16 Mo. 302 | Mo. | 1852
delivered the opinion of the court.
From the statement in this case, the main questions before this court depend, for solution, upon the construction to be given to the deeds from Henry D. Bacon to Alexander, and from Alexander to Clark, the plaintiff.
To arrive at a proper decision in this case, we must look to the circumstances, as they present themselves by the record. Dennis Marks having failed in business, his brother-in-law, Bacon, stepped forward to the relief of his sister and her children. His deed to Alexander commences by reciting, í£ Tüat, whereas, my sister Mrs. Amira M. Marks, wife of Dennis Marks, of St. Louis, by reason of the failure of her husband in business, now stands in need of the aid and support of her own blood relatives and near friends,- and it is my desire to make for her such comfortable and independent provision as may be in my power.” Here we perceive the object of the grantor, and the motive which prompted the transaction — Ahe failure of Marks in business — 'the consequent needy situation of Mrs. Marks and her minor children, and the duty which her brother felt resting on him, to make provision for his sister, by which she might become independent and comfortable.
For this purpose, he conveys to Alexander, in trust for
It was the duty of the trustee, upon the receipt of money or property, by virtue of the said deed, to pay and deliver the same to Mrs. Marks, to be by her employed as she might judge best for the interest of herself and her children. If any property or money remained after the death of Mrs. Marks, it was to be divided among the remaining children, in equal shares. The deed also contained a clause conveying to the trustee two promissory notes, due by Mr. D. Marks to other
After this deed had been made and recorded, Alexander took upon himself the trust, and by his deed, dated July 2d, 1847, signed by him and by Amira M. Marks, and Luther C. Clark, the plaintiff, the said Alexander conveyed the property mentioned in the deed from Bacon to him, that is, the trust property and the profits arising thereon, to the said Clark, for the benefit of Mrs. Amira M. Marks and her children.
This last deed recites, that the trust property and money, now in the hands of said Alexander, amount to thirteen thousand eight hundred and seventy-three dollars ; and that the milling business had terminated ; and that the trust property and money were required by said deed from Bacon to Alexander, to be paid to the said Mrs. Marks, to be employed under her direction for the benefit of herself and children. And, “ whereas, the said Amira M. Marks has directed that the said trust property and money should be delivered and paid over to Luther 0. Clark, of St. Louis, to be held by him as trustee, for the benefit of herself and her children, and to be used and employed as she may direct,” &c., the said Alexander did, thereby, with the consent of said Amira M. Marks, sell and convey the same, in trust, to said Clark, &c.
Clark made Dennis Marks his attorney in fact, or rather his agent, to attend to the management of the trust fund. This was done by the direction of Mrs. Marks.
The defendant, Maguire, having, before the deed from Bacon to Alexander, obtained judgments against Marks for a considerable amount, directed the'sheriff to levy on the property, which Dennis Marks, as agent for Clark, was attending to and managing, that is, the trust property, and had the same sold to satisfy his debt. The property was seized and sold by order of Maguire, as the property of Dennis Marks.
This construction is given to the deed, because the profits are mentioned therein, and directed thereby, to be applied for the benefit of Mrs. Marks and her children — 'Omitting the words “ sole use.” Now, it is generally admitted, that the incident will follow the principle. If there had been no mention made of the profits arising from the one half of the “ mill stock,” in this case, conveyed to the trustees for the sole use of Mrs. Marks and her children, could there have been a doubt to whom these profits would go ? Would any one have thought the husband of Mrs. Marks had any right or title to such profits ?
We must look to the intention of the parties. Here it is obvious, that Bacon supposed that he could'do more for his sister,
We must look at things as they are, and construe words and instruments, according to the meaning and intent of the parties, as manifested thereby.
There is nothing, then, in the deed from Bacon to Alexander, warranting the construction contended for by the defendant below.
It has been said by the plaintiff’s counsel, that, even if the second deed did not formally declare the trusts of the first deed, so as to exclude the creditors of the husband, still the property was held by Clark, the plaintiff, under the trust of the first deed ; for it was net competent for Alexander to change the trusts of the original donor. The creditor was permitted by the court below to hold the property, on the ground that the second deed did not, in terms, exclude the marital rights. This was error in the court below ; for, as that court was dealing with merely equitable rights, it was bound by the rules of equity; and in a court of equity, this property would be bound by the trusts impressed upon it by the donor in the original deed. I accord with this view.
The question was, whether the words “ for her own use and
Now, from this, the intention of the donor was the great point to be found, and that was to be carried out.
In the case before the court, this very intention is sought to be defeated, although it is unequivocal and manifest, by a hair-spun, technical construction of the instrument. In construing such a deed as this, the sympathies of our nature must become very cold, before we can be induced to destroy such manifest intention by a mere technicality.
In a gift or bequest to a married woman, after marriage, the words, that she is to have the property “ to her sole use or disposal,” or “to her separate use or disposal,” or “for her own use and at her own disposal,” or “ to her own use during her life, independent of her husband,” or “that she shall enjoy and receive the issues and profits,” or that it is an allowance as or for “pin money,” eo nomine,, will exclude the marital rights of the husband, and the property will be for her exclusive use. Stor. Eq. section 1382.
In Stanton v. Hall, 2 Rus. & Mylne, 175, (6 vol. Condensed Eng. Ch. Rep. 448,) the Lord Chancellor said, “ itwas
The whole object was, to provide for the sister and her infants, and to do this, without even permitting her husband to have any rights or interest in the trust fund.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff had the legal title and right in and to the property seized and sold by the sheriff, at the order and under the directions of the defendant, Maguire. There was nothing to prevent his recovery. The instruction, therefore, given to the jury, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, is erroneous. The judgment below must be reversed, and this cause remanded for further trial,