale profession educating teachers who are dedicated to the before, young. pointed As I have out the schools should for the be run students.
