CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY, INC. v. WILLIAMS
A07A0870
Court of Appeals of Georgia
November 1, 2007
288 Ga. App. 180 | 654 S.E.2d 402
RUFFIN, Judge.
In this premises liability action, Walter Williams sued Clark Atlanta University, Inc. (“CAU“) for injuries sustained when he was shot on property allegedly owned by CAU. The university moved for summary judgment, asserting it owed no duty to Williams. The trial court denied the mоtion, and we granted CAU‘s application for interlocutory appeal.1 For reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact remain and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a mаtter of law.2 On appeal, we review the trial court‘s summary judgment ruling de novo, construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.3
So construed, the evidence shows that at the time of the shooting, Williams was a student at Morris Brown College. Like CAU, Morris Brown is part of a consortium of six colleges and universities located within a geographic area known as the Atlanta University Center (“AUC“). The consortium schools collaborate in several ways, and the students intermingle. For example, students may cross-register in undergraduate courses and programs offered by the various schools. A shuttle transports students among the respective campuses and other areas within the AUC, such as the common library. Williams and other AUC students also shared a dormitory located on Bеckwith Street that was owned by the Interdenominational Theological Center, a school within the consortium.
The day of the shooting, Williams attended a workshop for graduating seniors at the student center on the CAU campus. He stayed at the workshop for several hours, then ate at the CAU student center cafeteria, remaining for approximately one additional hour. At that point, he walked through the сampus toward his dormitory and down a portion of Beckwith Street known as CAU‘s faculty row, where CAU owns several faculty houses that it leases to faculty members and other employees. Although CAU offered testimоny that faculty row is not “on [its] campus,” these properties are shown and identified on a CAU campus map.
En route to his dormitory, Williams stopped in front of a CAU faculty house located across the street from his dormitory to visit with friends. The faculty house was occupied at the time by a guest
In moving for summary judgment, CAU focused on the duty owed to Williams. It argued that because Williams was on a public sidewalk adjacent to a public street at the time of the assault, it was not liable for his injuries. It further claimed that even if Williams was on CAU property when the shooting occurred, he was not а CAU invitee, and the university owed him no duty of ordinary care. According to CAU, therefore, it was not duty bound to protect Williams from the criminal act of a third party.4
Williams testified, however, that he was seated on the front lawn of a CAU faculty house when assaulted, raising a question of fact as to whether he was on the university‘s property. A jury question also remains as to whether CAU owed Williams a duty of ordinary care.
Under
Although Williams was enrolled at Morris Brown, he was a student within the AUC and entered the CAU campus to attend an AUC student function. While attending that function — and while later eating at the CAU cafeteria — Williams undoubtedly was an invitee on the campus. The question, therefore, is whether he lost that status at some pоint before the shooting.
On appeal, CAU argues — and the dissent agrees — that Williams was no longer an invitee while visiting with friends on the
A jury could find that Williams had not yet left the campus at the time of the assault. And although the faculty house where the assault occurred was occupied by a guest professor, CAU was paying the rent on the property, and the evidence does not demonstratе that, as a matter of law, Williams was in an area “off limits” to students.8 Moreover, we cannot conclude that Williams necessarily lost his invitee status simply because he stopped to socialize for 45 minutes, a normal activity for college students.
Questions of fact remain as to whether Williams was an invitee of CAU when he was shot. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied CAU‘s motion for summary judgment on this basis.9
2. As noted above, CAU moved for summary judgment on the issue of duty, arguing that because Williams was not an invitee at the time of the shooting, it owed him no duty of ordinary care. The university raised this same argument on appeal, agаin asserting that it owed no duty to protect Williams. Despite this focus, the dissent argues that the trial court‘s ruling should be reversed because even if a duty of ordinary care existed, Williams failed to produce еvidence that CAU breached the duty.
We disagree. This Court does not apply a “wrong for any reason” rule.10 On the contrary, we must refrain from reversing a ruling on a ground not raised or considered below.11 CAU chosе to move for summary judgment only on the issue of duty. It could have challenged Williams‘s proof of breach, and, as the dissent suggests, such argument might have been successful. But it did not do so, and Williams was never on notice thаt he needed to address the issue or present evidence regarding breach at the summary judgment stage.
The dissent advocates granting summary judgment at the appellate level on an issue neither raisеd by the parties nor considered by the lower court. Such sua sponte action is not only fundamentally unfair, it undercuts our purpose — the correction of errors of law
Judgment affirmed. Smith, P. J., Phipps, Mikell and Bernes, JJ., concur. Johnson, P. J., and Blackburn, P. J., dissent.
JOHNSON, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
Because I find that Williams was not an invitee of CAU at the time of the shooting, I must respectfully dissent. Clearly, Williams was an invitee while he attended a workshop and ate a snack at the CAU student center. And, clearly, Williams continued to be an invitee as he left the workshop and student cеnter. However, Williams admits in his deposition that he walked back to his residence hall on another campus, but, instead of going inside the residence hall, he waited on the public sidewalk directly across frоm his residence hall to meet some friends. According to Williams, he sat on the front lawn of 642 Beckwith, a faculty house owned by CAU. Williams admits he did not know who lived at the property and had never attended any function at the property. And, there is no dispute that Williams was not invited onto the property and did not have permission to be on the property. The friends stood and sat socializing on the public sidewalk and lаwn outside the CAU property for approximately 45 minutes prior to the assault at issue in this case. And, there is no question that the third-party criminal committed the assault while standing on the public sidewalk. Based on thеse facts, I believe that Williams had clearly exceeded the scope of his CAU invitation at the time and place of the assault.
Although the majority finds that CAU owed Williams a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches of 642 Beckwith safe,
Moreover, еven if we accept the majority‘s view that Williams was an invitee and that CAU owed him a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep its premises and approaches safe, Williams has failed to show that CAU breached its duty in this case. The street where the assault occurred is an open, public city street, and there is no evidence that CAU had any authority or right to control in any way who made use of the street. Here, the third party “shooter” had free access to the street and, unless and until he violated the law, CAU had no control
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Blackburn joins in this dissent.
DECIDED NOVEMBER 1, 2007 —
Freeman, Mathis & Gary, Theodore Freeman, Donald J. Grate, for appellant.
Gregory B. McMenamy, Jr., for appellee.