48 So. 359 | Ala. | 1908
The 40 acres in controversy was at the time of the attempted sale a part of the homestead, and the bond executed by John A. Clark, not being signed and separately acknowledged by . his wife, was Void as an obligation to convey, and was not the subject of a specific enforcement. — Moses v. McCain, 82 Ala. 370, 2 South. 741; McGhee v. Wilson, 111 Ala. 619, 20 South. 619, 56 Am. St. Rep. 72. Nor does a conveyance of the homestead which does not conform to the statute (section 4161 of the Code of 1907) operate as an estopped against the husband, notwithstanding he has been paid a Valuable consideration. It is simply void — a nullity to all intents and purposes. — Halso v. Scawright, 65 Ala. 431; Alford v. Lehman, 76 Ala. 526; Crim v. Nelms, 78 Ala. 604. The renting of these 40' acres, which was a part of the homestead, the owner at the time residing on the other portion, did not operate as an abandonment or affect its character as' a homestead. — Bailey v. Dunlap, 138 Ala. 415, 35 South. 451; Metcalf v. Smith, 106 Ala. 301, 17 South. 537. The chancellor therefore properly decreed that the contract was a nullity and not the subject of a specific performance.
The Constitution of 1901 (section 205) expressly exempts the homestead from the payment of any debt, except by a mortgage or other alienation, with the volun
We, of course, have decisions where the court has required the repayment of the purchase money as a condition precedent to a recovery of land; but they did not involve the homestead. S'o. too. are owners of land re quired, under certain conditions, to pay for improve ments as a condition precedent to an eviction of an
The case of Cowan v. Southern R. R., 118 Ala. 554, 23 South. 754, and which is relied upon by counsel, is no authority estopping the plaintiff (Clark) from recovering his homestead, because of the erection by Bird, with the knowledge of Clark, of improvements, until first paying for said improvements. It is true the Cowan Case, supra, lays down the general rule of an estoppel from evicting a railroad whose track was laid with the knowledge of the owner, and cites authorities on the subject. But the homestead was not involved in a single case cited, and while the land in said Cowap, Case, supra, was the homestead, what was said as to the estoppel was not decisive of the case. There was no attempt to evict the railroad, as the bill simply sought compensation for the right of way and that the company be enjoined from using the same until complainant was compensated under the Constitution and statutes pertaining to the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Moreover, we can see how the doctrine of estoppel might be invoked against the eviction of a railroad going over the homestead, and yet not have any application to prop: erty not condemned or taken under the doctrine of eminent domain. The Constitution makes provision for taking property for certain purposes, whether it be the homestead or not, by compensating the owner, and which can be done independent of obtaining a conveyance. Yet when a conveyance is relied upon, instead of con
While'we hold that the bond'of'John A. Clark is void as dn obligation to convey the homestead, we do not wish' to intimate that lie would not be personally liable for a breach of samé.' ' •"
The chancellorerfed in not dismissing the bill of complaint, and the decree is reversed,'and one is here render ed dismissing" sáin'e. ' ‘ ' ‘
Reversed and rendered.