*76 OPINION
By the Court,
This аction was commenced to challenge the constitutionality of the 1977 legislative act creating a metropolitаn fire department in any city having a population of 125,000 or more located in a county having a population of 200,000 or more and in which a county fire agency exists within 10 miles of the city. NRS 280A.011-280A.201.
The constitutional challenge is twofold. First, that since only the City of Lаs Vegas and the County of Clark have the requisite population, the Act must fall as local and special legislation prohibited by Nev. Const, art. 4, § 20; second, that the Act denies equal protection because citizens of Clark County who are not alsо residents of the City of Las Vegas are disenfranchised. 1
The district court found no contitutional infirmity. We need not reach the question of whether the Act is local or special legislation, cf. Damus v. County of Clark,
In order to increase efficiency, lоwer purchasing costs, coordinate efforts and improve the use of equipment, personnel and supplies, the legislature proposed a merger of city and *77 county fire agencies (in cities and counties having the requisite population) thereby creating a metropolitan fire department. This end was to be accomplished by directing the city commission to manage, administer, supervise and control the department [NRS 280A. 101(3)], and to prepare the annual budget for the ultimate approval or modification of the budget committee [NRS 280A.161(1)].
The City Commission of Las Vegas is an elected body. The commissioners аutomatically govern the metropolitan fire department (except for budget control) by reason of their popular election to the City Commission. Since residents of the County who are not residents of the City do not vote for city commissioners, such residents have no voice in governing the metropolitan fire department (except for budget control) and are not represented.
Indeed, even with regard to budget control, county residents of the fire district who are not residents of the city have only a diluted representation upon the budget committee. That committee is composed of eight members; the four city commissioners, the city mayor, and three county commissioners. City representation upon the budget committee is automatic by reason of the commissioners’ popular election and the popular election of the mayor. The three county commissioners are appointed to the budget committee by their fellow county commissioners. Thus, residеnts of the county and fire district who are not residents of the city have, at best, a 3/8-representation upon the budget committеe, while the city enjoys a 5/8-repre-sentation. 2
The central question presented by this litigation is whether the governmental structure of the metropolitan fire department denies equal protection to county residents within the fire district who are not residents of the city.
1. The metropolitan fire department envisioned by the Act is a new political unit with its own governing body. It exercises governmental powers. Cantwell v. Hudnut,
The “one man, one vote” concept embraced by the equal protectiоn clause [Gray v. Sanders,
Whether a governing structure is appointed or elected depends upon whether an election automatically results in membership. Abate v. Mundt,
Election is a prerequisite to membership of the governing board of the metropolitan fire department. Only the budget committee has some appointed members, the three county commissioners. When considered together, that is, the governing body of thе metropolitan fire district, and its budget committee, we find that 10 members are elected, and only 3 are appointed. The presence of a minimal number of appointed officials on the budget committee should not serve to insulate the metropolitan fire department from judicial scrutiny for fair apportionment. Oliver v. Board of Education of City of New York,
2. Since the true nature of the governing structure is elective, the demands of equal protection must be met. This is not accomplished by the Act in its present form. The entire governing board of-the fire district and a majority of the budget committee is elected only by residents of the City of Las Vegas, resulting in the near total disenfranchisement of almost fifty percent of the residents of Clark County, residing outsidе the City but within the fire district.
3
Thus, we are not here concerned with vote dilution [Reynolds v. Sims,
The Act creating the Metropolitan Fire Department violates the Equal Protection Clause and is unconstitutional.
Notes
The plaintiffs in this action consist of Clark County, several unincorporated towns, and fоur individual taxpayer plaintiffs. It is well-established that political subdivisions have no standing, either at
parens patriae
or to vindicate any “rights” of their own, tо challenge state laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. City of New York v. Richardson,
Since there is no requirement that all three county representatives on a committee reprеsent county commissioner districts outside the city, county representation conceivably could be less than a 3/8-representation.
The 1970 census reveals that the City of Las Vegas has a little more than one half of the population of that portion of Clark County within the fire district.
