101 Iowa 270 | Iowa | 1897
Lead Opinion
V. It is also contended that defendants did not file a complete list of their employes. This contention is based .upon a misapprehension of the record. The employe whose name is said to have been omitted did not work around the premises in question.
It is thought that' the law, if construed as contended for by appellees, does not affect the charter or laws of the city of Cedar Rapids. The charter of a corporation is the instrument creating the corporate body, giving it its name, defining its objects, and conferring its powers. Its laws are the by-laws, rules, regulations, and ordinances passed by the governing body, under and by virtue of its charter, or necessarily incident to the exercise of its charter powers. The charter of the city of Cedar
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — I do not concur in the reasoning or the conclusion of that part of the majority opinion, holding that, because of section 941, of McClain’s Code, the act known as the “Mulct Law” does not apply to the city of Cedar Rapids. Independent of the prescribed method of expressing the legislative intent, no one, I think, doubts that the mulct law was designed to apply to all cities of the state, and such has been its popular construction and application. It is a question, then, if the legislature has failed to indicate in a legal manner, its intention as to the act. I do not dispute the facts stated in the majority opinion, that go to make section 941 apply to the mulct law, barring the single conclusion stated therein, that the law affects the charter and laws of the city of Cedar Rapids. I frankly concede that, if it does affect such charter or laws of the city, the conclusion of the majority is correct. I make the further admission., for the purpose of the case, at
It is said in the majority opinion that we must assume that the legislature had in mind section 941, when it passed the mulct law. With that statement I agree. It then' leaves to inference the conclusion that, because of such knowledge, and its failure to make the reference necessary to permit the law to affect the charters and laws of such cities, it did not intend the law to apply to such cities. With that conclusion I do not agree. No fact of state history of public importance is better understood than that, the law was intended to apply to all cities. The only rational conclusion is that the intent was that the law should apply to all cities, and that as to those under special charters it should not be construed so as to affect their charters or laws. It seems to me that the majority, to evade this conclusion, has enlarged upon the language of section 941, so as to make it read that “no general law as to powers of cities incorporated under the general incorporation act, shall be construed to apply to cities under special charters,” etc., instead of “to affect the charters or laws” of such cities. The difference in meaning is manifest. A reference to the opinion will show that the language of
It is further said in the opinion, speaking of the powers of the city of Cedar Rapids by virtue of its charter and the law in question: “If construed to apply to them [that is, the powers’ under their charters], it would certainly change and thus affect the charter' and laws” of the city. I grant it, but that is begging the question. The correct'test is, how will it be if you don’t so construe it? It logically and rightly follows that it won’t affect them. Section 941 says the law must not be construed to affect them. It seems to me the case should not be permitted to turn on a forbidden state of facts. I will add here that a chief ground of my contention is that the subject of the mulct law, it being as to the sale of intoxicating liquors, is one clearly outside the powers possessed by such cities under their charters, because of a general law of the state, and the grant, under the mulct law, in no way affects a single provision in the charter of Cedar Rapids. With the act in full force, the city could do, as to its charter rights, precisely as it did before. I may repeat that the act is as to a subject entirely independent of charter rights and provisions, and the grant of particular powers therein is distinct from such rights and provisions; and, because of the rule of construction prescribed by the legislature in section 941, the act cannot be construed as an attempt to change the charter. I think, then, we have the fact, that there is an absence, of a legislative intent to change the charter rights of Cedar Rapids by the mulct law, and the further fact that it actually does not conflict with the act in force in the city, according to its terms. What is said as to the charter, is also true as to the laws of the city, so far as the record shows. I may add, that I have, with considerable care, examined the acts constituting