182 A.D. 152 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1918
Lead Opinion
All of the above cases involve the question of the jurisdiction of the State Industrial Commission to make the awards in question, and some of them involve the problem of estoppel or waiver on the part of the insurance carriers. It is conceded
In Matter of Sullivan v. Hudson Navigation Company (No. 26), and Matter of Anderson v. C. W. Chadwick & Company (No. 39), there was an accident upon a steamboat upon navigable waters, as in Matter of Belknap (supra), and in the Sullivan case the Commission, after suspending action, subsequently reinstated an award to the claimant upon the theory that as the matter was before the Commission with the consent of the insurance carriers the original award might be sustained on the ground that the question of jurisdiction was not raised in the proceeding, and, therefore, was to be deemed waived. Substantially the same situation prevails in the Anderson case (No. 39).
Assuming for the present that the accidents, which occurred on shipboard on navigable waters, were within the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty courts, did the fact that the proceedings before the State Industrial Commission were consummated before the decisions of the United States Supreme Court were known, have the effect of waiving the rights of the insurance carriers and employers, or of estopping them from raising the question of jurisdiction? It is not suggested that any objection to the jurisdiction of the State Industrial Commission was raised when the cases were before that body for determination, and it was only after the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (244 U. S. 205) and Clyde S. S. Co. v. Walker (Id. 255) that the Commission itself began to question
It is true, of course, that persons and corporations may waive in some matters, and upon some occasions, a constitutional or statutory provision in their favor (Mayor, etc., v. M. R. Co., 143 N. Y. 1, 26, and authorities there cited), but this power is subject to the limitation that it must not be against good morals or sound public policy. (Matter of New York, L. & W. R. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 447, 453.) The public policy of the State is evidenced in legislative and constitutional enactments, and is defined and applied in judicial decisions. (Matter of Lampeon, 161 N. Y. 511.) When that public policy has been declared parties cannot make a binding contract, by waiver, estoppel, or by mutual agreement, which is in violation of such declared law or public policy. (Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 N. Y. 13, 19.) Whatever is forbidden by law, either directly or by necessary implication, cannot be legally done; in law it has no standing whatever and is void. And a “ void [act] is no [act].” (People v. Witherbee, 178 App. Div. 368, 370, and authorities there cited; Davidson v. Ream, Id. 362.)
This rule is specially emphasized as it relates to the powers of courts or bodies charged with the discharge of particular duties. The powers or jurisdiction cannot be extended by consent. The rule is well established that “ when a party interposes the judgment of a court as the foundation of his title or claim, the want of jurisdiction in the court to render the judgment may always be set up against it when sought to be enforced, or when any -benefit is claimed under it by the party in whose favor it was rendered, or by any one claiming under him.. It is always open to the party against whom the judgment is offered to prove the want of jurisdiction in the court, even though such proof contradicts recitals in the record. * * * Whenever, therefore, a judgment is interposed as a claim or the foundation of a title, the party
So far, therefore, as the jurisdictional question is involved in any of the above cases, we are of the opinion that it cannot be waived, and that the conduct of the parties cannot work an estoppel;which -will give validity to an award of the State Industrial Commission where it was without jurisdiction of the subject-matter; A party may, by appearing, waive an objection to the jurisdiction of his person, but he cannot confer authority upon a court or other body, which is denied by law, by a failure to offer the objection seasonably. Where the body acts contrary to law and without power or jurisdiction, the party aggrieved may raise the question at any time when his rights are invaded; he may challenge the jurisdiction. Where there are facts before the court for determination on which the question of jurisdiction depends, of course the adjudication may be reviewed only on appeal. {O’Donoghue v. Boies, supra.) In such a case it is necessary to raise the question at a proper time and in a proper manner, but the question of whether the body acted within the jurisdiction or power granted, and which impliedly forbade the exercise of any other power than that granted, may always be asserted and raised, directly or collaterally, either from an inspection of the record itself when offered in behalf of the party claiming under it, or upon extraneous proof which
In Matter of Doey (No. 38) and Matter of Coakley (No. 35) we have cases in which the employers were corporations engaged in making alterations or repairs upon - ocean-going ships to fit them for carrying particular cargoes, and the employee was found dead in the hold of the vessel in one instance, and was injured in the other. Awards have been made in both cases, and the only separate question necessary to be considered is whether these men were within the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty in the performance of their work; whether their contracts of employment were maritime in their nature. It is true that these men were what might be called carpenters by trade, and they were engaged in carpenter work at the time of the accidents, but they were doing work looking to the fitting of vessels to carry the cargoes offered; they were doing work preliminary to the actual loading of the vessels, and no good reason suggests itself to our minds why we should attempt to distinguish between this class of labor, performed on shipboard in connection with the taking on of cargoes, and the work of longshoremen in actually placing the cargo. The work of a stevedore has been conclusively determined to be maritime in its nature, and his contract of employment a maritime
In Matter of Anderson (No. 48), Matter of Keator (No. 52) and Matter of Tacoletti (No. 50) the injured employees were at work upon the wharf, and, if the jurisdiction depended upon the rule in cases of torts, it might be that there would be some question as to whether the admiralty court would have jurisdiction. The authorities seem to hold that in
While there are some expressions in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (supra) which seem to intimate that the case is intended to be limited to vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, we think a careful reading of the opinion does not warrant such a limitation, especially in the light of the previous adjudications of that court. In the Hine v. Trevor (4 Wall. 555, 563) the court, in speaking of The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh (12 How. [U. S.] 457), say that that case overrules all the previous decisions limiting the admiralty jurisdiction to tidewater, and “ asserts the broad doctrine that the principles of that jurisdiction, as conferred on the Federal courts by the Constitution, extend wherever ships float and navigation successfully aids commerce, whether internal or external,” and in Matter of Garnett (141 U. S. 1, 15) the court, after citing many cases, say: “ In some of the cases it was held distinctly that this jurisdiction does not depend on the question of foreign or interstate commerce, but also exists where the voyage or contract, if maritime in character, is made and to be performed wholly within a single State,” and quotes Mr. Justice Clifford in The Belfast (7 Wall. 640) as saying that “ difficulties attend every attempt to define the exact .limits of admiralty jurisdiction, but it cannot be made to depend upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce, as conferred in the Constitution. They are entirely distinct things, having no necessary connection with one another, and are conferred, in the Constitution, by separate and distinct grants.”
If the Workmen’s Compensation Law had-given the right which the statute now gives, and had provided a common-law remedy, the difficulty here presented would not exist. (Dougan v. Champlain Transportation Co., 56 N. Y. 1, 5.) By giving a right unknown to the common law, and by providing a remedy equally strange to our underlying law, the subject-matter of contracts" of a maritime nature is left to
All of the awards made must b¿ reversed, and all of the orders which have been • made denying relief to the appellants must follow this disposition; and in Matter of Belknap (No. 34) the determination of the Commission should be affirmed.
All concurred, except John M. Kellogg, P. J., who dissented (with an opinion in which Cochean®, J., concurred) in each of the cases except the Sullivan case, the Belknap. case, and the Emily Anderson case, in which latter cases he concurred in the result.
On October 6, 1917, after the accidents herein, the words “and to claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen’s Compensation Law of any State ” were added to the statute as quoted in the opinion. (See 36 U. S. Stat. at Large, 1091, § 24, subd. 3, as amd. by 40 id. 395, chap. 97, § 1; 36 id. 1160, 1161, § 256, subd. 3, as amd. by 40 id. 395, chap. 97, §2.) —[Rep.
Dissenting Opinion
Concededly, the Workmen’s Compensation Law is valid, and its terms, in effect, enter into every contract of employment embraced within its various groups. (Matter of Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544.)
The State Industrial Commission has general jurisdiction over all questions of compensation, and when a claim apparently within the law is presented to it, and the employer and insurance carrier are duly notified of it and of the hearing thereof, the Commission has general jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties. If in exercising its jurisdiction it makes mistakes, overlooks certain facts or rules of law, the remedy is by appeal.
The determination of the Commission is more easily sustained by the general presumption created by the statute that in a proceeding to enforce a claim for compensation, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, the claim comes within the provisions of that act. (§ 21.)
The determination of the Commission is also aided by section 20 of .the law, which provides: “The Commission shall have full power and authority to determine all questions in relation to the payment of claims presented to it for compensation under the provisions of this chapter. * * * The decision of the Commission shall be final as to all questions of fact, and, .except as provided in section twenty-three, as to all questions of law.” Section 23 provides: “ An award or
It is unprofitable to attempt to apply to proceedings under this law the. rules relating to actions and other proceedings in court, for one of the objects of the law was to take claims of injured employees from the courts where determination depends somewhat upon technicality and fixed rules of law and practice, and to provide a summary remedy where matters of substance only should be considered and speedy substantial justice administered in an informal way. Section 68 of the law provides that the Commission “ in making an investigation or inquiry or conducting a hearing shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure, except as provided by this chapter; but may make such investigation or inquiry, or conduct such hearing in such manner as to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties.” The provisions above referred to not only relate to and govern the action of the Commission, but continue at all times, and govern the actions of any court which is called upon to review or consider in any way the proceedings of the Commission.
An employment may fall within one of the groups named as hazardous employments; nevertheless there may be employments embraced within that group which are practically exempted from the law and for which compensation cannot be made. For example, the operation of a stationary engine is within group 22 as a hazardous employment; but if the engine is operated by the farmer who owns it, and his farm hands, in doing his ordinary farm work, such as threshing and sawing wood, etc., the operator is not within the benefits of the law because farm laborers and domestic servants are excepted therefrom by subdivision 4 of section 3. Longshore work, including the loading or unloading of cargoes “ or moving or handling the same on any dock, platform or place, or in any warehouse or other place of storage,” is a hazardous employment within group 10; but if a stevedore, or a longshoreman who is performing the work of a stevedore, is actually engaged in stowing away the cargo upon a vessel
- A careful perusal of the cases cited shows that there is more or less uncertainty as to just what constitutes an admiralty or maritime claim. The cases, however, establish that the exact location of the performance of the work, that is upon navigable waters or upon a ship in use in navigating such waters, is the controlling feature in case of an injury to a workman. The effect of these cases, when attempted to be used to destroy or limit this beneficial statute, must be strictly construed and confined to the actual point decided by them or necessarily included in the spirit of the decision. The mere fact that an injury takes place upon a boat, at a public dock, does not show conclusively that it was a matter within the admiralty jurisdiction. It must arise from a matter pertaining to the navigation of the boat; if we assume that the boat upon which the accident occurred had never entered upon navigation, but was being fitted for its initial trip, the work upon it would not be within admiralty jurisdiction.
z A claim is presented to the Commission showing that an ¡employee was injured while operating a stationary engine. The employer and insurance carrier are summoned before it and the evidence taken. The facts alleged in the claim are not disputed, but it does not appear just what kind of work the engine was doing at the time of the accident; neither party apparently was interested in that question at the time. An award made upon that record is not void by proof thereafter that the engine at the time was engaged "by the owner in performing his ordinary farm work, or that the engine was in operation upon a steamboat navigating public waters. Those matters should have been proved before the Commission. The evidence before the Commission, and the presumptions applying to the case, fully justified the award when made and, as we have seen, the determination is final unless reversed or modified on appeal. The insurance carrier
Upon the other hand, if we assume that it appeared before the Commission that the engine was in fact engaged by the owner in doing his ordinary farm work, and was used solely. . for that purpose by the farm hand who was injured, or that it was on board a ship navigating public waters, the Commission would have no power to go further with the inquiry, as the claim clearly would not be within its jurisdiction. In the first supposed case the petition upon which the hearing was had, and the evidence aided by the presumptions in favor of the claim, show that it was a matter properly before the Commission. In the other supposed case, it appeared that the Commission had no power to make inquiry as to1 such a matter. A court, or body acting judicially, after it has acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person by a proper complaint or petition and service of a summons or notice of hearing, loses jurisdiction of the subject-matter when the evidence conclusively shows that the real facts are outside of the jurisdiction of the court. It does not, however, lose jurisdiction by the proof of such facts after the decision is made.
A brings action against B on contract in the Supreme Court, with a summons personally served. Both parties are present at the trial. The evidence is meagre. It is shown, however, in a general way that by a contract which A has performed B became liable to pay $1,000 which is due and unpaid, and plaintiff has judgment therefor. B cannot allege thereafter that the court had not jurisdiction because the contract was a maritime contract solely within the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts. In a like action for tort the wrong is established by general evidence and plaintiff has judgment for the damages proved. B cannot thereafter, for the first time, raise the question that the judgment is void because the tort was a maritime tort solely within the cognizance of a court of admiralty. The court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter alleged and proved, and the defendants, by failing to show the facts, have precluded themselves from showing other facts which if timely shown would have deprived the court of jurisdiction.
We conclude, therefore, that unless the claim itself, or the evidence upon which the award is based, shows that the Commission had no jurisdiction over the claim, the only remedy of the insurance carrier and employer is to apply to the Commission and satisfy it that justice requires a rehearing.
- Where no appeal is taken from an award, and the time f to appeal has expired, a rehearing will not be granted for the consideration of questions which were within the record. Such a rehearing would practically be an extension of the time in which to appeal. (Clemens v. Clemens & Grell, No.2, 180 App. Div. 92; 167 N. Y. Supp. 519.)
After these general considerations we may consider the particular cases: In the Coakley case the employee was a carpenter (group 42) and the award was made upon an agreement of the parties. The agreement did not necessarily show that the matter was of admiralty jurisdiction. The fact that the parties consented to the award and agreed that the case was within the law probably prevented an inquiry as to the exact facts. Upon the agreement the Commission had jurisdiction to approve of it and make the award effectual. . In the Tacoletti and Louis Anderson cases the employees were engaged in longshore work, but upon the dock and not upon a vessel or upon navigable waters. They were within group 10 and are not affected by the decision in the Jensen and Walker cases, for admiralty jurisdiction does not cover a dock worker.
In the Keator case the employer was engaged in the manufacture of plaster parís and in stone crushing and grinding (a hazardous employment within group 19), with a plant at the docks. A boat belonging to third persons was unloading stone at the plant on the dock, and Keator, from the dock, was superintending or directing the unloading. He was not an employee of the boat or upon the boat at any time; his work' was upon the shore at the master’s plant and he was , not subject at any time to admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. The Commission properly refused to vacate the award.
In the Bernard Anderson case the claim for compensation presented to the Commission, and upon which the award was made, established that the employee was master of a barge engaged in the coastwise trade, and met his death while operating it. The employment was clearly within the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty and the Commission had no power to enter upon the hearing or make an award.
In the Belknap case the employee was chief engineer on the steamship Newburgh, and was injured while putting his engine in order. The petition and evidence upon which the award was made did not show that the case was within exclusive admiralty jurisdiction. The presumption that the claim is within the law, and the claim itself, might justify the Commission in concluding that the boat was being fitted out and was not at the time in actual use in navigation. After the award the deputy commissioner reported that the accident having happened on a steamer on the Hudson river, it was exclusively within admiralty jurisdiction, and upon that theory the Commission made the determination appealed from dis-' allowing the award which it had previously made. In seeking to deprive the laws of the State of force over its citizens it must be affirmatively established that the case is of admiralty jurisdiction. The Commission overlooked the fact that the employment was hazardous under group 22. It evidently had in mind only group 8. It considered the award as made void, when in fact it was not. It could not vacate the award without determining that justice under the circumstances required such action, and we cannot determine that justice required that the insurer should be relieved from meeting
In each of the cases, aside from the Sullivan and the Bernard Anderson cases, the employee was engaged in work embraced within one of the groups of section 2 of the Compensation Law, other than group 8, and if injured upon shore and not upon navigable waters his injury would clearly be compensable. In each case the claim, and the papers filed with it bringing the matter to the attention of the Commission, did not make it clear that the injury actually occurred upon navigable waters, or upon a vessel navigating such waters. Giving the claimant the benefit of the presumption raised by the act, the Commission could not determine off-hand that he was engaged in maritime service and within admiralty jurisdiction, and it was its duty to hear the claim. It had the right to believe that if it was solely within admiralty jurisdiction the insurance carrier and the employer would bring that fact .to its attention. The question, under the then state of the decisions, was not deemed material, and it is probable that for that reason no inquiry was made. The fact, however, that the insurance carrier did not prove its defense did not deprive the Commission of the jurisdiction which the claim filed gave it to hear and .decide the claim.
The insurance carrier, after having paid the awards for a longer or shorter time without objection, asks to have them vacated upon proof to the Commission that the accident happened upon navigable waters and that, therefore, the employees were not within the protection of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. The application was directed to the conscience of the Commission. It might grant it if in its opinion, under the circumstances, it was just to do so; otherwise it was its duty to deny the application. In the Keator case, as we have seen, his employer was engaged in an employment concededly hazardous under the act. In all of the other cases the insurance carrier, in malting the application, claims that the employers were not within the provision of the law and that they required no .insurance, and that any
If the payment of the award should fall upon the employer at any time, the determination of this appeal is without prejudice to his right to bring the matter again before the Commission. (McNally v. Diamond Mills Paper Co,, 9 State Dept. Rep. 352.)
I, therefore, favor a reversal in the Sullivan, the Belknap and the Bernard Anderson cases and an affirmance in each of the other cases.
Cochrane, J., concurred.
Determination in each case reversed and the awards annulled, except in the Belknap case, where the determination is affirmed.