123 P. 708 | Or. | 1912
delivered the opinion of the court.
In extending a street under the procedure required by its charter, the city develops at least two classes of opponents with whom it must reckon; one consisting of those who suffer damage by the taking of the land included in the new street, and the other comprising those upon whose holdings are assessed the benefits supposed to result from the enterprise. These two classes are adverse to each other in interest. The individual in the first class will naturally be concerned in getting as much as possible for his land; while the man of the other class will strive to lighten, not only the burden of his assessment for benefits, but also that of his general taxation for any amount the city may pay directly in the condemnation of the land.
In prescribing who may appeal the charter recognizes not only these adverse interests, but also the separate appeal of the individual. Section 351 says:
“The owner (singular) or owners of any lot or part thereof so to be appropriated as aforesaid, or of the improvements thereon or any person having an interest therein or any person against whom an assessment of benefits has been made may appeal.”
Great reliance is put in the case of Shannahan v. City of Waterbury, 63 Conn. 420 (28 Atl. 611), by the defendant as sustaining its position here that all persons affected by the proposed street extension are joint parties in one proceeding, so that the city may finish its litigation with all of them before béing concluded as to any of them by the nine-month limitation mentioned. That case is distinguishable from the one at bar in these material particulars: The charter there in express words postpones the opening of the street “until all applications * * for relief against acts done in reference to the laying out of such public improvements shall be finally disposed of by said superior court”; while such language is not found in the Portland charter. Again, the Waterbury charter provided “that in case of any appeal being made from the doings of the board of compensation * * in making any assessment of damages or benefits, * * and no appeal is taken from the lay-out, nothing in said charter shall be construed to prevent said city from opening, occupying and working the same during the pendency of the appeal from the doings of said board.” It seems that the city there was authorized to take the property first and pay afterwards; while our constitution requires the compensation to be first assessed and tendered (Constitution, Article I, § 18), or at least secured, when the taker is a corporation. Constitution, Article XI, § 4. Still further, in that case, the court held that the city had no option to abandon the improvement after the assessment of damages on appeal; while here, as we shall
There is some testimony in the record and much has been said about the great increase in the value of plaintiff’s property since the inauguration of the proceeding to condemn it. This, however, in our opinion, is not necessarily involved here. It ’furnishes a convenient reason for plaintiff’s suit, for, if Portland’s phenomenal progress had suddenly ceased, with a consequent slump in prices of realty, he might not be here complaining; but, so far as value is concerned, in this case, it was fixed by the condemnation proceedings. When the city would acquire property for public use by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, it is impracticable to settle upon the compensation in a day, especially if litigation becomes necessary. In the very nature of things, the process should be flexible enough to permit of its practical application. In discussing proceedings of this nature in State Park Commissioners v. Henry, 38 Minn. 266 (36 N. W. 874), the court there said:
“A reasonable opportunity may be given to abandon the proceedings, or reject the offer, if the price be found to be such as to render it inexpedient to go on with the projected enterprise. And where the property is taken directly by the State or a municipal corporation, the fact that payment is postponed for a reasonable time to make an assessment and collect a tax to pay the amount ascertained, or to enable the legislature to decide finally, or make an appropriation, does not make a law authorizing condemnation proceedings unconstitutional.”
In respect to the condemnation of the land, the object to be attained by the viewers in the first instance and
The price having been fixed on appeal, the question then is, How long does the option of the city continue to take the property or leave it? The charter answers it in the conclusion of section 358:
“And unless such assessments are collected, and said warrants so drawn and ready for delivery within nine months after the termination of the time limited for appeal, if no appeal be taken, or within nine months from the date of the rendition of final judgment on appeal, if an appeal be taken, all acts find proceedings under such survey and view shall be null and void.”
This provision is a fixed boundary, beyond which the city cannot pursue the individual and virtually sequester his property pendente lite. It is a protection to the single owner with whom, we have seen, the city must deal. This plain provision is not overcome by the earlier clause of the section, saying that -the warrants shall be drawn
It follows that the decree of the circuit court is reversed, and one here entered, enjoining the defendant from taking plaintiff’s property under the proceedings mentioned in the pleadings, and for costs and disbursements, but without damages. Reversed.