232 F. Supp. 255 | S.D. Tex. | 1964
Petitioner, Willie Earl Clark, is a prisoner in state custody pursuant to judgment and sentence of Criminal District Court No. 3, Dallas County, entered on August 16, 1961. After trial by jury, petitioner was found guilty of the offense of burglary as charged, and it was further found that petitioner had been convicted of two prior felonies as alleged in the indictment. A life sentence was imposed in accordance with the Texas recidivist statute, Art. 63, Vernon’s Ann. Texas Penal Code, and notice of appeal was given to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Petitioner’s application of direct appeal was denied on March 8, 1961. Subsequently, two applications for writ of habeas corpus were filed with that same court and both were denied. Thereafter, on August 10, 1962, a petition for writ of certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court of the United States. This was denied without written order on February 18, 1963.
Having thus exhausted his state remedies, petitioner sent an application for writ of habeas corpus to this court, accompanied by a pauper’s oath and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauper-is.
The essence of the complaint is that petitioner was legally insane at the time of the purported burglary, and that one who is insane is not criminally responsible for his actions. This contention was first raised in petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. In order to substantiate petitioner’s allegation of insanity it was shown that petitioner was adjudged insane by a jury in the County Court of Dallas County, Texas, on July
Respondent argues, on the other hand, that the petitioner should have raised the question of insanity at the time of his trial or on appeal therefrom. Furthermore, respondent urges that there is sufficient evidence so that this court should find that petitioner was sane and competent to stand trial on the date he was tried.
Both parties misconstrue the function of the federal court in hearing a habeas corpus petition. The purpose of habeas corpus is to determine if a person is being held in violation of his constitutional rights. Misapplication of state law, be the rule evidentiary or substantive, does not alone constitute a denial of due process. See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 92 L.Ed. 1683 (1948). Nor does this court have the authority in a habeas corpus hearing to make a determination of a defendant’s sanity at the time of his trial.
On July 31, 1931, petitioner was adjudicated a lunatic by a jury and committed to the state asylum for treatment. At the hospital, petitioner’s condition was diagnosed as syphilis: general paresis. And on June 25, 1935, petitioner was discharged as “improved”. The Texas statutes are clear evidence that the laws of Texas amply provide for recognition of the humane doctrine prevailing in all common law jurisdictions that a person cannot be tried for criminal misconduct while he is insane.
In proceedings to commit a person to a mental hospital, the general mental condition of the subject is in issue. These proceedings contemplate a determination of whether the person involved is mentally ill so as to be dangerous to himself or others, and, in order to protect society, a proper subject for commitment to a mental hospital. See, Pure Oil Co. v. Clark, 56 S.W.2d 850 (Comm. of App.Tex.1933). In other cases the law is primarily concerned with the ability of the person to comprehend the effect or consequences of the particular act under investigation. It is an ancient rule of law that an insane person cannot be held legally responsible for his criminal acts.
In view of the differing standards applied in determining insanity, this court finds it difficult to hold that petitioner was deprived of his freedom without due process of law when he was convicted of a felony without regard to his prior adjudication of insanity. It is true that in Texas the prior commitment acts so as to shift the burden of proof on the question of insanity in a criminal case. A rebuttable presumption does arise that petitioner was and is insane until that prior adjudication is set aside. E. g., Dudley v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 334, 248 S.W.2d 934 (1952); McGee v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 639, 238 S.W.2d 707 (1950).
Furthermore, both the fact that the defendant was represented by counsel at the time of his trial and the fact that he was released from his commitment as “improved” must be taken as mitigating factors against petitioner’s claim of abridgment of federal constitutional rights. This decision is in no way to be taken as indicating a determination by this court of the question of petitioner’s prior or present sanity. It does mean that this court feels petitioner has not been deprived of any constitutional right, regardless of any state evidentiary presumption which attaches to commitment proceedings.
There being no abridgment of a federal constitutional guarantee alleged by petitioner, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the petition of Willie Earl Clark for writ of habeas corpus be and it is hereby denied.
The clerk will record this Memorandum and Order on the minutes of the court and will forward true copies hereof to the petitioner and the attorneys of record.
. A previous application for habeas corpus in this court was denied on August 3, 1962, on the grounds that petitioner bad not met the jurisdictional requisite of exhaustion of remedies. 28 U.S.O.A. § 2254.
. It would appear, in any event, that the problem is whether the defendant was insane at the time of the burglary rather than at the time of the trial. While it is true that, under Texas law, a person who is insane at the time of the trial cannot be tried, petitioner is alleging that no criminal responsibility should have attached to bis acts. Such an allegation goes to the question of insanity at the time of the act.
. Art. 34, Texas Penal Code.
. It should be noted that such a presumption would not arise in Texas if the inmate were released from the mental hospital after 1958. The adoption of the Mental Health Code, Art. 5547-81, Vernon’s Civil Statutes of Texas, did away with the presumption in cases where the inmate is discharged. Section (b) provides, “The discharge of a patient who has been found mentally incompetent terminates the presumption that he is mentally incompetent.” The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Amos v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 44, 331 S.W.2d 225 (1960), refused to make this provision effective as to anyone discharged prior to its adoption. This court, therefore, treats the instant case accordingly.