67 N.C. App. 516 | N.C. Ct. App. | 1984
Respondent assigns error to the court’s conclusion of law that she “willfully abandoned” her child.
N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 48-2(l)a in pertinent part provides: “For the purpose of this Chapter, an ‘abandoned child’ shall be any child who has been willfully abandoned at least six consecutive months immediately preceding institution of an action or proceeding to declare the child to be an abandoned child.” “A child has been ‘willfully abandoned’ within the meaning of the statute when the conduct of the abandoning parent over the six months period reveals a settled purpose and willful intent to forego all parental duties and obligations and to relinquish all parental claims to the child.” In re Stroud, 38 N.C. App. 373, 374, 247 S.E. 2d 792, 793 (1978) (citing Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 503, 126 S.E. 2d 597, 609 (1962)). “The word ‘willful’ means something more than an intention to do a thing. It implies doing the act purposely and deliberately.” In re Maynor, 38 N.C. App. 724, 726, 248 S.E. 2d 875, 877 (1978) (emphasis original).
Our examination of the findings of fact made by the trial judge in the instant case reveals that the court made no findings in support of its conclusion that Ms. Jones’ failure to communicate with Antionette was willful, as that term has been defined by our courts. While the court found as a fact that respondent made no attempt to communicate with her child during the critical six month period, this finding alone is insufficient support for the conclusion that her actions reflect “a settled purpose and willful intent ... to relinquish all parental claims to the child.” Because the court’s findings of fact do not support its conclusion of law, the order declaring Ms. Jones to be not a necessary party to the adoption proceedings instituted by petitioners must be vacated.
Our conclusion in this matter is buttressed by an examination of the record, which reveals that Ms. Jones introduced substantial evidence that her actions in not communicating with her daughter
Our disposition of this case makes it unnecessary for us to discuss respondent’s remaining assignments of error.
The order of the Superior Court entered on 17 January 1983 is
Vacated.