CLARK v. NORTHERN LIGHT HEALTHCLARK v. NORTHERN LIGHT HEALTH
The court affirms the recommended decision of a magistrate judge over a pro se plaintiff’s several objections. The court concludes the plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her federal antitrust claim and that the complaint also fails to plausibly allege an antirust claim. Because the court dismisses the federal antitrust claim, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state law claims and dismisses the complaint in its entirety. The court dismisses without prejudice the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the complaint since she has not made a formal motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 17, 2026, Heather Clark filed a civil complaint alleging Northern Light Health (NLH) violated state law and federal antitrust law. Compl. and Demand for Jury Trial (ECF No. 1) (Compl.). On July 9, 2026, the United States Magistrate Judge, after granting Ms. Clark’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and conducting a preliminary review, recommended dismissing the complaint because it failed to plausibly state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
On July 19, 2026, Ms. Clark objected to the Magistrate Judge’s recommended decision. Pl.’s Obj. to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision (ECF No. 6) (Obj.). First, Ms. Clark argues the complaint plausibly alleges concerted action and the Magistrate Judge improperly credited NLH’s “factual defense,” applied a higher standard than Rule 8 requires for pleadings, and relied on “materially distinguishable” caselaw. Id. at 1-2, 3-6. Second, Ms. Clark argues the complaint sufficiently alleges antitrust injury and the Magistrate Judge incorrectly construed the complaint to allege only personal injury, rather than a broader injury to the labor market sufficient for antitrust standing. Id. at 2-3, 6. Accordingly, Ms. Clark asks this Court to permit her complaint to proceed to discovery. Id. at 5, 7. In the alternative, Ms. Clark asks that this Court grant her leave to amend her complaint. Id. at 7.
II. DISCUSSION
Having performed a de novo review, the Court concludes Ms. Clark lacks antitrust standing and that the complaint fails to plausibly allege a Section 1 claim. First, Ms. Clark lacks antitrust standing because she has not plausibly alleged an
A. Antitrust Standing1
In a federal antitrust case, a plaintiff must satisfy both the typical requirements of Article III standing and the so-called “antitrust standing” doctrine. See Vázquez-Ramos v. Triple-S Salud, Inc., 55 F.4th 286, 293 (1st Cir. 2022); see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31, (1983) (In addition to satisfying the requirements of Article III standing, “court[s] must make a further determination whether the plaintiff is a proper party to bring a private antitrust action”). Here, the only question is whether Ms. Clark has antitrust standing.2
As the First Circuit has explained, “[t]he purpose of the antitrust standing doctrine is ‘to avoid overdeterrence’ and to ‘ensure that suits inapposite to the goals of the antitrust laws are not litigated’” so “‘that persons operating in the market do not restrict procompetitive behavior because of a fear of antitrust liability.’” Vázquez-Ramos, 55 F.4th at 293 (quoting Serpa Corp. v. McWane, Inc., 199 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1999)). “To further this purpose,” courts apply a six-factor test “to ensure that the prospective antitrust plaintiff has suffered an injury of the kind antitrust laws were intended to prevent, such that the plaintiff is a proper party to bring a federal antitrust suit.” Id. Specifically, the First Circuit instructs district courts to balance the following factors:
(1) the causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and harm to the plaintiff; (2) an improper motive; (3) the nature of the plaintiff‘s alleged injury and whether the injury was of a type that Congress sought to redress with the antitrust laws (“antitrust injury”); (4) the directness with which the alleged market restraint caused the asserted injury; (5) the speculative nature of the damages; and (6) the risk of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of damages.
Id. (citations omitted).
The First Circuit has emphasized the third factor of this test—whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an “antitrust injury.” See RSA Media, Inc. v. AK Media Grp., Inc., 260 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2001). In the First Circuit, a “[l]ack of an antitrust injury is typically enough by itself to negate standing.” Vázquez-Ramos, 55 F.4th at 294 (citation omitted); see also RSA Media, 260 F.3d at 14 (“Even when a causal link has been established between the alleged violation and the injury, the absence of ‘antitrust injury’ will generally defeat standing”) (first citing Serpa, 199 F.3d at 10-11; and then citing Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 1994)).
The Supreme Court defines “antitrust injury” as an “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful.” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); accord Vázquez-Ramos, 55 F.4th at 294 (“[T]he alleged injury must be the type of injury the antitrust violation would cause to competition”) (citation
Here, the complaint does not allege an injury that antitrust laws are intended to prevent. Ms. Clark claims that NLH “restrained competition within the Bangor healthcare labor market by restricting employment opportunities available to current and former Securitas employees” when it rescinded her conditional employment offer “immediately after learning of [her] prior employment with and pending litigation against Securitas” and “attempted to impose a permanent no-rehire restriction.” Obj. at 3, 6; Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 9-14, 18-32. At the threshold, “loss of employment alone is insufficient for an antitrust injury.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Loc. Lodge No. 1821 v. Verso Paper Corp., 80 F. Supp. 3d 247, 274 (D. Me. 2015). Thus, any alleged injury flowing from NLH’s recission of its conditional employment offer must combine with additional allegations of anticompetitive conduct to demonstrate an antitrust injury. Here, Ms. Clark insists that NLH’s recission combined with its proposed no-rehire agreement is sufficient to show antitrust injury. The Court disagrees.
As pleaded, the complaint does not allege NLH engaged in anticompetitive conduct as contemplated by federal antitrust law. The no-rehire restriction Ms. Clark decries as anticompetitive appears to be an agreement between NLH and Ms. Clark that would “prohibit Plaintiff,” i.e., Ms. Clark herself, “from seeking future
This kind of self-imposed restraint is not anticompetitive conduct under federal antitrust law; any injury is to Ms. Clark individually, not to market competition. See Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 486 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Anticompetitive . . . refers not to actions that merely injure individual competitors, but rather to actions that harm the competitive process”) (citation omitted); see also Am. Steel Erectors v. Local Union No. 7, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers, 815 F.3d 43, 60 (1st Cir. 2016) (“The Sherman Act protects against unlawful impairments to competition, not to individual competitors”) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); Cable Line, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns of Pa., Inc., No. 3:16-cv-1000, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172583, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2017) (Caselaw “is replete with examples where plaintiffs failed to establish an antitrust claim when they have only alleged injury to their own welfare”).3 Moreover, Ms. Clark cannot claim she suffered injury from the no-rehire restriction, because she declined to agree to the proposed provision. See Compl. ¶ 31.
Nowhere in the complaint does Ms. Clark allege NLH entered into similar no-rehire agreements with other current or former Securitas employees. The complaint merely alleges NLH proposed this no-rehire agreement between itself and Ms. Clark. Although the complaint alleges “[i]n separate federal litigation, [NLH] admitted that a Northern Light security manager requested that Securitas remove a Securitas employee from a Northern Light work assignment and further admitted the employee had been assigned by Securitas to work at Northern Light facilities,” see id. ¶ 28, the only case cited is an employment discrimination and retaliation lawsuit against NLH, Northern Light Eastern Maine Medical Center, and Securitas. Id. at 5 (citing Clarke v. Northern Light Health, No. 1:26-cv-00141-SDN). However, that case concerns a dispute over removing the plaintiff from work assignments due to alleged misconduct, and the complaint does not mention a no-rehire agreement or raise a federal antitrust claim. See Clarke, Compl. at 1-10 (ECF No. 1); Clamp-All Corp., 851 F.2d at 486 (“Anticompetitive . . . refers not to actions that merely injure
The Court therefore cannot conclude Ms. Clark has met her burden of demonstrating antitrust standing. See Sterling Merch., Inc. v. Nestlé, S.A., 656 F.3d 112, 121 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Nor did the Magistrate Judge “overextend[ ]” First Circuit caselaw in concluding otherwise. Cf. Obj. at 6. Consistent with Vázquez-Ramos and other First Circuit caselaw, upon de novo review, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Ms. Clark lacks antitrust standing.4
B. Concerted Action
“Section 1 of the [Sherman] Act prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade or commerce through contracts, combinations, or conspiracies; it thus applies only to concerted action that unreasonably restrains trade.” Am. Steel Erectors, 815 F.3d at 60. Accordingly, a Section 1 claim has two elements: (1) concerted action and (2) “the actors’ agreement must involve either restrictions that are per se illegal or restraints of trade that fail scrutiny under the rule of reason.” Euromodas, Inc. v. Zanella, Ltd., 368 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2004). An antitrust plaintiff must present “direct or circumstantial evidence of defendants’ ‘conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.’” Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., 720 F.3d 33, 43 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).
The complaint’s conclusory allegation that NLH and Securitas have entered into a no-poach agreement is insufficient to plausibly allege concerted action. Rather, the complaint must present sufficient factual content of concerted action (i.e., a contract, combination, or conspiracy) with an improper anticompetitive purpose. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (noting that “a naked assertion of conspiracy in a [Section] 1 complaint . . . without some further factual enhancement . . . stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility”); Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Ecoer Inc., No. 24 Civ. 1464 (PAE), 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130177, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2024) (“The existence of a lawful business relationship does not plausibly suggest a separate, unlawful agreement to restrain trade”) (citation omitted).
Without more, Ms. Clark’s Section 1 claim may not proceed, because “[a] restraint of trade cannot simply be a corollary of the agreement; the restraint must be an objective of the agreement” itself. Suzuki of W. Mass, Inc. v. Outdoor Sports Expo, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 40, 47 (D. Mass. 2001); Zanella, Ltd., 368 F.3d at 16 (explaining that “concerted action” is a necessary element of “a successful [S]ection 1 claim”). The Court is therefore unpersuaded by Ms. Clark’s objection that the Magistrate Judge applied a higher standard than required at the pleading stage.
Moreover, Ms. Clark’s allegation is unsupported by the evidence she supplies in support of the complaint. The materials attached to the complaint state that NLH
At bottom, the complaint “point[s] to nothing, other than [Ms. Clark’s] own inability to obtain employment, to indicate any coordinated action between” NLH and Securitas. Walker v. Analog Devices, Inc., No. 22-11934-PBS, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147353, at *11 (D. Mass. Aug. 4, 2023) R. & R. adopted by 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146538 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 2023). The pleading rules “demand[ ] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Here, Ms. Clark’s complaint does not begin to establish a valid Section 1 claim.
C. The Relevant Market
Although neither the recommended decision nor Ms. Clark’s objection addresses it, the complaint’s failure to sufficiently define the relevant market is further reason to dismiss Ms. Clark’s Section 1 claim. “Without a definition of [the]
The complaint refers to “the healthcare labor market in Bangor and throughout Maine” in general, Compl. ¶ 27, but does not elaborate on the “the area of effective competition.” Am. Express Co., 585 U.S. at 543. The relevant market, or area of effective competition, encompasses both a geographic market and a product market. See Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc., 817 F.3d 849, 853 (1st Cir. 2016). Here, the complaint’s vague reference to the general healthcare labor market insufficiently defines the relevant product market. The complaint alleges Ms. Clark received a conditional employment offer from NLH as a Patient Transportation Specialist but does not state the services she would provide in that role or how it relates to the healthcare labor market at all. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2. Without more, the Court cannot evaluate whether similar services provided by current or former Securitas employees combine to form a competitive market for those same services. Without a definition of the relevant market, the Court must dismiss the complaint.
D. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Given that the Court concludes Ms. Clark’s only federal claim, the Section 1 claim, must be dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim for relief, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses without prejudice Ms. Clark’s state law claims.5
The Court also denies Ms. Clark’s request to amend her complaint. In her objection, Ms. Clark lists “additional factual allegations” she can provide. Obj. at 6-7. However, she has not actually filed a motion for leave to amend nor has she provided the Court with a proposed amended complaint. Instead, she suggests that she would like to amend her complaint to cure the current defects in her complaint. Id. at 6 (“Even assuming this Court concludes additional factual allegations are required, dismissal without first granting leave to amend is inappropriate”). However, the Court will not grant leave to amend in the abstract. If she wishes to amend her complaint, she must file a motion to amend and attach a proposed amended complaint, and if she does so, the Court will rule on the merits of the motion as presented. Until then, her complaint is fatally defective for the reasons clearly set forth by the Magistrate Judge and expanded upon in this order.
The First Circuit “has made clear that a ‘contingent request to replead, contained in an opposition to a motion to dismiss’ rather than a motion to amend pursuant to
To be clear, the Court reviewed the additional facts contained in Ms. Clark’s objection and is not convinced that these additional factual allegations would remedy
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the recommended decision and in this order, the Court AFFIRMS and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision after Preliminary Review (ECF No. 5). The Court therefore OVERRULES Heather Clark’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision (ECF No. 6). To the extent Heather Clark requests permission to amend her complaint in lieu of a formal motion to amend pursuant to
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 11th day of August, 2026