Clarke v. GaffeneyClarke v. Gaffeney
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Magruder
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court:
This is an action of ejectment, brought by appellee, against appellants,‘in the circuit court of Madison county, to recover a strip of land described in the declaration, as follows: Beginning at a point on the east line of lot 1, of John T. Lusk & Co.’s subdivision of the north-east quarter of section 15, town 4 north, range 8 west of the third principal meridian, in Madison county, Illinois, where said east line intersects the south line of the highway known as the Edwardsville and St. Louis road, and running thence south on the east line of lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said subdivision, to the south-east corner of the lot last named; thence east sixty-seven links; thence north, on a direct line, to a point seventy-three links east of the north-east corner of lot 2 of said subdivision, and continuing thence
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John T. Lusk and John R. Torrence are admitted to be .the common source of title. On June 21, 1856, they had become the owners, by a regular chain of title from the government,
In November, 1856, Lusk and Torrence made the foregoing plat of the one hundred and four acres owned by them, and recorded the plat on November 17,1856. It shows the subdivision of the one hundred and four acres into ten lots, containing each about ten acres, with a strip of land, containing six and seven-tenths acres, running north and south through the center of the one hundred and four acre tract, and dividing it so that lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 lie on the west side of the strip, and lots 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 lie on the east side of it. A main road, called the St. Louis road, or the Edwardsville and St.Louis road, ran “on the north side of this land.”
On November 17,1856, Lusk and Torrence, or J. T. Lusk & Co., sold the ten lots at public auction, and Lusk announced publicly to the purchasers at the sale, that the strip of land dividing the lots as above stated, had been laid out as a roa d for the use and benefit of those buying lots, so that the owners of lots lying south of the main road could have access to it through this strip, without traveling over the property of their neighbors. It was this announcement which induced parties to buy the lots. The proof shows that there was no convenient means of access to or egress from the lots that were remote from the main highway, except through the strip running between the eastern and western tiers of lots. At the auction sale, one Nelson Daniels bought lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, and the deed executed to him and William M. Whaling by Lusk and Torrence, dated November 17, 1856, describes the property as “lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, subdivision of west part, N. E. J of sec. 15, town 4 N., B. 8 west; lot 1 contains 9T|^ acres, lots 2, 3 and 4 contain each 10^°^ acres.” Appellants are now the owners of lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, by a regular chain of
During twenty-seven years’ after the death of Lusk, his heirs and devisees asserted no claim of ownership in the strip of land running between these two sets of lots. During more than twenty years after the death of Torrence, his heirs asserted no ownership therein. In the year 1884 appellee succeeded in obtaining deeds to herself from the heirs and devisees of Lusk and Torrence, conveying the strip in question, and shortly thereafter began this suit.
Ever since the auction sale in 1856, this strip has been used openly and continuously by those who bought at said sale from Lusk and Torrence, and by the grantees from those so buying. The owners of the lots on either side of the strip holding under the purchasers from Lusk and Torrence, have used the whole of the strip, for one purpose or another, from 1856 down to the commencement of this suit. The northern part of it, running south from the St. Louis road for about one hundred yards, was used for twenty years as a roadway or means of approach to the lots lying on either side.
As between Lusk and Torrence, and the original purchasers from them, the latter were entitled to an easement or right of way in this strip of land for the use and benefit of their lots. It would certainly have been an act of great injustice for Lusk and Torrence to have interfered, in any way, with the enjoyment of such easement by their vendees. It is true, that while the title to the one hundred and four acres remained in Lusk and Torrence, the subdivision, as above made, created no easement of any kind. Until a severance, and the premises were held by separate owners, no question of that character could arise. The foundation of the doctrine of easement in this and similar classes of cases is a disposition and
Lusk and Torrence subdivided and platted this land in such a manner that there was no way of approach to the lots which did not abut upon the main highway, except along the strip in question. They then severed their title by conveyances of different lots to different owners, accompanying their sales with the declaration that each lot owner should have a right of Avay over the strip to the main road. Each lot passed with the advantages conferred, as well as subject to the burdens imposed, by the original owners. Under the circumstances of this case, appellee, holding by conveyance from the heirs of such original owners, is as much estopped as were Lusk and Torrence from interfering with the right of way of these different lot owners over the strip designated and reserved for their use.
It is not necessary that such right of way should have been specifically mentioned in the conveyances. “Incorporeal hereditaments, appendant or appurtenant to land, as, common of piscary and of pasture, and right of way, pass by a conveyance of the land to Avhich they are annexed, without even mention of the appurtenances. ” (Coke on Litt. 121b.) In Hadden v. Shoutz, 15 Ill. 581, a mill and dam had been erected upon a creek running through the quarter section, of
The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
It seems to be conceded that prior to November 17, 1856, John P. Lusk and John E. Torrence were the owners of the strip of land now in1 controversy. It was then a part of a certain quarter section, which the -owners about that date divided into ten lots, of about ten acres each. A plat of the quarter section, showing the relative situation of the lots, was made .by a surveyor, and was duly recorded in the office of the recorder in the county where the land is situated. The lots were designated on the plat by consecutive numbers, from one to ten, both numbers included. Between these lots is a strip of land containing about six acres. This strip of land is not numbered on the plat as are the lots, nor is the length and width of it stated, as is clone in respect to the lots. The xdivision of the land into lots was.made by the owners for
There can be no controversy that plaintiff’s title is the better title, and must prevail, unless the conveyance of the several lots abutting on the narrow strip intervening the lots, by operation of law, carried the title to the center line. No other title is insisted upon. Obviously the conveyances of the several lots could not have the effect claimed for them, unless it shall be ascertained the land on which the lots abutted was left by the proprietors for a public road, and was either granted to or dedicated to the public for a road or highway. This is the vital question in the case.
As before stated, the plat made of the quarter section was not a town or village plat, nor was-it an addition to any city or village, hence it is not a street in the sense the term street is used in the statute, where the fee vests in the corporation or municipality. Nor can it be said it is a public highway or road, in the statutory or any other sense. It was never granted to or dedicated to the public for a highway or public road. The owners, at the time the plat was made, forbade the surveyor to mark it “a road.” Nor is there the slightest evidence it was ever used or accepted by the public for a highway or public road. It is essential to every dedication of land for public use, as, for a highway or public road, there should be an acceptance and appropriation to the uses intended, and until there is such an acceptance, the owner may withdraw his offer and appropriate his land to any other purpose. It is obvious, from the evidence in this case, the public, by its officers, never contemplated appropriating this land to public uses as for a highway or public road. It was not practicable to do so, and it never was used by the public either for a highway or for any other purpose whatever. The assumption this was a highway or public road, has absolutely nothing in its support.
Treating the permission given purchasers of lots to pass over this strip of land as a mere license, it is quite evident the doctrine insisted upon, the conveyance of land abutting on a highway where the grantor, at the time of such conveyance, owned the fee of the highway, gives the grantee the fee to