In this eaise the plaintiff, a -registered Democrat, sought to 'Change his party affiliation and to qualify himself to vote in the Republican Primary. The election officials, as a condition precedent to the сhange, demanded that he take -the oath prescribed by G.S. 163-50, as follows:
“I, ., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I desire in good faith to change my party affiliation from the.to the.party, and that such change of affiliation be made on the party ■ registration books, and I further solemnly swear (or affirmJ that I will support the nominees of said party to which I am now changing my affiliation in the next election and the said party nominees thereafter until I shall, in good faith, change my party affiliation in the manner provided by law, so help me Gоd.” (emphasis added).
The plaintiff refused to take that part of the oath -above in italics. The election officiаls .refused to make the requested transfer. The case presents this'question: Did. the General Assembly act within its competence in requiring, as a condition of the party transfer, that the plaintiff make oath -in- the manner set forth in the statute? The plain wording of.the oath .obligated -the plaintiff to support the nominees of *142 ■tihe Republican. Painty “in the next general election and the said party nominees thereafter until I shall, in good faith, 'Change my party affiliation in the manner provided by law.” For additional emphasis to this in futuro commitment, the Legislature by G.S. 163-197, provided that any .person shall be guilty of a felony who knowingly swears falsely with respеct to any matter* pertaining to any primacy or election.
The true intent .and purpose of the primary laws are stated in
States’ Rights Democratic Party v. Board of Elections,
Many of the cases in other states hold that obligation to support the nominees of the primary imposes a moral obligation which is .already implicit in the very act of taking part in the primary. “(T)he primary voter*, with or without the statute, incurred a mоral oibliga.tion .binding on his honor.” The court concluded that the obligation was no greater with than without the oath. “The voter’s conduct must be determined largely ,by his own peculiar sense of propriety .and of right. It is for such reasons that the courts do not undertake to compel performance of the obligаtion.”
Westerman v. Mims,
Without the binding commitment to support .the “next” and the “thereafter” candidates of the party, the remaining parts of the oath would seem to furnish adequate means by which to determine good faith membership in the party and to prevent raids 'by one party into the ranks of the other in primary nominations. Any eleсtor who offers sufficient -proof of his intent, in- good faith, to change his .party affiliation cannot be required to bind himself by an oath, the violation of which, if not sufficient to brand (him as a felon, would certainly be sufficiеnt to operate as a deterrant to his exercising a free choice among available candidates at the election — even -by hasting a write-in ballot. *143 Hits membership in his party and his right to participate in its primary may not be denied because he refuses to take an oath to vote in a manner which violates the constitutional provision that elections shall be free. Article I, Sec. 10, Constitution of North Carolina.
When a member of either party desires to change his party affiliation, the good faith of the change is a proper subject of inquiry and challenge. Without the objectionable pаrt of the oath, ample provision is made :by which the officials may strike from the registration books the nаmes of those who -are not in good .faith members of the party. The oath to support future candidatos violates -the principle of freedom of conscience. It denies a free ballot — one that is cast according to the dictates of the voter’s judgment. We must hold that the Legislature is without power to shackle a voter’s conscience by requiring the objectionable part of the oath as a price to pay for his right to participate in his party’s primary.
The oath as prescribеd by G.S. 163-50 is divisible. It stands, but with the objectionable part eliminated.
Banks v. Raleigh,
No doubt, the authorities, upon a new application, will permit the plaintiff to change his party affiliation without requiring that part of the oath 'herein declared to be invalid.
The judgment of the Superior Court of Guilford County is
Reversed.