151 Mich. 416 | Mich. | 1908
(after stating the facts). We think that Mr. Wells sold his stock to the corporation and not to Mr. Clark individually. Mr. Wells had invested in the corporation $5,000, receiving therefor five thousand par value of the stock fully paid. He acted in entire good faith, and there is an entire absence of evidence showing any intent on the part of the stockholders to defraud creditors. The only evidence of any existing indebtedness at that time is the testimony of Harvey J. Wells, as follows:
“We might, have been owing a little money at that time; I could not give you exactly the amount. I could approximately, somewhere within $300.” .
No then existing creditors, if there were any, are now complaining. The claim of complainants Minnie and Chauncey R. Clark is eliminated from the case. The cross-bill denied the validity of their debt. They did not answer the cross-bill, and the order pro confesso admits the allegations to be true. They do not, therefore, now stand in this suit as creditors. The assets of the corporation were worth about $9,000. All the creditors now complaining are subsequent creditors, who gave credit with the mortgage on file in the proper office. The stockholders are not in position to complain, for they were all willing parties to the transaction and are therefore estopped to deny its validity. Solomon Solar Salt Co. v. Barber, 58 Kan. 419; Butterworth & Lowe v. Milling Co., 115 Mich. 1.
The transaction as to all parties then having any interest in the corporation or its assets was entirely valid. The interveners, subsequent creditors, while conceding that the record of the mortgage is constructive notice to
The first important question to determine is the relation in which Mr. Murphy stands to the corporation. He insists that he put $4,452 into the corporation as a creditor, while Mr. Wells insists that he put it in as purchaser of his stock. No stock was issued to Mr. Murphy, but that was not essential to constitute him a stockholder. He admits his intention to’ become a stockholder, but denies that that intention was consummated by actual purchase. He was elected a director on October 1st, and also treasurer. His friend Sheehan was also elected a director and secretary at the same time. Mr. Murphy from that time controlled the affairs of the corporation. His method of dealing with it appears from the fact that he immediately caused the note of the company to be given to his particular friend, Mr. Allen, for $1,800, when Allen had not delivered the goods for which the note was given. Mr. Murphy testified:
“After I got in as treasurer Allen got his' note for $1,800 at a crack.”
It appears that the property thus contracted for has not yet been delivered. Murphy continued in the control of the company until this litigation began and a receiver was appointed by the court. Mr. Wells’ stock which he
It is immaterial whether Mr. Murphy paid his money into the treasury of the company in furtherance of the contract of October 1st, or whether that was abandoned and he paid it for himself. While there is no express showing what particular stock Mr. Murphy paid his money to purchase, a court of equity will apply it in accordance with the principles of justice and equity. As above stated, Mr. Wells acted in good faith. There was no one in existence at that time to' be defrauded. Mr. Clark, to whom the stock was assigned for the company, was authorized to sell it. We will apply the payments to this stock, and will hold that this purchase was valid in so far as he paid for it, viz., to the extent of $4,452. Mr. Murphy paid this money to the corporation with full knowledge of the transaction between Mr. Wells and the corporation. He had the corporate books before him where the entire transaction was in good faith recorded.
We are compelled to hold that the assessable stock and the assets of a corporation constitute a trust fund,. not only for the benefit of existing, but also for future, creditors (American Steel & Wire Co. v. Eddy, 130 Mich. 266; Peninsular Savings Bank v. Stove Polish Co., 105 Mich. 535; Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45), and that the assets of a corporation cannot be used by it in the purchase of its outstanding stock to the exclusion of subsequent creditors.
It follows from our conclusion, that the mortgage is invalid to the extent of $548, which was included in the sale to the corporation and has not been resold. It is apparent under the record as it now stands that the assets will