Clark County Solid Waste Management District v. Danis Clarkco Landfill Co.Clark County Solid Waste Management District v. Danis Clarkco Landfill Co.
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- Before:
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Aрpellants Danis Clarkco Landfill Company (“Danis”) and the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“OEPA”) appeal from the trial court’s declaratory judgment in favor of appellee Clark County Solid Waste Management District (“District”).
This appeal involves two consolidated cases in which Danis and the OEPA each contest the District’s authority to consider certain “siting” criteria when reviewing Danis’s plans to construct a landfill in Clark County. Additionally, Danis contends that the trial court erred in not allowing more discovery and asserts that declaratory judgment was improper absent a “definite and concrete” controversy.
The appellants’ claims stem from the District’s March 31, 1993 adoption of two rules regulating solid waste disposal in Clark County. In relevant part, the rules required general plans and specifications for any proposed solid waste disposal facility to be submitted to and approved by the Clark County Board of Commissioners. The rules also prohibited the construction of any solid waste disposal facility not complying with the Clark County Solid Waste Management Plan. 1
The District subsequently brought a declaratory judgment action against Danis, the OEPA, and two citizen groups. The District sought a declaration that it could require the proposed Danis landfill to comply with the siting criteria provided in the Clark County Solid Waste Management Plan. The District and the OEPA filed cross motions for summary judgment on September 16, 1994.. Danis joined in the OEPA’s motion on September 20, 1994, and filed its own cross-motion for summary judgment on October 21,1994.
Thereafter, the trial court issued a two-page decision and judgment entry on June 8, 1995, granting the District’s request for declaratory relief. Specifically, the trial court made the following findings:
“1. Clark County Solid Waste Management District is empowered by Ohio Revised Code Section 343.01(G) to adopt, publish and enforce Rule No. 2-393;
“2. Clark County Solid Waste Management District is empowered by Ohio Revised Code Section 343.01(G) to adopt, publish and enforce Rule No. 3-393;
“3. Having adopted and published Rule No. 2-393, Clark County Solid Waste Management District may follow the siting procedure and criteria described in Part II, Section 8.b and Appendix M of the Clark County Solid Waste Management Plan in making its determination whether the general plans and specifications of the proposed Danis Clark Landfill comply with the plan;
“4. Clark County Solid Waste Management District is required by Ohio Revised Code Sеction 3734.55(C)(4) to follow the siting procedure and criteria described in Part II, Section 8.b and Appendix M of the Clark County Solid Waste Management Plan in making its determination whether the general plans and specifications of the proposed Danis Clark Landfill comply with the plan;
Danis and the OEPA subsequently filed timely appeals, which we have consolidated for our review. In essence, Danis argues that the trial court erred by (1) finding Danis to be subject to the District’s site evaluation process; (2) concluding that the District’s siting criteria, as applied, did not require the District’s impermissible consideration and application of design criteria; (8) ignoring discovery requests by Danis and awarding summary judgment based upon incomplete facts; and (4) awarding declaratory relief in the absence of a controversy. In addition, the OEPA contends that the trial court’s declarations, viewed collectively, violate
Rather than considering each of Danis’s and the OEPA’s assignments of error in turn, we will combine the arguments, when appropriate, to facilitate efficient appellate review. We start our analysis with Danis’s first assignment of error, which provides:
“ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1: The trial court failed to recognize that the District has no statutory authority to apply the site identification strategy required under Ohio Rev.Code section 3734.53(A)(8) to facilities not ‘identified’ as needed to serve the District’s capacity needs.”
In this assignment of error, Danis claims that the trial court erred when it ruled that the District could apply its facility siting requirements to Danis’s proposed landfill. We begin our resolution of this issue with a brief review of Ohio’s legislative scheme governing solid waste disposal. Pursuant to
The solid waste management plans mentioned in
In the present case, Danis’s proposed landfill is not a facility “identified” by the Clark County Solid Waste Management District pursuant to
Conversely, the District argues that two legislative provisions authorize the application of its site identification strategy to nonidentified facilities. In particular, the District relies upon
“The solid waste management plan of a county or joint district may provide for the adoption of rules under division (G) of
<( * * *
“(2) Governing the maintenance, protection, and use of solid waste collection and solid waste disposal, transfer, recycling, and resource recovery facilities within the district and requiring the submission of general plans and specifications for the construction, enlargement, or modification of any such facility to the board of county commissioners or board of directors of the district for review and approval as complying with the plan or amended plan of the district,[.]” (Emphasis added.)
Additionally,
“To the extent authorized by the solid waste management plan of the district * * *, the board of county ‘commissioners of a county district or board of directors of a joint district may adopt, publish, and enforce rules:
it * * *
“(2) Governing the maintenance, protection, and use of solid waste collection or other solid waste facilities located within its district. The rules adopted under division (G)(2) of this section shall not establish design standards for solid waste
An analysis of
In the present case, the District’s solid waste management plan states at Section IV.2 that a District committee will administer and supervise the development of new and expanded facilities. Furthermore, Section IV.2(a) explains that the plan’s siting criteria will guide the District in identifying the location of
all
new solid waste management facilities within the District. Additionally, Section IV.2(b) provides for the adoption of rules pursuant to
Furthermore, Part IV.2(b) of the District’s plan provides for the adoption of rules, pursuant to
In opposition to this determination, Danis recites
We disagree with Danis’s statutory interpretation. The primary purpose of
Consequently, we agree with the District that
In the present case, the District’s plan provides that all proposed facilities must meet the District’s siting requirements. We find this provision entirely appropriate. The location of a proposed landfill, identified or not, certainly is a matter of local District concern, and we find nothing in the Revised Code prohibiting the District’s action. 4 Accordingly, we overrule Danis’s first assignment of error.
Having determined that the District may subject Danis’s proposed landfill to the siting strategy contained in the District’s plan, we next must consider whether the siting strategy, itself, violates any provisions of the Revised Code. Danis and the OEPA raise this issue in their second and first assignments of error, respectively. Based upon their similarity, we will consider these twо assignments of error together.
In its second assignment of error, Danis claims:
“ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2: The trial court erred by failing to declare the Plan’s siting procedures and criteria (at Part II, Section 8.b and Appendix M) invalid as applied because those siting procedures and criteria require consideration and application by the District of design criteria, an area reserved exclusively to the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (‘OEPA’), and
Similarly, the OEPA’s first assignment of error states:
“Assignment of Error No. 1. The trial court erred in declaring that the District may and must find that a landfill does not ‘comply with the district plan,’ and so may not be constructed, if the landfill is unacceptable under the siting criteria contained in Part II, Section 8.b of the District plan, because the District’s exercise of such authority will violate the prohibition against establishing landfill design standards set forth in R.C.
In these two assignments of error, Danis and the OEPA contend that the District’s application of its siting strategy to the proposed Danis facility violates
Like the previous assignment of error, this argument requires us to construe the language of
In the present case, Danis and the OEPA contend that the District plan’s siting strategy requires the District’s consideration, application, and establishment of design standards in violation of
Part II, Section 8 is entitled “A Strategy for Identification of Sites for the Additional Solid Waste Management Facilities and Capacity Identified under Division (A)(7) of this Section.” It provides a comprehensive review of the District’s process for siting solid waste management facilities within Clark County. Section 8.b states that the siting process includes three procedures that may be used depending upon a proposed facility’s type and complexity. Furthermore, each procedure includes two parts. Part I requires the District to determine whether a proposed facility complies with the goals and objectives of the Clark County Solid Waste Management Plan. Part II requires the District “to determine whether the proposed facility and site are appropriate for the District by evaluating the facilities and sites according to specific requirements and criteria.” These “specific requirements and criteria” are found in Appendix
As a sanitary landfill needing an OEPA installation permit, Danis was required to provide the District with preliminary information and to comply with detailed site evaluation criteria. These requirements are contained in Appendix M, List E of the District’s plan. Specifically, List E provides horizontal and vertical isolation requirements that mirror current OEPA regulations governing a proposed facility’s physical location. More important, List E also establishes a “Landfill Siting Matrix System.” List E, Section III.2.C explains the matrix system as follows:
■ “In addition to the general horizontal and vertical isolation requirements, a siting matrix system shall be used to evaluate less definitive criteria of importance to the District. Areas of concern are listed as criteria with respect to landfill facility siting. Each criterion is ranked according to its relative importance in the matrix by an assigned weighting factor. For each of the criteria], the specific site conditions proposed by the developer will be evaluated. This point system can be used tо compare facility sites to one another or can be used in comparison to a standard for an acceptable landfill site.”
The matrix includes four categories: (1) hydrogeologic conditions, (2) design criteria, (3) facility impacts, and (4) host community concerns. The District evaluates a proposed landfill based upon its score in each of these categories. The maximum number of points a potential developer can achieve under each criterion is ten. A proposed landfill must score at least eighty percent of the possible points in each category to be acceptable under the District plan.
The present assignment of error concerns the District’s evaluation of design criteria, the second category in thé matrix. List E, Section III.3.b provides that a District advisory committee “will evaluate the design of the landfill to determine whether it compliments hydrogeological conditions.” The committee’s review includes evaluation of a propоsed facility’s linear design, final cover, leachate collection, decomposition gas control, and groundwater monitoring system. Section III.3.b presents a five-step process for evaluating and scoring these aspects of a facility’s design.
■ Step one addresses linear design and states:
“The [Ohio Adm. Code] 3745-27 regulations identify minimum specifications for the type of liner that shall be used in the area of solid waste placement. They specify a double liner system; a geomembrane liner placed on a recompacted soil liner. The recompacted soil liner is to be constructed according to specified design parameters.
Step one then awards no points to a facility failing to meet minimum liner design specifications, eight points to a facility meeting minimum standards, and ten points to a facility exceeding minimum standards.
Similarly, step two addresses a facility’s final cover and states:
“The OAC regulation 3745-27-11 identifies] minimum specifications in the construction of a cap system over the area of solid waste placement. The [District] staff or consultant support shall determine the minimum acceptable cap based on .the local conditions as applied to OAC standards. A proposed facility meeting the minimum standard will receive eight (8) points * *
Step three concerns a facility’s leachate collection system. It states:
“The OAC regulation 3745-27-08 identifies minimum specifications in the construction of a leachate management system of a sanitary landfill. The [District] staff or consultant support shall determine the minimum acceptable leachate management system based on the local conditions as applied to OAC standards. A proposed facility/site meeting the minimum standard will receive eight (8) points * * *.”
Like step one, steps two and three also award zero points for failing to meet minimum standards or ten points for exceeding minimum standards. Stеp four differs from the previous three, however. It concerns a facility’s decomposition gas management system and provides:
“The OAC regulation 3745-27-12 requires that a decomposition gas monitoring system around [the] perimeter of a landfill be installed if a residence is located within 1000 feet of the limits of solid waste placement. A proposed facility/site meeting the minimum standard will receive eight (8) points.”
Step four, unlike the previous three steps, does not allow the District to determine minimum acceptable standards “based upon local conditions as applied to the OAC standards.”
Step five, the final step, involves calculating the overall design criteria score to be used in category two of the landfill siting matrix. Step five provides:
“To determine the point value for design criteria to be used in the Landfill Siting Matrix, add all point values assigned to Steps 1 through 4 above, [and] multiply by .25. A minimum of 8 (eight) points is required to meet the required siting matrix. All individual scores from steps 1 through 4 must be above the stated mínimums.”
We find the appellants’ argument on this issue persuasive. As we explained above, steps one through four of the District’s evaluation first identify the minimum applicable OEPA standards for various design elements. Steps one, two, and three then provide that the District staff or consultant support shall determine minimum acceptable standards for each element “based on local conditions as applied to OAC standards.” Significantly, step four does not allow the District to establish minimum acceptable standards. Instead, it recites the OEPA standard for decomposition gas management systems as found in
To the extent steps one, two, and three allow the District to determine minimum acceptable design standards, however, we hold that those provisions violate
The plain language of steps one, two, and three grants the District discretion to deviate from and exceed OEPA standards. The three provisions do not recite the Ohio Administrative Code design requirements and then mandate mechanical application of those requirements. Indeed, empowering the District staff to review OEPA standards but requiring strict compliance with those standards would prove futile. Instead, steps one, two, and three allow the District staff to consider not just OEPA regulations but local conditions as well. Without question, then, drafters of the District plan contemplated some staff discretion when they devised steps one, two, and three.
Furthermore, as we noted above, step four does not authorize consideration of local conditions. It simply recites the OEPA standard and awards a passing
Nevertheless, the District seeks to avoid this conclusion by arguing that its plan refers to OEPA design requirements but does not establish independent standards. In fact, the District contends that its siting procedure “recognizes and yields to the design standards established by the OEPA in Chapter 3745 of the Ohio Administrative Code by automatically grading out a proposed facility at passing scores within the Matrix System when the facility meets the minimum standards of the OEPA.”
For the reasons explained more fully above, however, we find the District’s interpretation of its siting strategy at odds with the language of its plan. By its own terms, Appendix M, List E does not “automatically” award a passing score to a proposed facility meeting minimum OEPA standards. Instead, the plan allows the District staff or consultant support to determine minimum acceptable standards based upon OEPA regulations
and
local conditions. As we noted above, however, the District possesses no such authority. Establishing District design standards less stringent than the OEPA’s violates the Ohio Administrative Code, аnd establishing District design standards more stringent than the OEPA’s violates
Despite this conclusion, the District supports its argument by relying upon another portion of its solid waste management plan. Specifically, the District cites the following introductory language from page one of Appendix M:
“Any facility sited under these criteria must meet the minimum established regulations set forth by the Ohio EPA. As the State regulations change, these criteria shall be updated by reference. All such regulations overrule the criteria specified herein. The siting process will not violate or exceed OEPA regulations as set forth. This plan recognizes the director of the OEPA’s right to waive specific requirements relative to this Site Evaluation Process.”
This general provision, which precedes the plan’s intricate siting strategy, declares that the District’s siting process will not exceed OEPA standards. Furthermore, it provides that any conflicting OEPA regulations overrule the plan’s siting criteria. Consequently, the District contends that its plan recognizes the superiority of OEPA regulations and, therefore, does not violate
The wholesale extraction of language allowing District review “based upon local conditions as applied to OAC standards” would destroy the operation of the matrix. Absent such language, the District staff would be relegated to rubber-stamping those plans meeting OEPA design standards and rejecting those failing OEPA design standards. This redundant exercise would serve no purpose, 5 and it clearly was not contemplated by the plan’s drafters. Consequently, we are not prepared to modify the District’s intricate siting matrix on the basis of a conclusory sentence stating that all state regulations overrule the criteria specified in the plan.
Accordingly, we hold that the siting strategy contained in Appendix M, List E enables the District to establish design standards in violation of
We now turn to the OEPA’s second assignment of error, which contends that the District’s application of its siting strategy to Danis unlawfully duplicates and intrudes upon the OEPA’s permitting authority. More specifically, the OEPA asserts that some elements of the District’s siting criteria also are considered by the OEPA when it decides whether to issue an installation permit. However, our resolution of the previous assignment of error renders this assignment of error moot. Having declared the District’s siting strategy invalid because it establishes design standards, we need not consider whether the siting strategy improperly
Having addressed both assignments of error advanced by the OEPA, we now will consider Danis’s remaining assignments of error. Danis’s third assignment of error states:
“ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3: The trial court erred by failing to allow Danis to pursue its requested discovery of the facts underlying the District’s efforts to apply Rules 2-393 and 3-393 as a pretext to block the Danis landfill when Danis offered documents and affidavits showing that (a) the District officials adopted the Rules to thwart the Danis landfill by erecting additional hurdles for Danis, and (b) the discovery requested by Danis was ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ within
In this assignment of error, Danis argues that the trial court granted the District’s motion for summary declaratory judgment without first allowing Danis to pursue discovery calculated to reveal the District’s reasons for adopting, applying, and selectively enforcing its rules and siting strategy. Danis cites the following four discovery requests as “exemplary of the balance of the discovery requests”:
“REQUEST NO. 3: All writings identifying which solid waste facilities have been designated by the District.
“REQUEST NO. 4: All writings relating to the District’s consideration, development, submission or approval of the Siting Process/Ranking Scheme set forth in the Plan for designated facilities.
“REQUEST NO. 5: All writings relating to the District’s application of the Siting Process/Ranking Scheme set forth in the Plan to undesignated facilities.
“REQUEST NO. 6: All writings relating to the District’s consideration, development, submission or approval of other siting procedures and criteria for facilities not designated in the Plan.”
Danis contends that these requests were relevant to issues before the trial court because each “addresses the issue of whether the Plan’s [siting process and ranking scheme] can be imposed on Danis’ new sanitary landfill.”
In response, the District first alleges that Danis failed to preserve this issue for our review. Specifically, the District claims that Danis did not file a motion to compel discovery with the trial court or file a
“Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion for summary judgment that he cannot for sufficient reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.”
Although Danis did not file a motion to compel discovery or file a motion requesting a continuance, it did include a “Rule 56(F) affidavit” with its supplemental memorandum of April 20, 1995. The affidavit, sworn to by Steven Stanley, vice-president of Danis Environmental Management Company, states at paragraph nine:
“9. Pursuant to Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 56(F), Danis cannot present by affidavit all of the facts demonstrating the District’s selective enforcement of its Plan and Rules, and the bias and prejudicial acts and statements by District officials to thwart the Danis landfill. Danis has. sought to discover those facts; however, they are within the exclusive knowledge of District officials; the District’s refusal to consent to discovery has blocked Danis’ efforts.”
The District contends that this affidavit does not meet the requirements of
Thus, we disagree that Danis supplied the affidavit solely to advance its motion. By its own terms, Danis’s summary judgment motion directly opposed the
We believe that this attempt preserved the discovery issue for appeal. Although the affidavit did not aсcompany a motion to compel discovery or a motion for a continuance, Danis’s affidavit did accompany its supplemental memorandum, which in part opposed the District’s summary judgment motion. In
Tucker v. Webb Corp.
(1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 121, 4 OBR 367, 447 N.E.2d 100, the Ohio Supreme Court considered a similar issue involving an appellant who failed even to cite
The Ohio Supreme Court in
Tucker
reasoned that the appellant had chosen not to rest his opposition to the appellee’s summary judgment motion on the inadequacy of discovery alone.
Id.
at 123, 4 OBR at 369, 447 N.E.2d at 102. Instead, “[f]aced with the task of opposing appellee’s motion, appellant attempted to include all possible theories contra to appellee’s motion, as well as proposing his own motion for summary judgment.” The court found the appellant’s actions appropriate.
Id.;
see, also,
Dixon v. Kroger Co.
(June 12,1995), Athens App. No. 94CA1649, unreported, 1995 WL 356497 (noting that “the Ohio Supreme Court has held where a party was allotted insufficient time to discover the essential facts, that it is error for a trial court to enter summary judgment against a party who has asked for more discovery in a memorandum in opposition, even though the party has not specifically moved for a continuance pursuant to
In the present case, as in
Tucker,
Danis challenged the sufficiency of discovery in a summary judgment memorandum. Unlike the appellant in
Tucker,
however, Danis went further and did include a
Consequently, we now must consider whether the trial court erred when it granted the District summary declaratory judgment without providing additional discovery. At the outset, we note that “[t]he provisions of
In the present case, we cannot say that the trial court’s failure to allow additional discovery constituted an abuse of discretion and substantially prejudiced Danis’s position. The only issues properly before the trial court were (1) the District’s statutory authority to adopt its two rules, and (2) the effect of those rules. A review of the trial court’s declaratory judgment reveals that these issues involved pure questions of law.
The first of the trial court’s five declarations stated that
Having determined that the District could adopt rules requiring Danis’s compliance with the District plan, the trial court next declared that the District could consider its siting criteria when reviewing Danis’s proposal. The court presumably reached this conclusion because the District plan provides that its siting strategy “will guide the District in identifying the location of all new solid waste management facilities within the district.” District Plan at Part IV.2(b). Thus, this third declaration was a logical extension of thе trial court’s first two rulings, and, like them, it did not require the resolution of any factual disputes.
Finally, the trial court’s fifth declaration stated that any proposed sanitary landfill found unacceptable by the District plan’s siting strategy “is not in compliance with the Clark County Solid Waste Management Plan.” This self-evident statement carried the trial court’s analysis to its logical conclusion and did not involve any genuine issues of material fact. ’ In this declaration, the trial court explained, quite logically, that any facility violating a portion of the District plan would not comply with the plan.
Consequently, we find no genuine issues of material fact that should have prevented the trial court from rendering its summary declaratory judgment. Danis’s requested discovery related to “the District’s reasons for adoption and application, and selective enforcement of its [r]ules.” However, the trial court’s declaratory ruling addressed the District’s authority to adopt its rules and to subject Danis’s proposed facility to its siting strategy, not its motivation for doing so. If Danis perceives at a later date that the District is applying its siting strategy fraudulently or in bad faith, Danis remains free to challenge the District’s conduct at that time. Such a challenge, however, is irrelevant to the District’s authority, under the Revised Code and its own plan, to apply its siting criteria to Danis. Therefore, we overrule Danis’s third assignment of error.
In its final assignment of error, Danis contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that any proposed landfill found unacceptable under the District’s siting strategy does not comply with the District’s plan. Danis’s final assignment of error states:
“ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4: The trial court overstepped its authority in declaring that any prоposed sanitary landfill that may be found unacceptable by the siting procedures and criteria in Part II, Section 8.b of the Plan is not in compliance with the Plan.”
In this assignment of error, Danis argues that no “definite and concrete controversy” exists to support the trial court’s broad and prospective ruling. In support of its argument, Danis suggests numerous factual scenarios under which the District improperly may reject Danis’s proposal as violative of the District’s siting strategy.
For example, Danis contends, the District could find insignificant noncompliance with its plan, succumb to local pressure to reject the landfill, base its
We disagree. A grant of declaratory judgment is proper when (1) a real controversy exists between adverse parties, (2) the controversy is justiciable, and (3) speedy relief is needed to preserve rights that otherwise may be impaired. Fairview Gen. Hosp. v. Fletcher (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 146, 148-149, 586 N.E.2d 80, 82-83. In the present case, the trial court determined the construction, validity, and effect of District Rules 2-393 and 3-393, and all three prerequisites for a declaratory judgment were satisfied when the trial court made its decision.
First, a real controversy existed concerning the District’s authority to subject Danis’s proposed facility to the District’s siting strategy. Danis and the District undeniably were at odds on this issue and, therefore, were adverse parties.
Second, the controversy between Danis and the District was justiciable. The relevant Revised Code provisions and District rules were in effect. As the District notes, it simply requested the triаl court “to construe the effect of the interplay among these provisions and delineate the District’s obligations under them.” The Ohio Supreme Court has held that declaratory relief is an appropriate means of construing and testing the validity of statutes, ordinances, or regulations. Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm. (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 93, 96-97, 63 O.O.2d 149, 150-151, 296 N.E.2d 261, 263-264.
Finally, speedy relief was necessary to preserve the District’s ability to enforce its rules to the extent authorized by law. The District argues that before the trial court’s ruling it faced potential lawsuits from Danis if it enforced its rules and from various citizen groups if it did not. Consequently, the District sought declaratory relief to resolve this conflict and identify the scope of its rulemaking authority. We agree with the District that declaratory judgment was designed “to lift the people from the horns of such a dilemma.”
Furthermore, we cannot accept Danis’s contention that the trial court’s ruling insulates the District from judicial review of potentially arbitrary decisions. Danis suggests that the trial court’s ruling grants the District
carte blanche
to find a proposed facility in violation of its siting strategy for trivial reasons and then to reject the facility for noncompliance with the District plan. In its fifth
Indeed, as the District notes, if Danis or any other potential developer objects to the District’s plan-compliance decisions, that developer remains free to challenge the District’s determination in court. At that time, the developer can cite any perceived shortcomings in the District’s evaluation process or assert claims of fraud or bad faith stemming from the District’s application of its siting strategy. The trial court’s declaratory judgment does nothing to hamper a developer’s ability to challenge arbitrary District rulings. Consequently, we overrule Danis’s fourth assignment of error.
However, having sustained Danis’s second and the OEPA’s first assignment of error, we reverse those portions of the trial court’s judgment allowing the District to demand Danis’s compliance with its siting strategy. Although we hold that the District may subject
all
proposed solid waste disposal facilities to siting criteria, the District’s criteria before us violate
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s first two declarations allowing the District to enforce rules requiring developers (1) to submit plans demonstrating compliance with the Clark County Solid Waste Management Plan, and (2) to receive District approval before constructing a sanitary landfill. Despite its adoption of these rules, however, the District may not follow its siting procedure and criteria when determining whether Danis’s plans comply with the Clark County Solid Waste Management Plan. As we explained above, that siting strategy improperly allows the District to establish design standards. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s third and fourth declarations. Finally, having declared the District’s siting procedure invalid, we also reverse the trial court’s fifth declaration. The District’s Part II, Section 8 “Siting Procedure C” may not be used to determine Danis’s compliance with the Clark County Solid Waste Management Plan.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Wolff and Fain, JJ., concur.
Notes
. District Rule 2-393 provides:
“No person, municipal corporation, township, or other political subdivision shall construct, enlarge or modify any solid waste transfer, disposal, recycling or resource recovery facility until general plans and specifications for the proposed improvement have been submitted and approved by the Clark County, Ohio Board of County Commissioners as complying with the Solid Waste Management Plan of the Clark County Solid Waste Management District.
” * * * All general plans and specifications shall be submitted in a format which provides the information described in Part II, Section 8.b and Appendix M of the Clark County Solid Waste Management Plan. All such general plans and specifications shall be clearly marked as complying with the requirements of this Rule No. 2 andSection 343.01(G)(2) of the Revised Code.”
Similarly, District Rule 3-393 provides:
“No person, municipal corporation, township, or other political subdivision, shall construct, modify or enlarge any solid waste transfer, disposal, recycling, or resource recovery facility that does not comply with the Clark County, Ohio Solid Waste Management Plan.”
. The only limitation on this statutory authorization is found in
. In accordance with this authorization, the District adopted Rule 2-293 and Rule 3-393, the two provisions at issue in the present appeal.
. In its brief to this court, Danis contends that the siting requirements of
. The only possible benefit of mechanically applying OEPA standards would arise in the context of multiple developers competing to become the District’s “identified” facility. In such a case, several proposed facilities could receive a passing score for meeting OEPA standards. However, the District‘s plan awards “extra credit” for facilities exceeding OEPA standards. Consequently, the District could choose among several OEPA-acceptable facilities and select the one obtaining the highest score in the District’s siting matrix. In this context, the District would not be prohibiting the construction of any landfill meeting OEPA standards. Instead, it would be utilizing its independent evaluation to choose the best facility, among several acceptable candidates, for District identification. However, the present appeal does not involve multiple developers vying for District identification. Therefore, we see no value in granting the District authority to “evaluate” design elements of the proposed Danis landfill.