258 F. 437 | 3rd Cir. | 1919
(after stating the facts as above). James Clark, Mendel Rankin, Louis Hanin, Julius Schlecter and Caesar Frazer were charged by one indictment with having in their possession
We have presented to us thirty-eight assignments of error, which may be readily compressed into four groups, viz.: Errors (1) in the admission of evidence; (2) in the refusal of the court to charge as prayed; (3) in the instructions charged; and (4) in the court’s refusal to direct a verdict of acquittal.
“This practice o£ unlimited assignments is a perversion of the rule, defeating all its purposes, bewildering the counsel on the other side, and leaving the court to gather from a brief, often as prolix as the assignments of error, which of the latter are really relied on.” Phillips Construction Co. v. Seymour, 91 U. S. 646, 648 [23 L. Ed. 341]; Grayson v. Lynch, 163 U. S. 468 [16 Sup. Ct. 1064, 41 L. Ed. 230]; and Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507 [35 Sup. Ct. 865, 59 L. Ed. 1433, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 252].
The assignments of error as we have grouped them resolve themselves into three questions: First, whether there were errors in the admission of evidence and in instructions which the court charged and refused to charge the jury; second, whether the evidence sustains the finding of the jury that property in the stolen copper was in the United States as laid by the indictment, and third, whether the evidence sustains the finding of Clark’s complicity in the crime.
“Of course, in jury trials, erroneous rulings are presumptively injurious, especially those embodied in instructions to the jury; and they furnish ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears that they were harmless.” Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U. S. 76, 39 Sup. Ct. 435, 63 L. Ed. -.
Applying this rule to the first question, we dispose' of it without doing more than to say, that the trial court’s rulings on evidence and its charge to the jury, covering instructions made and denied, were in nearly every instance free from error; and in the few instances open to doubt, it affirmatively appears, that if error was present, it, was entirely harmless.
The remaining question — the sufficiency of the evidence of Clark’s complicity in the crime — is not open to dispute in view of the positive character of the Government’s testimony and the negative character of the testimony produced by Clark. As the testimony for and against Clark was admitted with scrupulous regard to the rules of evidence in the trial of criminal causes, and as the jury have resolved that evidence against Clark, there is nothing for this court to do but direct that the judgment below be
Affirmed.