17 Barb. 202 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1853
The proof which the defendants offered to make by the witness Cameron, and which was rejected, should, I am satisfied, have been received. The conversations between Montgomery and Gardner, two of the defendants, proposed to be proved, were intermediate the presentation of the petition to the county judge, and the application to this court at special term for a sale, and but a brief period before the order for a sale was obtained; they related to the past as well as to future proceedings to effect a sale, all of which are charged to have been fraudulent; and were so connected with those proceedings as to form a part of them; and they were of such a nature as to be entitled to some consideration, upon the question as to the motive with which those proceedings were conducted. They were part of the res gestee, calculated to afford some light on the subject under investigation, and, as such, proof of them was admissible. Whenever the intention with which an act is done becomes a subject of inquiry, the conversations and declarations accompanying it, of the persons by whom it was performed, may be proved in their favor, as part of the res gestee. (1 Phil. Ev. 231. 1 Greenleaf’s Ev. §§ 108,109,110.) Several illustrations are given and authorities referred to by those authors, and numerous others will he found in Cowen & Hill’s Notes, 585 to 606. (See also 3 Greenleaf’s Ev, § 99. Rex v. Whitehead, 1 Car. fy Payne, 67.) It would often lead to error, and be highly unjust, to refuse such evidence in explanation of the
Welles, Selden and T. R Strong, Justices.]
This proof might not have affected the result, but it is sufficient to call for the granting of a new trial, that the defendants were entitled to make it, and may have been prejudiced by its exclusion. It would have tended to show that Montgomery was not guilty of the fraud charged, and proof of that fact would have essentially aided each of the other defendants in his defense.
Aside from the offers and rejection of evidence which have been considered, I should have no difficulty in sustaining the judgment.
I am therefore of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted as to the appellant; but my brethren have arrived at the conclusion that the evidence rejected, if it was admissible, and had been received, could not have affected the result, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.