delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff Clarendon America Insurance Co. (Clarendon) filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify defendant Aargus Security Systems, Inc. (Aargus), in several underlying lawsuits arising out of the October 17, 2003, fire that occurred at a building owned by defendant County of Cook (Cook) and managed by defendant 69 West Washington Management, LLC (69 West), located at 69 West Washington Street in Chicago. Clarendon issued a commercial general liability (CGL) policy to defendant B.G.K. Security Services, Inc. (BGK), from which Aargus sought coverage as an “additional insured.” Intervenor Scottsdale Insurance Company (Scottsdale) issued an excess insurance policy to BGK and intervened in this action also seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend Aargus. Clarendon filed a motion for summary judgment in the trial court. Scottsdale filed a brief in support of Clarendon’s summary judgment motion. The court granted Clarendon’s summary judgment motion against Aargus. 1
Aargus appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in holding that the relevant contract, insurance provisions, and certificates of insurance were insufficient to demonstrate a potential for additional insured coverage for Aargus; and (2) in the alternative, the trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment in favor of Clarendon and Scottsdale because a genuine issue of material fact existed.
On April 1, 2002, Aargus entered into a contract, entitled “Agreement with Service Contractor” (hereafter, 69 West/Aargus Contract), with 69 West, acting as the manager and agent of Cook, to provide security guard service to the commercial high-rise building located at 69 West Washington Street in Chicago.
On June 17, 2002, Aargus and BGK entered into a contract entitled “Joint Venture Agreement, 69 West Washington Management Company, L.L.C., 69 West Washington, Chicago, IL 60602” (hereafter, Aargus/BGK Agreement) in which the parties agreed to jointly provide security guard service at the 69 West Washington building. The Aargus/BGK Agreement stated that “B.G.K. Security Services, Inc. shall serve as Aargus’ exclusive subcontractor under the Contract.” Paragraph 16 of the Aargus/BGK Agreement provided: “All insurance that may from time to time be required shall be obtained in such manner as the parties hereto agree.”
BGK obtained a CGL policy from Clarendon, effective January 21, 2003, to January 21, 2004. The Clarendon policy provided $1 million of liability coverage per occurrence with a $5 million general aggregate limit. The Clarendon policy contains a “Blanket Additional Insured Endorsement” (additional insured endorsement), which states, in relevant part:
“WHO IS AN INSURED (Section II) provision of the Policy is amended to include as an insured any person or organization (called ‘additional insured’) to whom you are obligated by valid written contract to provide such coverage, but only with respect to liability for ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising solely out of ‘your work’ on behalf of said additional insured for which coverage is provided by this policy.”
Scottsdale issued an excess liability policy to BGK, effective August 1, 2003, to January 21, 2004. The Scottsdale policy “is excess of and follows form to the Clarendon policy.”
In March and May 2003, Mack & Parker, Inc., an agent of BGK, issued two certificates of insurance to Aargus. The first certificate identified Aargus as “an Additional Insured as respects work performed” by BGK, and the second said that Aargus “is an Additional Insured as regards General Liability for operations performed” by BGK.
On October 17, 2003, a fire occurred at the 69 West Washington building. As a result of the deaths and injuries that occurred in the fire, 22 lawsuits were filed in the circuit court of Cook County and were consolidated under case No. 03 L 12520 (underlying lawsuits). Aargus, 69 West, Cook, and BGK were named as defendants, third-party defendants, and/or counterdefendants in the underlying lawsuits.
Aargus, 69 West, Cook, and BGK tendered the defense in the underlying lawsuits to Clarendon. In July 2004, Clarendon filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the Clarendon policy issued to BGK did not provide coverage to Aargus as an additional insured. Scottsdale was granted leave to intervene in the circuit court and filed its own complaint for declaratory judgment. In January 2006, Clarendon filed a motion for summary judgment. Scottsdale filed a brief in support of Clarendon’s motion. In April 2006, the trial court granted Clarendon’s motion. In June 2006, the trial court found that pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the April 2006 order. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Aargus contends that the trial court erred in finding that the Aargus/BGK Agreement, the Clarendon policy and the certificates of insurance were insufficient to provide coverage to Aar-gus as an additional insured. In the alternative, Aargus asserts that a question of material fact exists regarding insurance coverage because of the Aargus/BGK Agreement and the certificates of insurance.
“The construction of an insurance policy and a determination of the rights and obligations thereunder are questions of law for the court which are appropriate subjects for disposition by way of summary judgment.” Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
“When construing the language of an insurance policy, a court’s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed by the words of the policy.” Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co.,
Aargus raises two theories for it to qualify as an additional insured under BGK’s policies with Clarendon and Scottsdale. First, Aargus contends that the additional insured endorsement only requires an obligation to provide insurance from a valid written contract and that paragraph 16 satisfies that obligation. Second, if the certificates of insurance are considered alongside the Aargus/BGK Agreement, then an unambiguous intent for coverage is shown. Clarendon and Scottsdale maintain that paragraph 16 of the Aargus/BGK Agreement did not obligate BGK to provide insurance coverage for Aargus. Clarendon and Scottsdale further respond that the certificates of insurance do not satisfy the requirement of a valid written contract because the certificates plainly state that they do not confer any rights under the policy without an endorsement from the insurer.
Aargus relies on Yoder v. Rock Island Bank,
We find the decision in Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
On appeal, St. Paul argued that CIPS was made an additional insured under Dover’s CGL policy with Liberty. The additional insured endorsement in Liberty’s policy amended an insured to include “any person, organization, state or other political subdivision, trustee or estate for whom you have agreed in writing to provide liability insurance.” Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,
“ ‘It is expressly understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto that no Work of any kind is authorized nor shall any Work be begun under this Contract until the Contractor shall have provided and delivered to the Owner satisfactory and acceptable evidence of insurance which is in full compliance with the Insurance Specifications attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein.’ ” Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,363 Ill. App. 3d at 341 .
The insurance specifications provided that “contractors such as Dover ‘will secure, maintain and provide evidence’ of ‘Comprehensive General Liability insurance for all claims for personal injury, bodily injury, including death, and property damage which may arise from the operations under this contract.’ ” Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,
Similarly, under the additional insured endorsement in the instant case, “an insured” is amended to include those that the named insured is “obligated by valid written contract to provide such coverage.” The only valid written contract between BGK and Aargus is the Aargus/ BGK Agreement from June 2002. However, the language of paragraph 16 (“All insurance that may from time to time be required shall be obtained in such manner as the parties hereto agree”) does not discuss any obligation undertaken by either BGK or Aargus to provide insurance. When interpreting the provisions of a contract, the court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties; and the language of the contract is the best indication of the parties’ intent. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,
We disagree with Aargus’ assertion that paragraph 16 creates an obligation for insurance coverage to satisfy the requirements under the additional insured endorsement. Rather, we conclude that paragraph 16 leaves the insurance obligations of both contracting parties undecided. As in Liberty Mutual, paragraph 16 does not indicate what insurance is required by either party and we decline to read paragraph 16 to create any coverage obligations. Based on the language of paragraph 16, we find that Aargus was not an additional insured under BGK’s policies with Clarendon and Scottsdale.
Aargus also contends that the certificates of insurance along with the Aargus/BGK Agreement show BGK’s intent to provide additional insured coverage to Aargus. According to Aargus, “when the certificates are considered, it is clear that BGK unambiguously intended by the Aargus/BGK Contract to assume an obligation to provide additional insured coverage for Aargus.” Clarendon and Scottsdale respond that the certificates of insurance do not satisfy the additional insured endorsement because a certificate of insurance does not constitute a contract between the parties. See Lezak & Levy Wholesale Meats, Inc. v. Illinois Employers Insurance Co. of Wausau,
Aargus cites William Blair & Co. v. FI Liquidation Corp.,
However, the problem with Aargus’ argument is that the plain language of paragraph 16 does not require BGK to add Aargus as an additional insured under its policies. In the absence of ambiguity, a court must construe a contract according to its own language, not according to the parties’ subjective constructions. William Blair,
Aargus further contends that the trial court’s reasoning in its ruling against Clarendon and in favor of 69 West and Cook, which is the subject of a separate appeal in case No. 1 — 06—1864, should be extended to Aargus. In that portion of the order, the trial court read the Aargus/BGK Agreement and the 69 West/Aargus Contract together to “satisfy the written contract requirement of the Clarendon and Scottsdale policies.” Aargus’ reliance on the trial court’s order as to those defendants is not persuasive. “Under Illinois law, the decisions of circuit courts have no precedential value.” Delgado v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago,
As an alternative argument, Aargus asserts that a genuine issue of material fact exists that makes summary judgment inappropriate. Aargus contends that “the certificates, if viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, evince an agreement between Aargus and BGK that Aargus should be added as an additional insured under Clarendon’s policy.”
“The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact, but rather to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co.,
Aargus tries to avoid summary judgment by arguing that summary judgment was premature. In its view, there is a question of material fact as to whether Aargus and BGK executed in writing an agreement about insurance. Aargus asserts that it should have had the opportunity to determine whether such agreement exists. We are not persuaded.
It seems clear that Aargus itself should know if it entered into a subsequent written agreement with BGK. The fact that no such agreement was produced should not preclude summary judgment. Here, the additional insured endorsement confers coverage on those that the named insured is obligated by valid written contract to provide such coverage. The Aargus/BGK Agreement is the only written contract between the parties and does not obligate BGK to provide additional insured coverage for Aargus. The Aargus/BGK Agreement left the insurance requirements open to a future agreement. This provision is unambiguous. There is no indication that a subsequent written agreement about insurance exists. Aargus’ reliance on the certificates of insurance to create a question of material fact is misplaced because the certificates are not contracts and cannot alter the fact that the written contract does not contain an obligation to provide for additional insured coverage. There is no question of material fact and summary judgment in favor of Clarendon and Scottsdale was correct.
Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.
Affirmed.
Notes
In the same written order, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 69 West and Cook and against Clarendon. Clarendon appealed that order in case No. 1—06—1864.