Clark v. Mincks

(Iowa 1982). If 322 N.W.2d 62 Dvorsky, retrial, the sen-

Finchum is convicted to exercise its dis-

tencing court will have of a concurrent or

cretion in the matter light of the circum-

consecutive sentence

stances. to district court for

We return the case

retrial. AND

REVERSED REMANDED. Shirley

Michael CLARK and J. James

Clark, Individually, Michael James

Clark, of the Estate of Administrator Clark, Deceased, Appel Lynn

Michelle

lants, MINCKS, Individually and as

Robert G. Nancy

Administrator of the Estate

Mincks, Deceased, Bogle, De and Gale

fendants, Larry E. Mincks and Rex

William

Mincks, Appellees. Shirley

Michael J. James CLARK and

Clark, Individually, and Michael James

Clark, the Estate of Administrator of Clark, Deceased, Appel Lynn

Michelle

lees,

.v MINCKS, Individually

Robert and as G.

Administrator of the Estate of

Mincks, Deceased, Defendants, Bogle, Appellant,

Gale Larry

William E. Mincks and Rex

Mincks, Defendants. 83-343,

Nos. 83-1164.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 1985. Riley, Riley,

Tom Peter Mary C. K. Riley Firm, Hoefer of Tom Rap- Law Cedar ids, appellants for Clark. Snyder Gregory

James R. M. Leder- Simmons, Perrine, Albright er of & Ell- wood, Rapids, appellant Bogle. Cedar for Richardson, Stephen Bloomfield, A. for appellees William E. and Larry Rex Mincks.

UHLENHOPP, Justice.

Plaintiffs grow- Clark assert three claims alleged wrongful out of an death: one against the owner and the estate of the deceased driver of the van which was in- volved, another the hosts of cook- ‍​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‍out which the deceased driver had attend- ed, against passenger and the third in the van. These appeals two consolidated in- volve latter two claims. appeals present two basic tort liabili-

ty questions, plead- and come to us on the ings discovery. appeal and results of One alleged giving is founded on the hosts’ beverages to an intoxicated (the van). appeal driver of the The other alleged duty founded on an of care passenger safety in a motor vehicle for the рassenger. of another allege Plaintiffs that defendants William (the Mincks) Larry E. and Rex Mincks host- party during ed a rural late afternoon evening of 1 and into October October 2, 1982, gave or other intoxicants beer (now) Nancy decedent Mincks when she was intoxicated. Plaintiffs had their chil- party, dren at the one of whom was Mic- Lynn Nancy helle Clark. Mincks and oth- ers, Michelle, including entered a van husband, op- by Nancy’s Nancy owned flipped it. The van side and erated onto its over, rolling and Mich- continued plaintiffs elle were killed. one count damages of the Mincks for Michelle’s ask death. plaintiffs’

The Mincks moved to dismiss claim, petition for failure to state a on the ground against social that a cause of action injuries flowing hosts does not arise from finding reasonably intoxicants to a from the hosts’ be made that Bo- gle plaintiffs knew guest. court sustained the mo- did not want their chil- The district tion, plaintiffs’ application Nancy. dren to ride with granted and we appeal. At some Michelle also entered the plaintiffs departed. asserted a and the van Plaintiff Mi-

In аnother count Bogle thought Gale chael J. Clark Michelle claim defendant carload, plaintiff Shirley moved for summa- first but J. Michelle’sdeath. Clark girl ry judgment to this count. We thus knew the was the van. as in the case which look to the documentation Plaintiffs soon left in a third for vehicle Viewing court. was before the district way they the tavern. theOn came favor, Tasco, plaintiffs’ documentation Nancy the wrecked and found that (Iowa Winkel, Inc. v. 281 N.W.2d and Michelle had been killed. 1979), Nancy findings could be made that Bogle’s The district court overruled mo- bеgan drinking Mincks about noon on Octo- summary judgment tion for in material cookout, came to the and ber 1st before she part. evening in the again then drank at the Hosts’giving 1. We first intoxicants. night; cookout until late that that she up plaintiffs’ take claim that a common-law cups drank over ten twelve-ounce of beer negligence cause of action for exists cookout, difficulty standing, at the had death, the Mincks for Michelle’s hosts; spilled Bogle on one of the beer arising giving Nancy from the Mincks’ in- she too drunk to drive and at one knew tоxicants she was Plain- when intoxicated. evening up prevent in the held her to negligence tiffs claim the arises here from stumbling; her and that at the time of a violation statute. See Restatement mishap her blood-alcohol level § (Second) (1965) (negligence of Torts milligrams percent. .222 violation). statutory They rely on on based following findings additional 123.49(1) of the of 1983: Iowa Code Nancy Bogle be made. and Mrs. had sell, person dispense, give No shall or brought quarters for their children to use any person, intoxicated or one simulat- playing games. midnight video About intoxication, or Nancy Bogle decided that at least some beer. people remaining party of the at the should question ruling As the arises from a to a take children into town tavern dismiss, plaintiffs’ a motion to we take games. Bogle had video Mrs. loaded allegations petition in their as true and girls, departed car with for allegations light most construe room, however, did not for town. She have pleaders. Salsbury favorable to the Lab boys. Nancy brought Michelle or for the DEQ, oratories v. Iowa site, picnic her around to the husband’s van 1979). (Iowa urged go others to climb in and Bogle got only into the van—the town. of the cases which come Most have be- plaintiffs’ well as Nancy involving furnishing adult beside fore this court —as boy. person small son and another Michelle was to another in the intoxicants arose playing steps. dramshop context. one in- van This however problems volves social hosts. Two arise: Clark, Shirley Plaintiff aware of Nan- J. whether a cause of action can exist at all condition, husband, cy’s Nancy’s asked and, sо, dramshop if outside the context Mincks, drive, not to let her Robert G. reject should such a cause of whether we plaintiff requested Michael J. Clark to re- setting action in the social for rea- move their son from van. Robert made sons. request Nancy, and Michael assured Shirley present involving statute liabili- would not drive. Plain- A. Our another, van; ty providing liquor whereby tiffs then removed their son from the boy person injured, the other remained in third does not create the vehicle. A a however, predicat- context; opinion, it is limited the Lewis nеgligence on violation of permittee of a ed or of a licensee Restatement sections on statu- we cited the Code liquor or beer establishment. Iowa negligence. did not tory violations cause a common-law 123.92 Can dealing restrict that rationale statutes non-licensee or non- action arise with minors. recent deci- permittee setting? Two of our sions, decided after the one of which was recent decision is The other Haafke here, ruling so indicate. court’s district (Iowa 1984). Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381 part of involved sales of intoxi- One general and courts in Formerly this court Haafke per- minor to an cants to a or furnished intoxi- that a held son, permit- by employees of the licensee or another, injured who in turn cants to question A in the case was whether tee. ‍​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‍to the third person, third was not liable to an in- employees those would be liable of the consumption person, because jured person on a common-law basis. The furnishing liquor and not the splintered, vote of this court was somewhat injury. proximate cause of the was thе majority a of the court held that such 358, but Hansen, 250 Iowa 92 v. Cowman The court stated: would arise. decision, (1958). how- 682 That N.W.2d State, ever, question in Lewis v. Applying principles came into of common-law 1977). (Iowa above, In Lewis a 181 hold that discussed we liquor to a liquor employee may sold under employees state store these be held liable prohibiting negligence furnishing a statute in minor in violation of common law § (1971). Miller, negligence may 123.43 liquor sales. Iowa Code and such such dramshop statute rely upon did not on the violations of statute or Lewis be based arising here, negligence alleged under the au- but on common-law ordinance as 123.43, and made is not thority from violation of section of Lewis. This We said: act. preempted by frontal attack on Cowman. the dram a hold the sale or furnish- We therefore opinion in the did at 388. Nowhere Id. in of intoxicating liquor violation of employee’s liability for sales court limit the proximate may section 123.43 well be the cases in which to an a result of injuries cause of sustained as minor. person was also a the intoxicated con- intoxicated individual’s tortious an a as in that thus hold We Haafke imposed liability may thus be duct arise from of action can common-law cause injured, in favor of the upon the violators 123.49(1). We in of section a sale violation question of party. innocent third however, dispensing of again, that note under such facts and proximate cause place in took intoxicants Haafke for the trier of circumstances would be in a commercial of sales of reference frame fact. establishment, distinguished from сorrectly court Consequently, the trial such as by a social host gifts of intoxicants motion for summa- overruled State’s we have here. it relied ry judgment insofar as furnishing intoxicants Apart B. proximate cause as a matter absence minors, that have con- nearly all courts of law. liability against a the assertion sidered prior our extent that To the it, rejected a number host have social this con- inconsistent with decisions are which proximate cause basis them on clusion, hereby overruled in this they are The decisions Lewis. we аbandoned respect. 504 Pa. Raysinger, analyzed in Klein v. note, however, 141, (1983). also Olson v. holding that our 470 A.2d 507 See (Minn.1984); Ische, Olsen li- N.W.2d 284 a commercial sale of 343 in the context of 483, 280 N.W.2d Copeland, 90 Wis.2d setting quor in a store and not the social v. (1979). principal decisions The two Moreover, 178 an have here. v. found are Coulter have adult, the sale Lewis was to a minor. 230 hand, 21

Superior County, majority argued San Mateo On the other Court of 534, 144, 669 Cal.Rptr. 548-49, Cal.3d 145 577 P.2d Kelly, 96 N.J. at A.2d at 538, (1978), Gwinnell, Kelly 96 N.J. (citations omitted): 1224-25 476 A.2d 1219 Coulter was abro We therefore hold a host who gated by legislаture. the California Cal. serves an guest, adult social § 1714(b) Business and Professional Code knowing guest both that the is intoxicat- (c), (c) 25602(b) (West Supp. ed operating and will thereafter be a 1985). vehicle, injuries motor is liable for inflict- arguments A number forceful be can party ed on third as a result against liability made both for and negligent operation of a motor vehicle Opposing liability, social host. the court negligence the adult such when is Kajet, Edgar stated Misc.2d caused intoxication. We (Sup.Ct.1975), 375 N.Y.S.2d duty this on the host to party the third aff'd, 55 A.D.2d N.Y.S.2d because wе believe consid- (1976): imposition erations served its out- far implications imposing civil liabil- weigh those opposition. asserted in ity Avis herein are vast and far-reach- recognize While we the concern our ing. Extending liability to non-sellers ruling accepted will interfere with stan- open would Pandora’s box virtual behavior; dards of social will intrude range potential wide of numerous de- enjoyment, somewhat diminish the fendants when the Court does not believe relaxation, and camaraderie that accom- that the ever en- intendеd to pany gatherings at which alcohol drinking act law that makes social served; such gatherings and that beverages relationships social are simply not tan- intoxicating liquors drinks of at social gential of a society benefits civilized but events actionable. a Just recitation of regarded by many important, few the considerations involved herein impels any just this Court to believe that the conclude that added assurance of extension liability legisla- should compensation be to the victims of drunken example, tive aсt. For how is a host at a driving as well as the added deterrent gathering social to know when toler- effect of the rule on driving such out- guests ance of one of his has been weigh importance of those val- other reached? To what extent should a host Indeed, given ues. we believe that socie- nearing refuse to serve drinks to those ty’s extreme concern about drunken driv- Further, of intoxication? how ing, any change in social behavior result- supervise is a host guests’ to his regarded from the rule will ulti- be implications activities? The arе almost mately very least, as neutral at the to might limitless as situations that arise change ‍​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‍worse; not as a for the but that dispensed is gath- when at a social loss, any if there event be it is well ering, holiday parties, family celebra- gain. worth the tions, picnics, outdoor to barbecues and The liability we here is analo- examples. cite a If few civil gous traditionally imposed on imposed herein, were on it be Avis owners of vehicles who lend their cars similarly imposed who, every in a host persons they If, to be know intoxicated. sрirit friendship liquor. serves drunk, lending a car to a a host be- analysis, In a final the controlling con- parties injured by comes to third liable public policy, any sideration is exten- the drunken negligence, driver’s sion of carefully should be con- same should extend to host sidered after all the factors have been visibly who furnishes to a weighed legislative examined and drunken our is, process, hearings, guest after he extensive who knows will thereafter drive surveys investigation. away. opinions They in our Lewis and duty intoxicated driver. base this decisions commоn-law contention that had “assumed base

Haafke broadly custody” of without Michelle. on breach exception for the social indication of an The principles subject on this are stated 123.49(1), itself, host. The statute 314, 314A, 315, in sections and 320 of the host; pro it except does not the social (Second) Restatement of Torts Sec- serving “any” intoxicated scribes general tion 314 states the rule: of intoxicants It is not limited sales The fact the actor realizes or provides “person” vendors—it that no shall should realize that action on his sell, dispense, give” “or intoxicants. necessary protection for another’s aid or § 123.49(1). On this branch of the case we impose upon duty does not of itself him a hold, only, and hold that a motion to dis to take such action. miss should be overruled virtue of sec Ische, (Minn. See Olson v. 343 N.W.2d 284 123.49(1) allega tion of the Code when the 1984). petition plain tions of the are such that the protection of a third tiff could introduce substantial evidence (Michelle) (Nancy) from another can take (1) intoxicated, (2) showing guest was involving per the fоrm of action the third personally actually the host aware the son, removing such as Michelle from the guest intoxicated, (3) the host then involving or action control of the tort- (or intoxicating beverages) made other beer (preventing Nancy driving). feasor (4) guest, available to the drank 314A Section of the Restatement deals with (or (5) beverages), guest, the beer while gives exceptions the former and intoxicated, vehicle, operated then a motor general excep rule in that situation. The (6) intoxication, reason of the plaintiffs apparently tion which endeavor guest operated the vehicle in a manner bring themselves within is stated in (or of) injury which caused the death (4) paragraph of the section: “One who is (or plaintiff plaintiff’s decedent). required by voluntarily to take or law pleading, plaintiffs’ pe Under notice custody takes of another under circum permit tition in this case is sufficient to deprive stances such as to the other of his introduction of such evidence. The district opportunities protection normal is under сourt should have overruled the Mincks’ duty protect against to the other to [a motion to dismiss. physical unreasonable risk of The harm].” Bogle’s alleged duty. II. given in the section consist of illustrations affirmative plaintiffs succinctly In their brief state the obligation passenger to a in a a railroad’s against Bogle issue defendant thus: “The train, obligation guest, an a hotel’s to a in sole issue this case is whether Gale store, theatre, patron in a a invitee a a duty prevent Nancy Bogle had a either to prisoner jail, in and a child in a school— a driving Mincks from the vehicle in- while imposes a all situations which the law prevent toxicated or to remove or Michelle protect per duty on the actor to the other entering Clark from the van while son. Pirkle v. Oakdale Union See also was at the wheel.” 207, District, 40 Cal.2d Grammar School (1953)(kindergarten pupil); 253 P.2d 1 Bar against Plaintiffs do not rest their claim Caruso, 125, N.J.Super. barisi v. Bogle duty Bogle on a to exercise care (1957) volunteering (grandmother A.2d 539 safety. they Nor do claim that for his own child). Bogle to look after does not fit intо imputed Bogle, or Nancy’s conduct is plaintiffs categories, of those and are Bogle placed himself Michelle the required Bogle contend that is in the danger. exposed thus her to Rath- van and “voluntarily of one who takes situation er, argue Bogle that when and Mic- they custody of another” —Michelle. car, Bogle had an affirma- helle were running directly exceptions deal duty from himself to Sections 316 to 319 with tive danger reference to con- protect general her from of an to the rule with Michelle McGIVERIN, (Nancy) pro- the tortfeasor Justice (dissenting trol of (Michelle). concurring part). tection the third exceptions relation- These involve various respectfully I dissent I and from division such as ships which are not involved here majority opin- in division II concur of the child, servant, parent master and ion. Section 320 custodian insane I believe im- judicially do not we should 314A(4) counterpart is the of section pose liability on a “social under host” even required an exception by states when one is by majority. the criteria delineated voluntarily custody to take or takes law change This monumental in Iowa’s tort law exception en- plaintiffs another —the judgment runs counter of the Gener- bring Again deavor themselves within. Assembly, legislators al elected of the relationships “required in which one people. body equipped is a It much better custody law” to take of another involve pass than we to consider and on the broad officer, peace or jailer “a sheriff or a ward- questions It is diffi- involved. penal institution, charge a en of officials imagine legislаture cult to how asylum hospital or for the crimi- a state plainer it preempted have made that it has insane, per- nally or to teachers of other has chosen itself field and to make for charge public duty sons in of a school. the social decision here. applicable conducting persons is also history An of the of the examination school, private hospital asylum, or private Iowa dram statutes me that convinces and to lessees of convict labor.” legislature already has decided Bogle a. As not fit Comment does into Also, position taken majority. of relationships, plaintiffs these kinds are my there several other reasons for again required Bogle to contend that is in concerning majori- dissent division I of the “voluntarily of one situation takes ty opinion. custody of another”. court correctly The district sustained the Plaintiffs’ case thus Bogle de- motion, Mincks, filed to dis- defendants pends on whether a fact issue exists that petition portion miss the at directed Bogle custody took of Michelle. Gruener them. City Falls, Cеdar (Iowa 1971). Lengthy depositions were Originally, I. our common did not law taken facts. witnesses to the any right recognize of action on the based depositions all of have scrutinized those selling intoxicating liquor. or See pleadings well as the to inter- answers Snyder Davenport, 323 N.W.2d A rogatories. question does not of fact (Iowa 1982). abro- permit jury exist would could find gated creating the common-law rule custody or infer that took of Mic- right statutory against “any civil of action helle. district court should have sus- person” liquor illegally. who furnished Bоgle’s summary judg- tained motion for 1862 Iowa Acts 50. re- See That statute against plaintiffs, go trial ment and let place mained in for It several decades. did plaintiffs’ forward claims not, terms, liability its limit the it creat- oper- and the estate of owner the deceased liquor only permittees, ed to licensees or ator of the Mincks it in and this court refused to so limit provided who the beer. Klemesrud, 614, v. 197 Williams N.W.2d ‍​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‍1972), (then (Iowa in 616 which the statute return the case to district court for 129.2) section Iowa Code was held to allow proceedings. further against рerson recovery illegally who fur- REVERSED AND REMANDED. liquor, though nished even permittee. licensee nor a neither a McGIVERIN, except All Justices concur HARRIS, WOLLE, JJ., legislature passed CARTER and In who 1963 another in dissent providing liability concur in statute for civil part.

233 per- permittees “selling giving” who served a liable for or licensees and intoxicants intoxication, “was not mere or who inadvertence.” son to Nelson v. Iowa, person. 881, 1963 Restaurants an intoxicated See N.W.2d served § (Iowa 1983). 114, 29, Iowa Acts ch. as amended § (In 115, ch. 8. 1963 Iowa Acts Williams stated, II. For the reasons above the 1963 we held that the enactment of majority of court wrong this in Haafke 123.95), section which statute Iowa Code Mitchell, (Iowa 347 N.W.2d only liability of licensees and treated 1984), stating in that the shop current dram repeal abrogate not or permittees, did preempt liability act did not in this field “any person” liability previously broader allowing and in negligence common law 129.2. created section 123.49(1) against claim based on section employees of a licensee. Thus, at one time Iowa had two dram statutes, shop рroviding liability one for The dissent Justice Harris in Haafke, permittees providing licensees and and one 391-92, 347 N.W.2d at accurately states the liability any person illegally principles that should have controlled the liquor. furnished This could include a so- issues in raised Haafke. host. cial negli- This court in fashioned a Haafke Apparently dissatisfied with this state of gence claim in setting against a commercial affairs, in “Li- in 1971 employees of a licensee based on al- quor expressly act re- and Beer Control” leged 123.49(1), violation a crimi- pealed sections 129.2 and 123.95. both See nal for the sale of intoxicants to an § Acts ch. 152. At the Iowa negligence That action shop time it dram same enacted new should not have been in allowed view of the statute with limited to licensees legislative policy choice made in 1971 which permittees. See 1971 Iowa Acts ch. preempted this area and confined § 92, now as Iowa Code permittees. to licensees and A codified discussing legisla- 123.92 this remedy 123.49(1) for a section violation obviously restricting tive action аimed at should have been restricted to its criminal shop liability permit- dram to licensees and 123.50(1). sanction. See Iowa Code section Williams, only, tees we said majority The here relies Haafke apparent at “it is that cases such as State, (Iowa and Lewis v. 256 N.W.2d 181 [i.e., attempting impose shop this dram 1977), to reach its result. For the reasons liability on one who is neither a licensee or above, I stated believe should be Haafke permittee] will not arise the future.” contrary public policy overruled as majority unfortunately does not find provide of this state. Neither does Lewis apparent this conclusion so as did today’s expansion Wil- firm base for ignoring By liams court. nonpermittees. Williams As to nonlicensees history shop of our dram statutes the Davenport, Snyder noted N.W.2d manages 226-27, majority to arrive at a result at the facts Lewis arose when Assembly “any person” no General doubt the section 129.2 dram thought precluded: imposi- in 1971 still in force. it had statute was tion of on a nonlicensee and non- majority III. case furnishing permittee illegal based on the now builds and embellishes the Haafke intoxicants. 123.49(1) holding and section civil negligent- liability on the “social host” who patently Rather than reach a result so ly person. gives intoxicants to a contrary legislative intent on this action, the better course is to accord the agree I with the New York court that Assembly General the deference owed to it stated: policy. on matters of social Extending liability to non-sellers would by legislature open

The limitation a virtual box to wide Pandora’s permittees, range potential defendants parties, licensees and to be of numerous held 234 Finally, not believe that V.

when the Court does the allowance of a claim legislature to enact a here ever intended law a social host of context drinking of makes social alcoholic the intoxicated who drives a motor beverages and the drinks of door open plethora vehicle for a will intoxicating at social liquors events ac- claims in other fields analogy to tionable. leap It would great decision. be no holding majority's to mаke the 100, 103, Edgar Kajet, v. 84 Misc.2d responsible civilly injury social host for the (Sup.Ct.1975), aff'd, N.Y.S.2d guest done or her his A.D.2d 389 N.Y.S.2d assaults, abuse, sexual or other criminal imposed that has only other state might acts occur after the has liability by judicial on the “social host” hospitality left the of the social host. Such abrogated decision that been has not is easily a result is reached though even Jersey. occurred in Kelly New This v. majority attempted tighten has its crite- Gwinnett, 538, 476 96 N.J. A.2d 1219 liability ria for the social host ‍​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‍as much (1984), a four-to-three decision. Even that possible. reаdily distinguishable case is because New Jersey shop Therefore, act. has no dram choice, which majority better re- Kelly implied court that the absence of take, simply acknowledge fuses to is to shop specific a dram its with defini- and, therefore, wrong court was in Haafke liable, gave tions of and who impose judicially refuse to important court more freedom consider legislature social host when the not chose public reaching policy its issues decision. to do so. We do not have such freedom here be- stated, For the I several reasons above legislature cause the made its clear would affirm the district court’s sustention decision in should 1971 and abide it. by. of the motion dismiss defendants We should not on the dram agree Mincks. I the majority with that the (“any person”) “social host” after the district court have Bogle’s should sustained legislature chose to do so. not summary judgment motion for plaintiffs. ap

IV. The other wherein decision an pellate imposed court on a “social HARRIS, JJ., WOLLE, CARTER and host” Superior is Coulter v. Court San join in this dissent concurrence 144, 145 County, Cal.Rptr. Mateo 21 Cal.3d part. (1978). However, 577 P.2d 669 abrogated California that deci

sion Cartwright five months later. See (D.D.

Hyatt Corp., F.Supp. 81 n. 5

C.1978). legislation clearly

The California outlines rights concerning parties third LOUGHLIN, Appellee, hosts and serve intoxicants. John D. vendors who 1714(b)(West California Civil Code Supp.1985) provides the consumption (Cherokee COUNTY, CHEROKEE Iowa beverages, alcoholic rather than the fur- County Supervisors), Board nishing same, proximate is the cause of Appellant. injuries inflicted another an intoxi- No. 84-198. 1714(c) provides cated Section so- cial hosts will not liable to either their be Supreme Court of Iowa. guests injured by or to those who their 20, 1985. March guests serving beverages. provisions Other relevant are California §§ 25602(a)

Business and Code Professions (b) (West Supp.1985). and 25602.1

Case Details

Case Name: Clark v. Mincks

Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa

Date Published: Mar 20, 1985

Citation: 364 N.W.2d 226

Docket Number: 83-343, 83-1164

Court Abbreviation: Iowa