*1 CLARK, Aрpellant Derrick Daron , (Defendant below) Appellee
STATE Indiana, below).
(Plaintiff
No. 48S00-0205-CR-270. Indiana.
Supreme Court
May 2004.
BOEHM, Justice. ap- Derrick Clark appeal, direct
In this murder and sen- his conviction peals affirm the parole. We to life without tence - trial court. Background and Procedural
Factual fiancée, Kim- with his Phillips lived Jeff Courtyard Apartments at the berly Hester Anderson, 10 and Between Indiana. 11, 2001, reported Hester April p.m. loitering people were Phillips that two car, and one Phillips's parking lot near Phillips on the car. sitting of them was outside, exchange and after brief went about group to a loiterer returned one and the away twenty twenty-five feet Clark, among who drove off. second *5 Phillips, and approached group, then After a brief out. argument broke an apart- returned to exchange Phillips jack- ment, his hooded retrieved Clark holding had been woman who from the et inside the go group told the it and building. apartment off most of had turned Phillips After Hes- Phillips and in the lights apartment, their bedroom window. out of peeked ter approach with a hood saw someone Phillips fire three building and apartment their of the bul-: Ore into the shots apartment. short died a and she Hester lets struck as the identified was later. 'Clark time Two group. member of by one shooter nine-year- witnesses, and a an adult other in the shoot- Clark boy, implicated also old shooting to the confessed Clark ing, and set cireumstances under interviews policе forth below. of Murder with the was charged Phillips, and of Hester, Murder Attempted IN, Indianapolis, Gray, Gerald Stephen requested The State violations. handgun Appellant.
Attorney for without sentenced that Clark life of Carter, Attorney General dis- that he charge Steve on the based parole Stock, Attor- a residence. Indiana, Deputy into Zachary J. a firearm charged Murder, At- IN, guilty of Attorneys General, jury Indianapolis, ney found Handgun Murder, Carrying tempted Appellee. jury Without a License.1 The recom Clark unsuccessfully objected to this line mended a sentence of life parole, without questioning as an get effort to Watson's imposed and the court that sentence. prior statements before the im- as peachment without having Watson's made In this direct appeal, Clark contests the: any inconsistent statements. admission of statements he made while custody at police station and other The State then offered trangeript during statements made an encounter with Watson's statement into evidence and the police parking officer lot. He also court admitted it. that Wat- contests the admission of a witness's state- son's statement improperly admitted ment, arguing that the witness incapa- because, trial, Watson claimed he was making ble of a statement at the time he under the influence of medication at the it, made and that the admission of the time of the statement and denied having witness's statement violated his constitu- knowledge of the facts presented in the tional Right to Confrontation. Finally, statement at the time he made it. The challenges sentence inappro- trial court ruled the transcript admissible priate, based on improper an consideration 808(5), under Evidence Rule pro- which of aggravating and mitigating cireum- vides: stances, and based an unconstitutional (5) Recorded Recollection. A memoran- statute. dum or record concerning a matter I. Witness' Statement about which a witness onee had knowl- The State called Michael Watson as a edge but now has insufficient recollec- witness. arrested, Before Clark was Wat- tion to enable the witness testify fully son had been interviewed under oath and accurately, shown to have been *6 prosecutor the about the events of the adopted made or by the witness when night of the shooting. interview, In this matter was fresh in the witness's the Watson testified that was at the Court- he memory and to reflect that knowledge yard apartments with Clark and others correctly. admitted, If the memoran- got when Clark argument into an with dum or may record be read into evi- Phillips everyone. and told go to inside. dence but may not itself be received as Shortly that, after Watson heard shots. an exhibit unless offered an adverse trial, At whеn facts, asked about these party. Watson asserted that he did not remember being at the The scene State and did concedes the not recall statement was anyone whether not properly else was there. The admitted as an pursu- State exhibit then 803(5) asked Watson to ant to read Rule transcript the because the Rule per- mits it to interview, be read from his jury, to the but not Watson testified that nothing in it was true. The prosecu- admitted an However, exhibit. the tor then asked Watson if specific points State state- out that appellate an court ments in his lies, interview may were affirm Wat- a trial judgment court's any son they said were. prosecutor said, The theory suрported by the evidence. Ratliff you're "And telling jury this under v. oath N.E.2d today here that everything (citation here that omitted). The State you've said about Derrick Clark was a lie?" Watson's statement was nevertheless ad- 1. charged Clark was also Carrying jury with charge trial on that and the court found Handgun Without a License prior with a guilty him after the returned its verdict. handgun conviction. He right waived his to a given It was requirements. both isfied 801(d)(1)(A) Rule Evidence under missible perjury for subject penalties to oath under inconsis- prior as a evidence as substantive investiga- prosecutor's course of the in the That under oath. made tent statement cage. If has not a declarant tion of the provides: Rule cross-examined, availability for his been if; <... hearsay [tlhe not A is statement the satisfies for cross-examination recall hearing trial or at the testifies declarant for cross- that he be available requirement con- cross-examination subject to and is State, 627 v. Kielblock examination. statement, the state- cerning (Ind.Ct.App.1994). with the declarant's inconsistent ment is opportunity to cross-examine thus had the given under oath and was testimony he chose not though trial even Watson at a perjury penalty subject to it. to use or in proceeding, trial, or other hearing a deposition. argues that Clark also admission violated prior statement of Watson's inconsistent priоr for a
In order under witnesses both right to confront this under admissible to be statement For the constitutions. "(1) state have been the statement Rule: federal must unavailing. reésdn, contention is this same subject penalty under oath given of confrontation has right and The federal proceeding or other at a trial perjury the witness is available when denied been (2) prior state who made the declarant v. States United subject for cross-examination. testify and be must both ment (9th Valdez-Soto, Cir.1 31 F.3d the state concerning cross-examination constitution, 994).2 Indiana Under statement is at the trial where ment oppor an have the accused must although introduced." See United sought during (7th the witness cross-еxamine tunity to DiCaro, 772 F.2d States confrontation, "oppor- Cir.1985). Here, statement Watson's face-to-face sat- guarantees of ing statement "bore that the United very decision recent 2. Washington, Su- States The United Supreme irustworthiness." Court States Crawford - - right to cross- -, Court held preme 124 S.Ct. U.S. - (2004), is the statement this case at the time does not affect either examine L.Ed.2d The St at trial. Watson testified because admission required and its made or at trial *7 question may into have called preme Court wit- right confront to the defendant's violates. rulings a number of evidentiary settled cross- available for witness is not nesses if Certainly it clear that made issues. related thorough conducting After examination. trump the Confronta evidence do not rules of history of Confrontation examination However, expressly the Court tion Clause. explained, Court jurisprudence, Clause that, is not ab the declarant "where noted to faithful thus remained cases have "lolur sent, testify to and to submit present to but is understanding: Testimonial the Framers' cases, cross-examination, anything, sup if our from trial witnesses absent statements have of his the admission port that the conclusion declarant only where the been admitted create a con does not statements out-of-court unavailable, only the defendant where Green, 399 problem." frontation California to cross-exam- priоr opportunity has had 1930, 149, 162, 489 26 L.Ed.2d 90 S.Ct. U.S. Crawford, at 1369. 124 S.Ct. ine." (1970). the admission addressed Crawford holding does that its specifically noted Court by who police a witness to prior statements declarant "when the the rule alter not that that admis at trial and held was unavailable trial, at appears for cross-examination against declarations of her statements sion ' at places constraints Clause no Confrontation Confrontation interest violated penal prior state- testimonial use of his all on the held the supreme court had state Clause. The Green, (citing U.S. 399 n. 9 though she was Id. even ments." admissible statements 1930). cross-examination, S.Ct. 90 reason- never available 1190 have to
tunity does not be seized or sue- argues each of following statements right cessful and the can be waived." constituted an assertion of right his to State, (Ind. remain silent: Pierce v. 677 N.E.2d 1997) (citation omitted). argues crazy. might "This is Yall as well send because statement was Watson's admitted me across the (referring jail)." street to stand, after Watson left Clark had no "Please, man, . you might as well take me Watson, opportunity to cross-examine but across the street." why gives he no reason he could not have already tryin' "You charge to me with He recalled Watson. has not established a this. So leave me alone and take me right violation of his to cross-examine. over here." When the agreеd officer to take Clark to
II. Statements to Police jail, Clark, "Okay. he said to That's what Custody While we'll do. going We're to tape. end the days shooting, Seven after the Anderson Anything you else say?" want police executed warrant for the limited responded "No." purpose of taking photographs Clark's fingerprints. After Clark was brought to An- assertion of Miranda station, the police Randy Tracy Detective rights must be unequivocal, clear and interrogated ultimately Clark and in determining person whether a has as shooting. confessed to the serted his or her rights, the defendant's rights his Mirando were be- statements are considered as a whole. violated Tracy ignored cause request his to end the Bowersox, Simmons v. 235 F.3d questioning. He also contends that his (8th Cir.2001). person A must do more confession was voluntary, and that the than express to talk reluctance to invoke custodial interrogation improper be- right to remain Taylor silent. police cause probabfe did not have cause to (Ind.1997). A state arrest him and interrogation exceeded this," ment that "I'm through with fol the scope of the limited warrant used to lowed dialogue continued paus without bring custody. Clark into ing or indicating that the defendant would no longer did not unambiguously respond, Review of a trial court's denial of assert right to remain silent. Havi a motion suppress is similar to other (Ind. land v. sufficiency matters. Gоodner v. 1997). Clark's statements here did not (Ind.1999). The record expressly right silent, invoke his to remain must disclose substantial evidence of pro request an attorney. Haviland, As in or bative supports value that trial court's Clark continued speak making after decision. Id. reweigh We do not the evi statements, these being and after advised *8 dence and we conflicting consider evidence that he was required not to continue with most favorably to the trial ruling. court's the interview. The trial court's conclusion Id. that Clark did not invoke his Miranda rights is supported by the A. record. Requests Questioning to End Clark argues first that the state B. Involuntariness of Confession ments police made in custody should have been excluded they because in were taken argues next Clark that his violation of rights his Miranda after four confession police made while in custody requests that the interview end. Clark given was not voluntarily and therefore
1191 only way to work conveyed to him that was taken it because inadmissible was give to a charge murder was out of his United States Indiana and violation States the United Under constitutions. statement. by a prove Constitution, must the State if inadmissible A confession is that the de the evidence of preponderance or im mitigation by promises obtained voluntary. Lego was confession fendant's and indefinite state munity; vague but, 477, 489, 92 S.Ct. 404 U.S. Twomey, v. in a that it would be by police ments (1972). The State's L.Ed.2d 618 30 cоoperated if he best interest defendant's is Indiana Constitution under the burden in confession subsequent do not render a reasonable beyond voluntariness to show State, v. 509 N.E.2d Collins admissible. (citing Miller, at 767 770 N.E.2d doubt. "(state (Ind.1987). Further, 827, 830 (Ind. State, N.E.2d 730 v. Schmitt 148 a desire that by police expressing ments deter 2000)). the trial court's appeal, On explaining the and suspect cooperate way as same mination reviewed possible are re that penalties crimes and v. sufficiency matters. other Griffith enough to constitute specific sults are not (Ind.2003). 842 N.E.2d Kahlenbeck or threats." promises either is determined Voluntariness (Ind.1999). N.E.2d v. totality of the cireumstances light of Here, promises. specific no Clark cites Miller interrogation. surrounding varying of Tracy explained Detective (cit (Ind.2002) suggested that and of homicide fenses State, 719 N.E.2d ing Kahlenbeck by telling the would better Clark served (Ind.1999)). factors include Relevant to attempt are an statements truth. These location, continuity of the and length, Tracy's re comply with induce to Clark education, maturity, and the interrogation, prom did not constitute quests, they but condition, mental health physical threats, benefits, or inducements ises of omitted). (citations To Id. defendant. involun confession that rendered Clark's vol given that a confession determine tary. in that must conclude untarily, the court violence, im ducement, threats, other or argues that Detec also Clark overcome did not influences proper decep constituted Tracy's tive comments State; 707 Ellis v. free will. defendant's his confession that rendered practices tive (citations omit 797, Tracy's argues that involuntary. Clark ted). people multiple that to statements Clark as the shooter case, had identified Clark supports the record In this intend to not Clark did Tracy believed that Clark's conclusion court's the trial meant intentional falsehoods kill were voluntary. points Clark confession Assuming from Clark. a statement way elicit Tracy that "there's statements this", Tracy's statements would around is correct you work can not factual, deception does poliсe honest were unless he was a future not have inadmis a confession automatically render he believed happened, about what factor to Rather, one only it is multiple sible. anyone, kill did not intend the cireum- totality of in the consider him the shooter. had identified people n. 5 Miller, at 767 like these that comments stances. *9 State, N.E.2d at 719 v. (citing Kahlenbeck leniency, promises of constituted others 1217). Further, good have a police his will if the lies, intimidation and overcame statements, statement, if Tracy even techni- because, through these faith for a basis 1192 false, not rise
cally 721, it does to the level of Davis Mississippi, 726-28, v. 394 U.S. Ellis, 707 at deception. See 801 1394, (1969), 22 89 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 676 held they defendant that (police who told had might individuals lim detained for a shoeprint good his crime seene had a purposes, ited such obtaining finger as in the statement faith basis when there prints, on a showing of less than probable size, footprints were similar to defendant's State, 1085, cause. In Baker v. 449 N.E.2d conclusively but not established had (Ind.1983), Court, Davis, this citing been defendant's). In asserting to be that mul concluded that warrants issued for lHmited had identified Clark as tiple people purposes, such fingerprinting as photo or shooter, Tracy referring was to three wit graphing, are if appropriate police pur act implicated nesses whose information had suant to and within seope оf such Clark in the crime. Two of these wit warrants. given information nesses had about the just occurring shooting,
events before the The warrant supported only including argument Clark's with Phillips fingerprinting Clark, and photographing everyone and Clark's instruction that else justify and did not interrogation. go given inside. The third statement was State counters that Clark's detention was by nine-year-old boy who witnessed the nevertheless lawful because police had shooting, testify but did not at trial and probable cause to arrest Clark at the time arguably expressed reluctance and confu he was taken into custody. Because the sion as Although to the facts. none of warrant was limited Clark is correct thаt these airtight, versions was warrantless, his arrest was and the State witnesses' enough their accounts were good" form a probable must establish cause to arrest Tracy faith basis to assert that he had Clark. Probable cause to arrest exists addition, shooting. witnesses to the In when, at arrest, the time of the the officer regardless Tracy of what personally knowledge has of facts and cireumstances thought shooting of Clark's intent that would warrant person reasonable window, through the that he believed believe that suspect has committed the intentionally per- did not kill was a criminal act in question. Berger v. New interpretation missible of the facts. The York, 41, 55, 1873, 388 U.S. 87 S.Ct. trial court's cоnclusion that Clark's confes- (1967); L.Ed.2d 1040 See also Henderson sion voluntary by is supported State, 172, 769 N.E.2d evidence. (citing Ortiz v. 716 N.E.2d (Ind.1999)). The amount of evidence nee- Scope C. Warrant of essary probable to meet the require cause that his detention ment is determined on case-by-case ba illegal and therefore the statements he sis. Ortiz v. in custody made should not have been (Ind.1999). grounded It in notions of admitted because he into was taken custo sense, common precision. mathematical dy on the basis of a warrant executed for (Ind. Ogle "purpose limited obtaining photos, 1998) Gates, (citing Illinois v. 462 U.S. fingerprints, palm prints," but was (1983)). 103 S.Ct. 76 L.Ed.2d 527 police detained at the ques station and tioned beyond permissible seope points The State out that at the warrant. The State refers to this warrant time Clark was detained Tracy Detective "a so-called Davis-Mississippi warrant." knew of given the statement under oath The United Supreme States Court Michael Watson which reported he
1193
2001)
State,
the
Phillips on
Joyner v.
with
736 N.E.2d
argued
(citing
had
Clark
State,
232,
(Ind.2000));
241
Jones v.
655
argument
the
after
question,
in
night
inside,
and N.E.2d
everyone
go
(citing Florida v.
to
instructed
Clark
Bostick,
429, 433-34, 111
S.Ct.
shortly after he
U.S.
gunshots
heard
Watson
(1991)).
This
purposes and was not Constitution United States imposition challenges Clark next The trial court warnings. given Miranda arguing parole, of life without the sentence objection ground overruled Clark's inappropriate, the sentence custody. That deci was not that Clark weigh aggravators and failed to trial court question of sufficien reviewed as sion is lifе with- and that the mitigators properly, Goodner, 714 N.E.2d cy of the evidence. facially unconstitu- statute is parole out at 641. by jury guilty was found tional. Clark Murder, Handgun Without a Carrying a eustody pur A is in person License, Follow- Attempted Murder. person if a reasonable poses of Miranda phase, penalty ing presentation have would under the same circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt jury found arrest or not that he was under believed a fire- intentionally discharged police. that Clark the entreaties free to resist dwelling. inhabited arm into an (Ind. 178-79 West v. *11 that person recommended Clark be sentenced to who showed remorse for his ac- argues After a tions. He parole. sentencing life without also that the Court should consider that there was some infer- 9, 2002, April the court im- hearing, on ence of sudden heat from his actions be- posed parole the sentence of life without cause, although he was convicted of mur- by jury. recommended The trial court der, jury was instructed on reckless aggravators charge cited as the murder voluntary homicide and In manslaughter. fact killing that the was intentional and order, the amended sentencing the trial discharged the fact that firearm pointed court out that in addition to the dwelling. July into an inhabited On finding that Clark kill intended to this Court remanded the case for discharge intended to a firearm into an resentеncing original because the sentenc- dwelling, inhabited the shooting "pre- ing order not comply did with the statuto- meditated, calculated, utterly without ry requirements sentence of life with- provocation." The trial pointed court also parole, by out which governed is the death to Clark's criminal history that included penalty § statute. Ind.Code 35-50-2-9 probation violations and the fact that Clark (2003). An sentencing amended order was failed to show remorse after the shooting. issued and that order is now under review. Although, IV.B, as discussed in Part there In the statute was amended to problems are in the sentencing order that, require imposed for sentences on or Clark has not on this record established 1, 2002, July after jury is to "recom- that the sentence inappropriate. is mend" a sentence and the trial court is to "accordingly." sentence original sen- B. Trial Court's Consideration Ag- tencing order and the sentencing amended gravating and Mitigating Circum- | order this case were both issued based stances gave the earlier statute that a court the This Court's order remanding impose discretion to a sentence recom- for a new sentencing order instructed the mended or its own sentence. trial court to amend its sentencing order to Neither any Clark nor the State raises comply with the requirements of Indiana contention based on the 2002 amendments (2002). Code section 35-50-2-9 Because to the statute. penalties both governed by are the same statute, a sentence of life parole without A. Imnappropriateness held the same standards as a death An appellate may court review a sen- State, sentence. Ajabu v. 693 N.E.2d tence if it is "inappropriate found to be (Ind.1998). A court sentencing under light of the nature of the offense and the the death penalty may statute consider character of the Indiana Appel- offender." only the aggravating factors listed that 7(B). late Rule argues Clark: that his sen- statute. Bivins v. 642 N.E.2d tence is inappropriate because maximum (Ind.1994). The trial court must also possible sentences are to be reserved for find that any aggravating factor used to the "worst offenders." He that he eligibility determine for the sentence has does not fit category into this because he proven been beyond a reasonable doubt years nineteen old at the time of the and must find that the aggravating cireum- shooting, juvenile delinquency adju- had no outweigh stances the mitigating circum dications, and only had a misdemeanor stances and make a record of the reasons (Greer handgun points pas- conviction. He to his supporting the sentence. tor's testimony (Ind.2001). a respectful Clark was As ex- present, it factors were mitigating in Harrison plained to remand with instruc- proper omitted): (citations would *12 1243, 1262 if signifi- the sentence tions to reconsider (1) reasons statement of court's The trial clearly are mitigating cireumstances cant aggra- mitigating and identify each must "Signifi- Id. by the record." supported (i) found, in- must circumstance vating nature gravity, on the cance varies based reasons facts and specific clude the they offenses as re- prior number of to find the exis- and court the which lead Wooley v. (Hi) to the current offense." cireumstance, late of each such tence (Ind.1999). and n. 4 mitigating that the must articulate judge expressed have been sentencing, circumstances In the trial aggravating in determination that, history is an "any and balanced criminаl evaluated the view (iv) of strength sentence, issue is the forth aggravator and the and must set that conclusion personal court's the trial mitigator The is that aggravation. that punishment appropriate is sentence the history." Lack of no criminal you have crime. and this for this offender history is a miti- criminal prior significant 85-50-2-9(c)(1), § gating factor, but I.C. sen trial court's amended The found, signif- had a the trial court Clark as to these did not conform tencing order history. juvenile criminal Clark's icant First, cited trial court the requirements. runaway incorrigibili- history and includes as murder was intentional that the the fact three documented ty charges. Clark has Neither intention factor.3 aggravating an violations, has been arrested twice parole found, "premedi nor, trial court as the al a handgun possession, and de- illegal for tated," statutory aggravating killing is a posses- on the second prosecution ferred penalty death statute. under the factor when he commit- yet expired not 35-50-2-9(b). sion had Accordingly, it was § I.C. findings establish murder. These ted the identify court to for the trial proper not carefully considered trial court that 'the to the decision factor as relevant that background. criminal Clark's parole. impose life without factor, which aggravating A second that the argues further establish Clark's properly could eligibility mitigat as a have considered court should fired wаs that parole, life without for signifi had no that Clark ing circumstance dwelling. inhabited handgun into by the history required criminal cant an sentencing order However, in its amended finding The of statute. parole life without improper aggrava- found an the trial court the trial court's factors is within mitigating factor, aggravators of the balance ting State, 535 N.E.2d discretion. Graham improper ag- without the mitigators (Ind.1989). However, "[wlhen Accordingly, the gravator is unknown. fails sentencing statement trial court's to meet sentencing order failed amended mitigating cir or evaluate to discuss life for a sentence requirements finding to make a cumstances fails improper it was tionally." that improper for the аrgues that it was 3. aggrava- an aggravator the fact murder as as an cite an intentional to find trial court a ma killing because was im- aggravating was intentional factor that the this tor. Because may be used as a crime given, element of we do terial applied for reason properly doctrine whether this the issue an enhanced not address aggravating an factor support given aggravator e.g., See, also invalidate sentence. would Bradley (Ind.Ct.App.2002). 388-89 killing "knowing" is sufficient that - murder convic of Clark's mens rea element murder conviction. "knowingly or inten- was that he acted tion again This case parole. without re- di. Williams v. sentencing a new
manded for
ordеr
(finding Ring
inapplicable
intentionality
does not include
to a
"guilt phase
death sentence where the
aggravating
an
factor.
murder as
necessarily
verdict
shows that
unanimously found that Williams had com
C.
Statute
Constitutionality of
murders,
thus,
mitted two
shows
-
At
the original
the time of
sen
the multiple-murder
cireum-
aggravating
tencing,
parole
life
statute pro
without
proved beyond
stance was
a reasonable
*13
that,
doubt");
vided
court
shall make the
1121,
Brown v.
"[the
sentence,
final determination of the
after
1126
(citing Wrinkles v.
considering
jury's
the
recommenda
905,
(Ind.2002))
(jury's
907-08
85-50-2-9(e)
(2002).
§
ILC.
tion...."
verdict in
guilt phase,
the
finding the de
that under the United States
guilty
murders,
fendant
of the two
neces
Supreme
Apprendi
decisions in
Court
v.
sarily
jury found,
means that
beyond
the
a
466,
2348,
Jersey,
New
120
U.S.
S.Ct.
530
doubt,
reasonable
that Defendant had
Arizona,
(2000)
147
Ring
L.Ed.2d 435
and
murder).
committed more than one
584,
2428,
36
122
U.S.
S.Ct.
153
5
jury
contends
the
knew
"ilf
(2002),
L.Ed.2d
parole
the life without
applied
the law was
in
way
such a
as to
applicable
statute
at the time of his convie
court,
bind the trial
jury might
the
feel
holds,
tion
Apprendi
is unconstitutional.
more solemn in its deliberations." This is
conviction,
prior
than the fact of a
"Lolther
not a
jury
claim that the
incorrectly
was
any fact
penalty
that increases the
for a
role,
instructed as to its
which
anis
error
beyond
crime
prescribed
the
statutory
that violates the Eighth Amendment as
jury,
maximum must be
to the
submitted
interpreted
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472
proved beyond
and
a reasonable doubt."
320, 330,
2633,
U.S.
105 S.Ct.
86 LEd.2d
Apprendi,
have since the was sus- C.J., DICKSON, SHEPARD, noneooperation with the pended due SULLIVAN, concur. Accordingly, given JJ. disciplinary process. *14 passage respondent's of time and the J., RUCKER, except for the concurs cooperate continued failure to with the dis- concerning the sen- majority's resolution ciplinary process, we now find that cause for Rather than remand this tence. suspensions should be con- respondent's sen- inadequate to cure an a second time suspensions to indefinite from the verted order, the maxi- impose he would tencing law, practice pursuant of to Admis.Disc.R. murder years of 65 for the mum terms 23(10). would further order conviction. He consecutive to the to be served sentence IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that IT im- already has the trial court sentences from suspensions practice the current carrying posed attempted murder Michael F. Tur- respondent, law handgun without a license. ner, cooperate with the disci- for failure to hereby are converted
plinary process immedi- suspensions, effective indefinite ately. Accordingly, order become of law in this practice to the readmitted state, successfully pe- must respondent pursuant for readmittance tition this Court 23(4). to Admis.Disc.R. Michael F. TURNER. In the Matter 72S00-0304-DI-166, Nos. All concur. Justices 72S00-0308-CI-360. of Indiana.
Supreme Court
May28,2004. SUSPENSIONS CONVERTING
ORDER WITH
FOR NONCOOPERATION
THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS INDEFINITE SUSPENSIONS
TO 24, 20083, pursuant
On October 23(10), Discipline Rule
Ind. Admission