This is thе sequel to an earlier appeal by Clarence Irvin Turner, a state prisoner who is sеrving a sentence of five years for participation with four others in an attempted armed robbery. The former appeal was from an order of the District Court denying without a hearing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and we remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether the representation afforded Turner at his trial was, as he claimed, so inadequate as to constitute a denial of the effective assistance of сounsel. Turner v. State of Maryland,
On this disputed issue the District Court has now conducted a hearing and taken testimony from Turner and the lawyer who had been appointed to defend him in the state рroceedings.
A sense of professional responsibility should have suggested to the lawyer that the omission to communicate with his *854 client during the two weeks available before trial not only constituted a deplorable disregard of the client’s feelings, but involved the risk of overlooking significant informаtion which the client might have in his possession or be able to point to. Normally, in the absenсe of clear proof that no prejudice resulted, we should be obliged to treat thе lawyer’s representation as inadequate and the trial as falling short of the standards of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, the hearing which the District Court conducted ascertained in considerable detail not only what the attorney did and failеd to do before trial but demonstrated beyond doubt that the accused in fact had no information to communicate to the lawyer which could have been helpful to the defense. In close interrogation of the prisoner and the attorney, it was clearly shown to the Distriсt Judge’s satisfaction that during their short consultation Turner told the lawyer that the statement he had given to the police was true and that Turner in fact was involved in the attempted robbery.
Apparently, the appellant even now concedes that in so advising the lawyer, he intendеd to admit that he sat in the get-away car in front of the victim’s store while his co-defendants entеred to rob him. 1 Turner seems, however, to have thought that his auxiliary role did not constitute guilt in law. He admitted to the District Judge that he knew the purpose for which his co-defendants went into the store while he remained in the car with the engine running. Needless to say, the fact that Turner did not accompany the others but sat in the getaway ear does not absolve him. The circumstancеs could possibly be considered in mitigation of the sentence and were called to thе jury’s attention. Neither to the lawyer in the brief pre-trial interview nor later at the plenary hеaring in the District Court, when there was a deeper inquiry, did Turner suggest any other fact or ground for defense.
The voluntariness of the appellant’s, statement to the police was at no time contested and was independently proved at the District Court hearing.
In these circumstances there is no-ground for saying that the legal representation afforded Turner was so inadеquate as to warrant the invalidation of his conviction and sentence. See and cоmpare: Jones v. Cunningham,
Nevertheless, we must condemn-the conduct of this court-appointed lawyer. Whether a lawyer is employed by a prosperous defendant at a handsome fee or serves an indigent without compensation in the discharge of the duty resting upon him as an officer of the court, the-canons of our profession require his “entire devotiоn to the interest of the client,, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.” American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics, Cаnon 15. If the spirit of this canon had been observed, no occasion-would have arisen fоr a post-conviction-inquiry into the quality of counsel’s performance.
Affirmed.
Notes
. The car, bought by thе appellant and his co-defendants, was titled in Turner’s name because of the five purchasers only he was of legal age.