22 S.D. 233 | S.D. | 1908
This is an.appeal from that part of an order of the circuit court of Lawrence county dissolving and discharging a temporary restraining order. The action was instituted by the the plaintiff to enjoin the defendant, .the city of Deadwood, from removing or taking down a certain one-story frame structure, situated (within the fire limits of the city of Deadwood. A temporary restraining order was issued upon the complaint, but upon the hearing the isame was dissolved.
It is further contended by the appellant that, if in fact there was no extension or waiver of the time mentioned in the contract or application for the extension of time, the city council has no authority, under the law, to tear down or destroy the plaintiff’s building. It is contended on the part of the city that, as the city possessed the power to prescribe the limits within which wooden buildings should not be erected or placed or repaired without permission, when the time for which permission had been given- had expired, t-he city had the right to require 'said building to be removed, as provided by the terms of the contract, and upon the failure of the plaintiff to cause such removal upon due notice on the part of ’the city, the city had the right to tear down or remove the same. In the view we take of -the case it will not be necessary, in this opinion, to determine the question as to the right of the city to- cause it-he removal of said structure-independently of the contract, and we therefore express no opinion upon that question.
The evidence introduced on the part of the plaintiff, tending to prove that the city had accepted a license fee of $10 per month, 'imposed upon the business carried, on in said building, for several months subsequently to April 1; 1905, did not, in our opinion, have the effect of extending the time stipulated in- the contract as to the ■removal of the building. ’ ■
‘'It is further contended by the'appellant that,■ assuming-theie -■Was no extension--of timé' or-waiver-of the same, the city council rhád'-no right,'úndér the law, to-tear-down or-destroy the-plaintiff’s
It is further contended on the part of the city that no case is presented that would warrant the court in granting an injunction: (i) Boa* the reason that the alleged threatened trespass is not one coming within the class of trespasses that will be enjoined by a court of equity; (2) that there,was- no- allegation or proof tending to show the insolvency of the city and that such an allegation is essential to be shown before the equitable powers of the court could be invoked. We lare of the opinion that this-.contention on the part of the city is correct. In Beatty v. Smith, 14 S. D. 24, 84 N. W. 208, this court had occasion to review and examine- the
It is disclosed by .the record that the building in controversy, as before stated, was a iframe wooden building, and Was used for the purpose of a skating rink and dancing pavilion. There would be no difficulty, therefore, on the part of the plaintiff in proving the value of the building, or the damages sustained by him .by its destruction, and in recovering from the ci'tv such value or damages which, in the absence of an. allegation to the contrary, it must be presumed the city would be able to pay, in case the .city should 'be held liable for damages. It is quite clear, therefore, that it was not a proper caise in which a court of equity - could be called ¡upon to exercise its equitable powers.. It also may be regarded as a well-settled rule that the dissolution or continuance of a preliminary in-, junction, rests largely in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and its action will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the
Under ithe facts, .therefore, dislosed by the record in this case this court cannot say that there was any -abuse of its discretion by the trial court in dissolving the restraining order, and -the order of the circuit court is therefore affirmed.