13 Vt. 460 | Vt. | 1841
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This case comes before us on an appeal from a decree made by the Chancellor of the second judicial circuit, declaring “ that a certain ceremony of marriage, heretofore had between the oratrix, Mary Almira Clark, and the defendant, Roswell M. Field, before Asa Keyes, 2d., Esq., be and was and is null and void, and of no effect or binding force whatever, either in law or equity, and that the same be henceforth so held and considered.” The object of the bill was to declare the ceremony of marriage null on several grounds or reasons, but principally because it was not intended as a marriage, at the time, unless afterwards consented to; was procured by fraud; and was not followed by consummation or cohabitation, and that theoratrix was previously engaged and betrothed to Mr. Clark, whom she after-wards married. Mr. Clark joined with her in bringing this bill, and has deceased since the decree pronounced by the Chancellor.
In limine, an objection is taken to the jurisdiction of the court of chancery over contracts in relation to marriage, and its power to pronounce a sentence of nullity on a marriage ceremony, pronounced or solemnized before those persons who are authorised to solemnize marriages in this state. We, however, are satisfied, that the court of chancery, under its common equity jurisdiction, may rescind, or relieve against a marriage contract, or annul a contract solemnized before a magistrate or a minister of the gospel, if obtained by force, fraud or imposition, or under a mistake as to the legal effect of such solemnization by one of the parties, if the other party knew the legal effect, and also knew that the party was under such mistake, when such ceremony has not been followed by consummation or cohabitation. Even, when followed by consummation, there may be extraordinary cases of fraud and imposition, which require the aid of the court of chancery to prevent consequences in a high degree disastrous, if that aid was not afforded. Our law regards marriage as a civil contract, valid and binding where the parties are able and willing to contract, and actually do contract.
Considering marriage as a civil contract, it would seem to be subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law and equity, in the same manner as other contracts, with only such differences as to the nature and forms of the remedy, and the time and place proper for the exercise of that jurisdiction, as would arise from the nature and design of the contract. In England, where cognizance of matrimonial causes is given to the spiritual courts, we have noticed that the performance of a contract of marriage could formerly be enforced in the spiritual court; yet, the courts of common law had also a jurisdiction to give damages for the breach of such contract, and, by commencing an -action at common law, the remedy in the spiritual court was actually released. Courts of law have the power of deciding directly upon the fact or legality of a marriage when it comes collaterally in issue. They have disregarded or considered as void a marriage, although evidenced by a record from a justice of the
This question of jurisdiction has been examined in the state of New York, and the results, to which the courts of that state have arrived, are perfectly satisfactory to us. In the case of Aymar v. Roff, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 49, where an infant, of twelve years of age, was married, being ignorant of the duties which a marriage, if legal, would impose, the Chancellor ordered her to be placed under-the protection of the court, as a ward, and forbade the husband all intercourse or correspondence with her. In the case of Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 343, the learned Chancellor examined the question of jurisdiction very fully, and came to the conclusion that it was in the power and was the duty of the court to declare void the marriage of a lunatic, and accordingly did so decree and declare the parties free from the
In the case before us, it is unnecessary and inexpedient to recapitulate the testimony, or to state all the facts to which testimony has been given. In relation to a transaction which was calculated to call up exasperated feelings, which has apparently faxed ingenuity and genius to criminate and recriminate, where a deep sense of injury is evidently felt and expressed by the parties to this controversy, and where this state of feeling has extended, as it was to be expected, to all the immediate friends of the parties, who, from their situation, were necessarily compelled to become witnesses and to testify in the case, it could answer no good purpose for the court to repeat all the statements which they have made in their depositions, to compare them one with another, and declare what parts of the testimony are to be received or rejected. It is sufficient to say that we have examined all the testimony critically, and to state what facts we consider as proved, so far as they are to have any effect on the decision which we are about to make, trusting and believing that all the witnesses have intended to give a true and faithful relation of every part of this case which came under their personal observation.
It appears that the oratrix arrived at the age of eighteen on the 12th August, 1832 ; that a mutual affection had for
On her arrival at Windsor, nothing was communicated to her mother or friends in relation to the marriage at Putney, nor was the marriage at that time made public, or intended to be made public. It was therefore to be expected that they,knowing of her engagement with Mr. Clark, and having heard rumors of her having received attentions from Mr.Field, inconsistent with that engagement, should have urged upon her the propriety of fulfilling it. Nor is it a matter of surprise, and certainly not a reason of complaint, that they should strenuously have urged and insisted on this, when the state of her affections for the defendant, and the extent of her engagement to him, were studiously concealed from her mother and friends. It appears further that on her arrival home, she wrote to the defendant, and on the next day to Mr. Clark. From her letters to Mr. Field, on the 15th, 21st, and 28th October, it would appear that she entertained a
“ To Mr. Roswell F.
c Sir, — Moments of consideration and much reflection have £ at length caused me to see in its proper light the whole of my ‘ late visit to Brattleboro’. That I have been led by you and ‘ others to a course of conduct which my own reason, sense £ and feelings entirely disapprove, is now very clear to me. I ‘ therefore write this to say to you -that I am not willing on ‘ any account, to see you again, neither will I by any course ‘ you can adopt, be prevailed upon to view the matter in a ‘ different light from what I now do. I leave you to the al- ‘ ternative of forever preventing the public avowal of a dis- ‘ graceful transaction, of which you yourself said you were ‘ ashamed. Mxhy A. P.”
On the 6th of November she addressed another short note to him, assuring him that the letter sent by Judge Aikens contained her real sentiments, and on the 27th of the same November she was married to Mr. Clark.
From this history of the case, and from an examination of the evidence, it is to be decided what was the intent and nature of the ceremony at Putney ; for, if it was intended to be a marriage between them, the present bill must be dismissed, however unfortunate and disastrous it may be to all the parties. The marriage with Clark was followed by the birth of issue in the September following. If the marriage at Putney is legal, she was an adulteress, and the defendant, possessing those honorable feelings which are attributed to him, could not live with her or receive her as his wife. He could
The evidence is satisfactory to us, that the parties did not, by the ceremony at Putney, intend a marriage, so far as we can learn their intentions from the testimony, and by their acts and conduct. How she viewed it, is beyond controversy. She was at the time undoubtedly sincere, intending to dismiss Clark and at a future time to receive Mr. Field as her husband, though it is apparent both from her letter to Mr. Field on the evening of her return to Windsor, and her letter to Clark on the following day, as well as her conduct that evening and morning, that she felt unpleasantly. She does not appear to have been fully acquainted with the legal consequences of a solemnization of marriage until the conversation with her brother, Francis E. Phelps, on the morning of the second of Novemher. It is inconceivable that she should have remained so long silent, and particularly that she should have written to Clark so pressingly to come up to Windsor, if she fully believed that she was lawfully the wife of another. How she declared it was to be considered, we learn from the testimony of her brothers, her sisters and her mother. Francis E. Phelps says that early on the morning of the second November, she informed him of the transaction at Put-ney, and told him that the defendant said if she would cheerfully go forward and stand up before a magistrate she might then go home,and after she got home she might then make her election, and, if she concluded to have Field, she could dismiss Clark, and Field could come up, court her, and be married. She said, further, “ she had told Clark all but the Put-ney affair, and he had forgiven her.” He further testified that she wanted him to tell them that she chose Clark, and did not want to have any thing to do with Field. She gave the same account to her mother and to Mrs. Emerson, her sister, saying, in talking of the transaction at Putney, that it
On an examination of the whole case, we come to the result that the ceremony at Putney was not intended as a marriage, in presentí, to be followed by consummation and cohabitation thereafter, without some future act or ceremony of marriage, or at least, that it was not so understood by her, and it was known to him that such was her understanding, and this is enough to decide the present case. It is true, “consensus, non concúbitos, facit nuptias.” The consent, however, in this state, must be declared before one authorized to solemnize a marriage, with a present intention to be husband and wife, by that solemnization, and, usually, with the intention of cohabiting together thereafter as husband and wife, in pursuance of the vows pledged at the time. This we do not consider was the case with these parties, and that it was viewed in no other light than in the nature of a promise or engagement which they meant to
It may be proper to add that we are not disposed to animadvert on the conduct of the parties, or of their respective friends and connections, nor to pronounce any opinion further than is required to show the grounds of our determination. The immediate parties may find some excuse or palliation in the thoughtlessness of youth, the strength of affection, the pangs of disappointed and blighted hopes, in versatility of feeling to which all are subject, and in constitutional temperament. The conduct of the friends of either is not to be judged of, nor censured, in consequence of the unfortunate results which have attended this truly unfortunate case. In judging of the past transactions of others, which have terminated either favorably or unfavorably, we are very apt to say that a different course was required and would have produced a different effect. But who can say what, would have been the inevitable consequences of a different line of conduct by the friends of either party? The infatuation and the determination of the parties to pursue that course, which was most agreeable to their own feelings and views, placed their friends and acquaintances, at the time, in a very unpleasant situation, and it would be wrong for us now to say that they were not actuated by good motives, and did not pursue that line of conduct which they thought, at the time, duty dictated. We inquire not as to the conduct of others, we censure them not, nor do wé say any thing as to the parties before us, except what has been thought necessary in deciding the case.
The decree of the chancellor is affirmed.