88 Conn. App. 178 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2005
Opinion
In this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner seeks relief from a writ of extradition sending him to Texas to face criminal charges in that state. Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (act), General Statutes § 54-157 et seq., he is subject to mandatory extradition only if he is a fugitive from justice in Texas. The petitioner claims that he is not a fugitive from justice in Texas because he was taken involuntarily from Texas to this state in order to stand trial on criminal charges here. In the absence of any disputed questions of fact, the issue he raises calls for statutory construction of the act. The trial court concluded that the act authorized his extradition and dismissed the petitioner’s application for the writ. The petitioner has appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The petitioner, Kenneth Clark, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he claimed that, because he is not a fugitive from justice, the respondent, the commissioner of correction,
The facts of this case are uncontested. In 1996, the petitioner had been extradited involuntarily from Texas to this state because of an outstanding parole violation. After having been returned to this state, the petitioner was incarcerated here until April, 2000.
In pursuit of his request for extradition in the present case, the governor of Texas sent to our governor a written demand, dated April 17,2003, for the extradition of the petitioner. See General Statutes § 54-157 et seq. In accordance with General Statutes § 54-159,
The petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his status as a fugitive was heard by the habeas court, Hon. William L. Hadden, Jr., judge trial referee. Judge Hadden found that “the extradition papers [were] in order in satisfaction of General Stat
As a preliminary matter, we note that the parties stand on common ground with regard to three important issues. First, the parties agree that the petitioner left Texas involuntarily when he was extradited to Connecticut in 1996. Second, they agree that Connecticut’s version of the act draws a distinction between the extradition of a fugitive and the extradition of a nonfugitive. A demand for a fugitive imposes on the governor a mandatory duty of compliance,
The underlying issue in this appeal, therefore, concerns the relative scope of the mandatory and discretionary provisions of the act, as enacted in Connecticut.
The petitioner argues that § 5 of the act,
The respondent does not challenge the petitioner’s reading of § 54-161. It argues, instead, that General Statutes § 54-158 is the applicable statute because it reflects the holdings of Connecticut common-law cases decided before the enactment of the act. It is undisputed that this case law held that a person could be deemed a fugitive even if he had been removed involuntarily from the demanding state by government compulsion. Moulthrope v. Matus, 139 Conn. 272, 277-78, 93 A.2d 149 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926, 73 S. Ct. 785, 97 L. Ed. 1357 (1953). The question is whether Moulthrope has been overruled by the enactment of § 54-161.
I
The uniform act was promulgated to supplement federal extradition law. Federal extradition law, which derives its authority from the United States constitution
The uniform act not only implements the extradition requirements of federal law,
When our legislature enacted § 5 of the act as General Statutes § 54-161, it modified the title of that section by deleting any reference to a person’s leaving a demanding state under compulsion.
II
The plain language of § 54-161 supports the petitioner’s argument that our extradition law does not make it mandatory to extradite a nonfugitive. No Connecticut court has directly considered whether to attribute a different meaning to the statute.
The respondent argues, however, that our case law indirectly has declined to make the distinction between fugitives and nonfugitives that § 54-161 seems to embody. He relies on two cases, Barrila v. Blake, 190 Conn. 631, 461 A.2d 1375 (1983), and Hill v. Blake, supra, 186 Conn. 409, both of which were decided subsequent to the enactment of the act. We are not persuaded.
In Hille v. Blake, supra, 186 Conn. 409, the issue before our Supreme Court was whether an extradition warrant was invalid because the governor of this state had extradited the petitioner as a nonfugitive when the requesting papers had referred to him both as a fugitive and also as a nonfugitive. In contrast to the present case, Hill involved the application of General Statutes § 54-162, not § 54-161. Hill v. Blake, supra, 405 n.2. Furthermore, the petitioner in Hill “at no time claimed that he was not a nonfugitive.” Id., 410 n.6. Here, by contrast, the petitioner’s claim focuses on his fugitive status and not on alleged inconsistencies in the extradition papers.
In the absence of more persuasive Connecticut authority, we must decide this case as one of first impression. Because § 54-161 replicates a provision in a uniform statute, it is useful to look for guidance to courts in other jurisdictions that have interpreted § 5 of the act. See General Statutes § 54-185; see also Bloom v. Lundburg, 149 Conn. 67, 70, 175 A.2d 568 (1961),
The case law in other jurisdictions falls into two categories. One category consists of cases interpreting a version of the act that is similar to ours. The other category includes cases interpreting statutory language that differs substantively from that contained in our act.
Of those cases in the former category, the evolution of extradition law in New York is particularly enlightening regarding the effect of the enactment of § 5 on earlier state law precedents.
Kansas is another state that has enacted a version of § 5 comparable to General Statutes § 54-161.
The law is different in states that have adopted a nonuniform version of the act. Commonwealth ex rel. Bonomo v. Haas, 428 Pa. 167, 236 A.2d 810 (1968), is such a case. In Haas, the court held that “the involuntariness of the removal to the asylum state does not prevent the petitioner from being subject to extradition under the fugitive from justice provision of the extradition statutes.” Id., 170. Pennsylvania, however, has enacted a version of the act that prohibits Pennsylvania’s governor from exercising discretion pursuant to § 5 because, except in cases involving § 6, it required all extradition warrants to “allege that the person sought ‘fled’ from the demanding state.” Id., 171 n.2. The fact that, under Pennsylvania law, a governor does not have discretion to deny an extradition demand does not enlighten the proper interpretation of § 5 of the act in this state.
Similarly, Texas law has been inhospitable to claims based on a statutory distinction between voluntary and involuntary absence from a demanding state. The respondent cites a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Landry v. A-Able Bonding, 75 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1996). That case involved claims of false imprisonment and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and did not address any of the issues presently before us.
Although California also has enacted a nonuniform version of the act,
Consistent with the majority of courts that have interpreted § 5 of the act, we hold that it governs the extradition of persons who have been removed involuntarily from the demanding state by government compulsion and that such persons properly are treated as nonfugi-tives. In our view, it is persuasive that our legislature enacted both § 3 and § 5 of the act, General Statutes §§ 54-159 and 54-161, respectively, without substantive alteration. It thereby manifested its intention that the governor’s authority to order extradition depends on the status of the individual sought as having left the demanding state voluntarily or involuntarily. Its manifest intention necessarily requires limitation of Moulthrope v. Matus, supra, 139 Conn. 272, to cases involving fugitives rather than nonfugitives.
Because the petitioner in this case was removed involuntarily from Texas to Connecticut, his status visa-vis Texas is that of a nonfugitive. The extradition demand, which described the petitioner as a fugitive from justice, therefore, is void. See Hill v. Blake, supra, 186 Conn. 410 n.6 (recognizing that extradition warrant is invalid where accused proves in habeas proceeding that his or her status does not conform to status indicated on extradition papers).
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment issuing a writ of habeas corpus.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The petitioner’s original habeas petition named Connecticut state police Detective Jeffrey Correia as the respondent. The habeas court’s memorandum of decision, however, named the respondent as an official from the department of correction. We note that the petitioner is being held by the department of correction on the basis of the governor’s extradition warrant
General Statutes § 54-170 provides in relevant part: “The arrest of a person may be lawfully made also by any peace officer or a private person, without a warrant, upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . .”
On July, 16, 2002, the state of Texas charged the petitioner with the crime of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of fourteen. The charge alleged that the commission of the crime occurred on February 1, 1996.
Judge Kaplan acted pursuant to General Statutes § 54-171, which provides in relevant part: “If from the examination before the judge it appears that the person held is the person charged with having committed the crime alleged and . . . that he has fled from justice, the judge shall, by a warrant reciting the accusation, commit him to a community correctional center for such a time, not exceeding thirty days ... as will enable the arrest of the accused to be made under a warrant of the Governor on a requisition of the executive authority of the state having jurisdiction of the offense . . . .”
General Statutes § 54-159 provides: “No demand for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another state shall be recognized by the Governor unless in writing alleging, except in cases arising under section 54-162, that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of
The accompanying application for extradition, which was prepared by the Dallas County district attorney and certified by the governor of Texas, also described the petitioner as a fugitive. In particular, the district attorney represented that the petitioner had attempted to avoid prosecution, had “fled from the jurisdiction of [Texas] and is now a fugitive from justice to be found in the custody of the State of Connecticut . . . .”
General Statutes § 54-163 provides in relevant part: “If the Governor decides that the demand should be complied with, he shall sign a warrant of arrest, which shall be sealed with the state seal, and be directed to any peace officer or other person whom he may think fit to entrust with the execution thereof . . . .”
The warrant referred to “the Constitution and laws of the United States” as the legal basis for its authority and described the petitioner as “having fled from [Texas] and taken refuge in the State of Connecticut . . . .”
General Statutes § 54-158 provides in relevant part: “[I]t is the duty of the Governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state . . . any person charged in that state with treason, felony or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this state.” (Emphasis added.)
General Statutes § 54-161 provides in relevant part: “The Governor of this state may also surrender on demand of the executive authority of any other state any person in this state who is charged . . . with having violated the laws of the state whose executive authority is making the demand, even though such person left the demanding state involuntarily.” (Emphasis added.)
Section five of the act provides in relevant part: “Extradition of Persons Imprisoned or Awaiting Trial in Another State or Who Have Left the Demanding State Under Compulsion. . . . The Governor of this state may also surrender on demand of the Executive Authority of any other state any person in this state who is charged in the manner provided in Section 23 of this act with having violated the laws of the state whose Executive Authority is making the demand, even though such person left the demanding state involuntarily.”
See footnote 10.
Article IV, § 2, cl. 2, of the federal constitution provides: “A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.”
Section 3182 of title 18 of the United States Code provides in relevant part: “Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District, or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District, or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. . . .”
In Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 99 S. Ct. 530, 58 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held: “[T]he courts of an asylum state are bound by Art. IV, § 2 ... by [18 U.S.C.] § 3182, and, where adopted, by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 288-89. Section two of the act describes the asylum state governor’s duty of compliance as mandatory with respect to extradition demands that satisfy the procedural requirements of the act. Our legislature enacted § 2 of the act as General Statutes § 54-158. See footnote 9. Section three lists several procedural requirements for extradition demands. Our legislature enacted § 3 as General Statutes § 54-159. See footnote 5.
Section six is another provision of the act that recognizes a distinction between fugitives and nonfugitives. Section six was “drafted to meet the practical need of authority for the extradition of . . . criminals who . . . cannot technically be called ‘fugitives.’ [This section], as approved by the Conference in 1926, provide[s] for the extradition of a criminal from the state in which he acted to the state in which his acts had criminal effect. By an amendment, approved by the Conference in 1932, this section now permits the extradition of that person not only from the state in which he acted, but from any state into which he thereafter moves.” Commissioners’ prefatory note, Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, supra, p. 292. Our legislature enacted § 6 as General Statutes § 54-162.
Section five of the act is titled, “Extradition of Persons Imprisoned or Awaiting Trial in Another State or Who Have Left the Demanding State Under Compulsion.” Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, supra, p. 463. General Statutes § 54-161, however, is titled, “Return to this state of person imprisoned or held in another state.”
See footnotes 9 and 11. In describing the bill that adopted the act, Senator John H. Shannon succinctly stated: “[T]his bill incorporates the uniform criminal extradition act in toto and enacts it into law by statute.” 7 S. Proc., Pt. 4, 1957 Sess., p. 2377.
The respondent concedes that if this case were tried in New York, the petitioner would prevail on his claim.
Section 570.14 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law (McKinney 1995) provides: “The governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any other state, any person in this state who is charged in the manner provided in section 570.08 with having violated the laws of the state whose executive authority is making the demand, even though such person left the demanding state involuntarily.”
Section 570.08 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law does not require that an application requesting the extradition of a person allege that he or she fled from the demanding state.
Florida Statutes Annotated § 941.05 (2) (West 2001), which enacted § 5 of the act, provides: “The Governor of this state may also surrender on demand of the executive authority of any other state any person in this state who is charged in the manner provided in s. 941.23 with having violated the laws of the state whose executive authority is making the demand, even though such person left the demanding state involuntarily.”
Florida Statutes § 941.23 does not require that an application requesting the extradition of a person allege that he or she fled from the demanding state.
Section 22-2705 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated (1995) provides in relevant part: “The governor of this state may also surrender on demand of the executive authority of any other state any person in this state who is charged in the manner provided in section 22-2723 with having violated the laws of the state whose executive authority is making the demand, even though such person left the demanding state involuntarily.”
Section 22-2723 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated does not require that
Section five of article 51.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (West 1979) provides in relevant part: “The Governor of this State may also surrender on demand of the Executive Authority of any other State any person in this State who is charged in the manner provided in Section 23 of this Act with having violated the laws of the State whose Executive Authority is making the demand, even though such person left the demanding State involuntarily.”
Section twenty-three of article 51.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure does not require that a demand for the extradition of a person allege that he or she fled from the demanding state.
Section three of the act was enacted in this state as General Statutes § 54-159. See footnote 5.
Section 1549 of the California Penal Code (Deering 1992) provides in relevant part: “The Governor of this state may also surrender on demand of the executive authority of any other state any person in this state who is charged in the manner provided in Section 1548.2 with having violated the laws of the demanding state even though such person left the demanding state involuntarily.”
Section 1548.2 of the California Penal Code provides in relevant part: “No demand for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another State shall be recognized by the Governor unless it is in writing alleging that the