25 Iowa 315 | Iowa | 1868
The statute gives to such corporation the privilege of an exemption from this process. This is a privilege which they may insist upon or waive, as they deem most to their interest.
Corporations, like individuals, may waive provisions, whether by contract or by statute, intended to be for their benefit. This is familiar law.
The primary object of section 3196 of the Revision was, doubtless, to relieve such corporations from being embarrassed in the execution of their political, civil or corporate duties, by garnishment. It may perhaps admit of discussion whether it was intended, where such a corporation owed a debt to another, to exempt such corporation from being compelled to pay the creditor of its creditor, instead of paying its creditor directly. Whatever question there may be on this point we leave open, and place our decision on the ground indicated below, conceding for the purposes of this case that the school district might have been discharged if it had not waived the privilege.
The garnishee moved for and obtained a hew trial, but did not ask for this new trial upon the ground of, its exemption from garnishment. Subsequently the garnishee filed an amended answer to the merits, and did not make any claim that it was not subject to be garnished. The plaintiff replied, and a jury was called to try the issues thus tendered by the garnishee.
“ The law of Iowa provides that a municipal or political corporation cannot be garnished, and the school district of Fairfield, being such a corporation, is not liable in this proceeding.”
• This the court refused to give, as well as another, intended to embody the same idea.
The court instructed the jury to ascertain from the. evidence the amount of indebtedness of the garnishee to the defendants Walker and Davis. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs for $381.81.
The garnishee assigns as error the refusal of the court to charge as requested.
In our judgment, the court, under the circumstances before referred to, properly refused to give the instructions prayed for by the garnishee. There was no issue to which they were applicable, and the garnishee had, by its prior acts and course of proceeding in court, represented by its officers and attorneys, waived the right to insist upon defeating the plaintiff, by an instruction that it was not subject to the process of garnishment.
If it had recovered against the plaintiffs, this would have been a bar to a subsequent suit against the district by the defendants. If it fails, as it once did, or if it finds, after the evidence is in, and large costs are made, that it is likely to fail, can it, for the first time on the trial and by way of an instruction, ask to defeat the plaintiff by setting up its exemption from garnishment proceedings ? We think not. The record shows, that, on the two trials of the issues which the garnishee tendered, costs were made to the amount of $139.20. If the instructions prayed for by the garnishee had been given, it would have been discharged, and the plaintiff left to pay the bill of costs. It is not necessary to dwell upon the
In relation to the other point made, we remark that the exception to the court’s charge was too general, and presents no question which can be reviewed in this court.
Affirmed.