58 Iowa 201 | Iowa | 1882
It was held, that upon the facts as they then appeared, no recovery could be had. Indeed, the witness in that trial, stated that he did not think Ralls said anything about the durability of the stream in former years. In the last trial, the witness Clark, claims that Ralls stated to him, not only that the stream would run the mill night and day for eight months of the year, but “that it had water enough to run eight months night and day, etc.” By’ this, the witness meant of course that the language used was: It has water enough, etc. Now, if Ralls said that, what did he mean? He certainly did not mean that it had at that moment water enough to run eight months night and day. He intended to be understood, as comprehending the history of the stream, during the time he had used it as a power, which was some three years. It was for the jury to determine whether, or not, the statement was made by Ralls both wrays, as now claimed by this witness, and it is useless, in view of the well known rule prevailing here, as to conflicting evidence, to call our attention to his evidence upon former trials, or to the evidence of Ralls or the witness Howe, which appears to be in direct conflict with Clark?s testimony. This disposes of the case as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, so far as the representations are involved.
“9. The delay in bringing the action, and the prompt payment of the notes for the purchase-money, may be considered as circumstances tending to show that the representations were not relied upon. On the other hand, the price paid, and any complaint of the scarcity of the power — if they made any complaint — may be considered as circumstances tending to show that the representations, if made, were relied upon. The value of these circumstances as evidence is wholly for your determination. Neither is conclusive. The delay in bringing suit, and the prompt payment, will-not defeat a recovery; if otherwise, the plaintiff ought to recover. Nor will the complaint of the want of power, or a large price, aid the plaintiff if he ought not otherwise to recover.”
There was no evidence, whatever, of any complaint made by the plaintiff or James W. Clark, as to the want of power in the stream, in the sense of charging the defendants with any fraudulent representations. Indeed, it does not appear that they complained of the defendants’ acts in any way in connection with the sale of the mill. They paid the deferred
IY. Many other objections are made to the instructions given by the court to the jury, and to the refusal to give instructions asked by the defendants. We have examined the instructions given, with care, and have to say that we find no error in them, except as above stated. In view, however, of a re-trial, we think it not improper to say, that it would, in our opinion, have been proper to have given the fifteenth instruction asked by the defendants. It is clear and pointed, and in harmony with the former opinion of this court in this ease.
Reversed.