156 Misc. 732 | City of New York Municipal Court | 1935
On August 2, 1929, defendant issued to George M. Clancy its $2,000 policy of life insurance. Upon Clancy’s death, on July 29, 1934, it paid this sum to his wife, Mary Clancy, the named beneficiary. Attached to the policy is a supplementary provision for the payment of an additional $2,000 as an accidental death benefit, on conditions set forth. The present action is to recover the additional benefit.
The supplementary provision, so far as pertinent, is as follows: “ If * * * due proof shall be presented at the Home Office of the Company, of the death of the Insured * * * caused solely by external, violent, and accidental means, * * * and that such death occurred within ninety days after such injury and as a direct result thereof, independently and exclusively of all other causes, * * * the company subject to the conditions herein set forth will pay an additional sum of Two Thousand Dollars.” “ This provision for benefit shall not apply if the death of the Insured results directly or indirectly * * * from homicide, or from any violation of law by the Insured.”
At the time of his death, Clancy was thirty-four years of age. In the early hours of the morning of July 19, 1934, in a night club in Long Island City, Clancy became involved in an argument with a stranger, a man about his own age. Both had been drinking rather heavily. During the course of the discussion Clancy invited the stranger “ outside,” when Clancy made a pass at the stranger, evidently intending to strike him, whereupon the latter pushed Clancy, who fell and struck his head. Clancy was removed to a hospital where he died a few hours later from a fractured skull.
Was Clancy’s death an accidental one within the meaning of the policy?
Those cases in which the insured, armed with a dangerous weapon, deliberately engaged in an altercation with another, and was killed, present no difficulty. The death of the insured in such circumstances was not “ accidental.” It was the result naturally to be
The same rule was applied where the insured was killed by a police officer attempting to effect the arrest of the insured, fleeing after the commission of a felony. (Piotrowski v. Prudential Ins. Co., 141 Misc. 172.)
In Gaines v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (111 App. Div. 386) the insured, who was apparently unarmed, was killed by another whom he had struck and threatened to kill. It was held that it was not an accidental death within the meaning of the policy. My attention has not been directed to, nor have I been able to find any case in this State, in which the same rule has been applied to an unarmed aggressor who engages in a dispute with another, who, as at bar, simply pushes him away apparently for the purpose of avoiding hostilities. In Gray v. Western States Life Ins. Co. (298 Pac. 512) the double insurance clause provided, in part, for payment of double face amount of policy on receipt of proof that insured’s death occurred as result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injury effected solely through external violence and accidental means, and also provided that such clause would not apply if insured’s death resulted from any violation of law by insured. Gray sought one Hough, against whom he had an apparently fancied grievance. He and Gray were not strangers to each other. When Gray found Hough he assaulted him thrice. On each one of these occasions Hough endeavored to avoid Gray, so much so that Hough, without retaliating, went away when Gray struck him. On the last occasion, when Gray repeated the assault, Hough, in self-defense, hit back, Gray fell backwards, striking the back of his head on a street car track, causing a fracture from which he died. Neither was armed. Neither had been drinking. It was held that Gray’s death was not accidental, within the meaning of the policy. As the court observed of Gray’s conduct: “ It presented a picture of one prolonged attempt on his part to assault, and of assaulting Hough.”
In Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Braude (76 F. [2d] 273) the policy provided that double indemnity should not be payable “ if such death result from any violation of law by insured.” The insured died as the result of being struck by a train of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company at Elizabeth, N. J. A New Jersey statute provides: “ Trespassing on tracks; contributory negligence; crossings. It shall not be lawful for any person other than those connected with or employed upon the railroad to walk along the trades of any railroad except when the same shall be laid upon a public
In Fidelity Casualty Co. v. Stacey’s Exrs. (143 Fed. 271) it appeared that the insured became involved with another and struck the latter in the mouth with his fist, causing a slight abrasion of the skin of one of the fingers of the insured. The finger became infected, which resulted in blood poisoning and the death of the insured. It was held that the death of the insured was not accidental within the meaning of the policy, under the terms of which the plaintiff’s testator, Stacey, was insured “ against disability or death resulting directly and independently of all other causes, from bodily injuries sustained through external, violent and accidental means.” In this case the court’s opinion appears to be based upon the fact that the injury to the insured was the result of bis voluntary act when he was in full possession of his mental faculties.
My attention has not been directed to, nor have I been able to find, any authority in this State in which the consequences of a voluntary act have been pushed so far in defeating the right to recovery upon a policy providing for double indemnity. The court’s point of view, in fixing the meaning of the word “ accident ” in the contract at bar, must be that of the average man. “ Such a man would say that the dire result, so tragically out of proportion to its trivial cause, was something unforeseen, unexpected, extraordinary, an unlooked-for mishap, and so an accident. This test — the one that is applied in the common speech of men — 'is also the test that is to be applied by courts.” (Lewis v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 224 N. Y. 18, 21.) The language just quoted seems to me to be applicable to the situation presented by the manner of Clancy’s death. The average man would probably consider him the aggressor in his quarrel with the stranger. But it is not consistent with the experience of the average man that the one who enters into a brawl with his bare hands, does so with the expectation that it may result fatally, if he has no reason to believe his antagonist is armed. At bar, “ the dire result, so tragically
At bar, Clancy was engaged in no violent assault upon Derwechter, nor did Derwechter in the heat of passion kill Clancy. There was nothing in the meeting between the two to justify a finding that Clancy took the risk of Derwechter’s resistance to any extremity. All of the surrounding circumstances show it bo be an incident trivial in itself except for the wholly unexpected tragical result which neither contemplated. The case is distinguishable from those in which, although the insured was unarmed, the circumstances were such that he should have known that the manner of bis entrance into the quarrel was liable to force the one he assailed to extreme measures.
Verdict directed for plaintiff in the sum of 32,000, with interest from the 29th day of July, 1934.
Ten days’ stay and thirty days to make and serve case.