Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order of summary judgment dismissing his cause of action for racial discrimination. Plaintiff had alleged that defendant, his former employer, discriminated against him in violation of both the Fair Employment Practices Act, MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458(1) et seq., 1 and the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e.
Plaintiff, a black male, alleged that he began working for defendant on or about April 9, 1966, as an assistant manager in defendant’s employee store. In April of 1974, when the manager of the employee store became disabled, plaintiff took over the manager’s duties in addition to continuing his own work. Subsequently, plaintiff was advised that he would be promoted to the position of store manager effective October 31, 1974. Plaintiff alleged that he was not only not awarded the promotion but was demoted to an hourly employee effective December 9, 1974, and then laid off effective *823 December 12, 1974. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that similarly situated white employees were promoted and permitted to continue their employment with defendant.
In its motion for summary judgment, defendant contended that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatоry reason for its actions toward plaintiff. According to defendant, late 1974 was the time of a massive reduction in its workforce, during which 800 employees were laid off and 300 others were transferred. Defendant indicated that it had an employment policy that prohibited employees from moving up in pay grade during a workforce reduction. Defendant сlaimed that the workforce reduction necessitated that one person be laid off from the Industrial Relations Department, of which plaintiff was a part. Plaintiff was laid off despite the fact that he had more seniority than another white department employee for the reason that plaintiff would have had to have been awarded a рromotion to replace that employee. Defendant contended that the rule prohibiting "upward bumps” was applied even-handedly and submitted affidavits indicating that the rule had been used to the disadvantage of numerous white employees.
The summary judgment was granted pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3). A motion under subsection 3 tests whether there is factual support for a claim, requiring a court to consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and other available documentary evidence.
Rizzo v Kretschmer,
Section 3 of the Fair Employment Practices Act
2
made it аn unfair labor practice to discriminate in any matter related to employment because of race. Similarly, subchapter VI of the the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e
et seq.,
prohibits racial disсrimination in employment. Both parties have relied extensively on federal decisions in constructing their respective arguments. We agree that federal precedent, although not binding upon our interpretation of the Fair Employment Practices Act, is persuasive in determining what the substantive law of racial discrimination in employment is.
Cf. Civil Rights Comm v Chrysler Corp,
In
McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green,
The shifting burden of proof in an employment discrimination case does not preclude the granting of summary judgment based upon the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. In its motion for summary judgment, defendant assumed, for the sake of argument, that an initial prima facie case was made out. Plaintiff contends on appeal that once such a prima facie case is posited, the case must be submitted to the trier of fact regardless of the nature of the employer’s proffered explanation and whether that reason is rebutted by evidence that it is pretextual. We disagree. Once a defen *826 dant presents a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason rebutting a plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination, even if it is in the context of a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must put forth factual allegations to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the proffered reasons were a mere pretext. Meyer v California & Hawaiian Sugar Co, 662 F2d 637 (CA 9, 1981). Thus, a plaintiff must present factual allegations allowing the inference that the defendant had a discriminatory reason that was more likely its true motivation or factual allegations that show the defendant’s proffered reason was unworthy of credence. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v Burdine, supra. The plaintiff must set forth specific facts showing thаt there is a genuine issue for trial; conclusory allegations are insufficient to rebut evidence of nondiscriminatory conduct. Patmon v Van Dorn Co, Plastic Machinery Division, 498 F2d 544, 547 (CA 6, 1974).
In the instant case, plaintiff presented no additional allegations beyond his bald assertion that defendant’s employment policy was a pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff has not offered any factual allegations to supрort that claim. Defendant’s employment policy of precluding upward promotions during periods of workforce reduction is obviously one designed to hold down labor costs during periods of declining revenues. By affidavit, defendant has indicated that the policy was applied even-handedly and has given numerous examples of white employees who were denied promotions or were demoted from their positions as salaried employees because of the policy. In his own deposition, plaintiff conceded that he knew of no instances where an employee was permitted to displace a person with a higher salary grade dur
*827
ing a workforce reduction. Moreоver, in opposing defendant’s motion, plaintiff has not alleged any facts to cast doubt upon the genuineness of the defendant’s employment policy. Stated alternativеly, plaintiff has not raised allegations to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant’s proffered reason for its actions was a mere pretext for raсial discrimination.
Meyers v California & Hawaiian Sugar Co, supra.
See also
Chatman v United States Steel Corp,
Summary judgment in favor of defendant was appropriate. In effect, the trial court was satisfied that it would be impossible for plaintiff’s claim of pretext to succeed at trial for complete lack of evidentiary support. There was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether actual discrimination existed, masked by the pretext of defendant’s employment policy. Consequently, judgment for defendant as a matter of law was warranted.
Affirmed.