Case Information
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA IN RE: :
: CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-2802 NATHANIEL CLARKE :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of June, 2025, upon consideration of pro se Plaintiff Nathaniel Clarke’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 3), Motion to Seal Case (ECF No. 2), and Complaint (ECF No. 1), it is that:
1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 2. The Complaint is DEEMED filed.
3. The Motion to Seal Case is DENIED because Clarke has not satisfied the heavy burden of establishing that this docket must remain sealed. to UNSEAL this case. The Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons stated
in the Court’s Memorandum. Clarke may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this
Order. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state the basis for Clarke’s claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting his amended complaint, Clarke should be mindful of the Court’s reasons for dismissing the claims in his initial Complaint as explained in the Court’s Memorandum. Upon the filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so by the Court. to send Clarke a blank copy of this Court’s
current standard form to be used by a self-represented litigant filing a civil action bearing the above-captioned civil action number. Clarke may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so. If Clarke does not wish to amend his Complaint and instead intends to stand on
his Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan , 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading , 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig. , 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”). If Clarke fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that
Clarke intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case. [1] See Weber , 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).
BY THE COURT: KAI N. SCOTT, J. doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria , 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) ( per curiam ). Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend her complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg , 700 F. App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) ( per curiam ) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc. , 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).
[1] The six-factor test announced in v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on her complaint. See Weber , 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint”