Claim of Rosen v. First Manhattan BankClaim of Rosen v. First Manhattan Bank
Lead Opinion
Appeals from a decision and an amended decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed December 30, 1991 and February 10, 1993, which ruled that the death of claimant’s decedent was a compensable accident.
When decedent arrived at the office building where he worked at about 6:30 a.m. on April 15, 1986, he was approached by Roger Proano, a coemployee. Instead of going to the 17th floor where their employer’s offices were located, the men rode the elevator to the 18th floor and went to that floor’s stairwell. At that point, Proano allegedly asked decedent for a $200 loan. Decedent refused and, according to Proano, made a vile remark that infuriated him, whereupon Proano murdered decedent.
Following a hearing on claimant’s claim for death benefits, the Worker’s Compensation Law Judge determined that the fatal assault arose out of and in the course of decedent’s employment. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed and this appeal by the employer ensued.
It is axiomatic that to be compensable under the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, an injury must arise out of the employment and it must arise in the course of employment (see, Matter of Koerner v Orangetown Police Dept.,
Having determined that the fatal accident occurred in the
The test to determine the compensability of injuries sustained in an assault is whether the assault originated in work-related differences or purely from personal animosity between the combatants (see, Matter of Privatera v Yellow Cab Co.,
The only evidence presented by the employer that the assault arose from personal animosity was Proano’s explanation which the Board, as is its province (see, Matter of Russell v Linens Plus, The Linen Mill Outlet,
Mikoll and Weiss, JJ., concur.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although we agree with the majority that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Workers’ Compensation Board’s finding that decedent’s death occurred in the course of his employment, we are of the view that the presumption afforded by Workers’ Compensation Law § 21 has been rebutted by substantial evidence to the contrary and, therefore, the determination that decedent’s death arose out of his employment must be set aside (see generally, Matter of Cuervo v CAB Motor Co.,
Denis Carroll, a homicide detective with the New York City Police Department, testified that he was assigned to investigate the circumstances surrounding decedent’s death. During the course of that investigation, he obtained a confession from Proano that he killed decedent. While Proano told Carroll that the reason he did so was the result of an offensive comment decedent allegedly made regarding Proano’s wife, Carroll was of the opinion that the killing was premeditated with robbery as the motive. He based his opinion on the fact that Proano had told his wife the prior evening to come to the workplace at 3:00 p.m. the next day to pick up money which he would have for her, and that was not Proano’s payday. Proano intercepted decedent in the lobby of the building where they worked, took him in the elevator to a different floor than the one on which they worked, took him into the stairwell and bludgeoned him with a pair of pliers, after which he took decedent’s personal property. Proano then changed into an extra pair of clothes he had brought with him to work and secreted the pliers and bloody clothes in the duffle bag that he had used to carry the change of clothes; Proano had rubber gloves that he used to avoid leaving fingerprints at the scene. From all of this Carroll opined that the killing was premeditated and was in no way work related.
Given that uncontroverted testimony, we are of the opinion that the Board’s reliance on the presumption of compensability was arbitrary and irrational. We would, therefore, reverse the Board’s decision and dismiss the claim.
Cardona, P. J., concurs. Ordered that the decision and amended decision are affirmed, without costs.