THORNE CLARK, Plaintiff, against TIFFANY LEE, Defendant.
Index No. 155917/2025
Supreme Court, New York County
November 24, 2025
2025 NY Slip Op 52053(U)
Gerald Lebovits, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
Gildin and Chapman Legal Services PLLC, Queens, NY (Steven Gildin of counsel), for defendant.
Gerald Lebovits, J.
Plaintiff, Thorne Clark, is suing defendant, Tiffany Lee, for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The parties dated intermittently between July 2022 and May 2024. Plaintiff‘s claim is based on allegations that defendant behaved abusively on numerous occasions throughout their relationship. Plaintiff is seeking default judgment for defendant‘s failure to answer his complaint on time. Defendant cross-moves to dismiss plaintiff‘s claim, arguing that documentary evidence establishes a defense to the claim, that plaintiff fails to state a cause of action, and that plaintiff‘s complaint constitutes a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). Both motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
The parties matched on the dating app Tinder in July 2022 and dated periodically for about two years. Plaintiff claims that he has suffered emotional distress from a combination of defendant‘s alleged harassing and coercive conduct throughout their relationship. Plaintiff alleges that defendant posted a derogatory statement about him in a Facebook group and falsely reported him to the dating platforms Tinder and Hinge. The latter act resulted in the suspension
Plaintiff filed a summons and complaint on May 7, 2025, seeking temporary and permanent injunctions enjoining defendant from publishing statements about plaintiff and an order enjoining her from contacting plaintiff, his family, and his associates. Plaintiff also seeks compensatory damages of not less than $1,000,000, punitive damages, mitigating damages, and attorney fees. An affirmation of service was filed on May 13, 2025, confirming personal service on defendant. An appearance was entered by defendant‘s previous attorney on June 2, 2025, along with a request for a 20-day extension for the filing of an answer.
On July 2, 2025, plaintiff moved for default judgment under
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for Default Judgment
A plaintiff is entitled to seek default judgment against a defendant who has failed to answer a summons and complaint. (
Plaintiff filed an affirmation of personal service for the summons and complaint on May 13, 2025. Defendant had 20-days within which to answer, by June 2, 2025. (See
A court may extend the time to plead or compel acceptance of an untimely served pleading when it is just to do so and if there is a reasonable excuse for default. (
It is unclear whether the attorney‘s child‘s illness contributed to the delay beyond June 22, 2025, to July 3, 2025, when the answer was filed. Defendant‘s prior attorney failed to explain why she did not request a further extension after June 22. Nonetheless, a court may accept a questionable excuse for delay when factors mitigate against dismissal. Mitigating factors include an absence of willfulness on the defaulting party‘s part and a lack of prejudice to the opposing party as a result of the delay. (Gordon Law Firm, P.C. v Premier DNA Corp., 205 AD3d 416, 416, (1st Dept 2022).) There is also a “strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits.” (Patel v New York City Tr. Auth., 199 AD3d 925, 929 (2d Dept 2021).) Plaintiff has not established that he has suffered prejudice from the delay, nor has he established any willfulness on defendant‘s part. Therefore, plaintiff‘s motion for default judgment is denied. Plaintiff must accept defendant‘s answer.
Defendant cross-moves to dismiss the complaint in its entirety under
A. CPLR 3211 (a) (1)
Defendant seeks dismissal under
B. CPLR 3211 (a) (7)
Defendant seeks dismissal under
The bar for extreme and outrageous conduct is high. Conduct must be so “outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” (Chanko v American Broadcasting Cos. Inc, 27 NY3d 46, 56 (2016).) In deciding whether defendant has engaged in outrageous and extreme conduct, a court may consider the “entire alleged course of conduct.” (Stram v Farrell, 223 AD 260, 265 (3d Dept 1996) [finding that vulgar language and emotional manipulation constitute extreme and outrageous conduct].) Physical threats can constitute IIED. (E.g. Eves v Ray, 42 AD3d 481, 483 (2d Dept 2007).)
Plaintiff makes numerous allegations against defendant. Defendant allegedly threatened plaintiff with violence. (See NYSCEF No. 1 at 34 [“[Defendant] warned plaintiff that if she told [unnamed people close to defendant] that plaintiff had called the police on her, ‘they‘ll kill you.‘“].) Defendant allegedly publicly humiliated plaintiff by posting a derogatory statement in the “Are We Dating the Same Guy? | New York City” Facebook group and by shouting and yelling at plaintiff in his apartment building. (Id. at 26, 63.) Plaintiff also alleges that defendant violated his privacy by breaking into his office cabinet. (Id.) Further allegations against defendant include defendant‘s being emotionally manipulative, harassing plaintiff, and making false allegations of criminal and unchaste conduct against him, including kidnapping, abuse, and having intimate relations with his aunt and his father‘s widow. (Id. at 48-53.) The combined alleged actions of defendant could constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. Defendant‘s alleged conduct, if true, also displays a disregard of a substantial probability of causing severe distress to plaintiff.
Plaintiff pleads that he has suffered emotional distress and mental anguish as a result of defendant‘s conduct. Plaintiff also avers in his most recent affidavit that this emotional distress has resulted in physical nausea, a trip by ambulance to the emergency room, doctors’ visits, tests,
C. CPLR 3211 (g) and Civil Rights Law 70-a and 76-a
Defendant argues that the complaint should be dismissed as constituting SLAPP litigation under
An action involves public petition and participation if it is based on a communication in a public forum connected to an issue of public interest or conduct furthering the exercise of free speech rights in connection with an issue of public interest. (
Matters that are purely private and are directed only to a limited, private audience are not of public interest, nor are generic references to issues of broad public interest when the primary focus is not an issue of broad public interest. (Nelson v Ardrey, 213 AD3d 179, 185 (2d Dept 2024).) Furthermore, matters involving “mere gossip and prurient interest” are not matters of public concern. (Aristocrat Plastic Surgery, P.C. v Silva, 206 AD3d 26, 30 (1st Dept 2022).) The Facebook group is private. The contents of the social-media post detail defendant‘s relationship with plaintiff, that they were recently intimate in a hotel room, and allege that plaintiff, is “a cheater” because a client from defendant‘s workplace discovered plaintiff‘s profile on a dating app. (NYSCEF No. 1 at 58-63.) The purpose of the post, as asserted in the defendant‘s affirmation, is to express her experience in a private and supportive space for women. (See NYSCEF No. 14 at 14 [where defendant states she posted to “share my truth in a private and supportive space“].) The primary purpose of the post is to make a statement on a private matter to a private audience.
Defendant‘s post references a potential issue of public interest. Her post states that plaintiff‘s behavior “towards [defendant] became nothing less than abusive.” (NYSCEF No. 1 at 63.) But the statement contains no further information or details on the nature of this alleged behavior. The reference to abusive behavior is generic and conclusory. Furthermore, it is made in the context of a sentence advising other women not to get involved “with [plaintiff] and his drama.” (NYSCEF No. 1 at 63.) The post advises others to contact defendant if they have matched with plaintiff or want details of her experience. The statement therefore falls within the “gossip and prurient interest” category and is not a matter of public interest. Plaintiff‘s complaint is not SLAPP litigation. Defendant has not made out a case for dismissal of the complaint under
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that plaintiff‘s motion for default judgment is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff must accept service of defendant‘s answer; and it is further
ORDERED that defendant‘s cross-motion to dismiss the complaint is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties are to appear for a telephonic preliminary conference on January 5, 2026.
DATE 11/24/2025
GERALD LEBOVITS, J.S.C.