196 A.D. 794 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1921
An award upon this claim was made in 1916, an appeal taken, and the award was unanimously affirmed in the Appellate Division (176 App. Div. 923), disposing of all of the questions in the case, except that of jurisdiction. When the case of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (253 U. S. 149) was decided in May, 1920, an application was made to the State Industrial Commission to reopen the claim, the employer and the insurance carrier maintaining that it was a matter within maritime jurisdiction. The Commission has reaffirmed its former award, holding that the claim is not within maritime jurisdiction, but is within that of the State Industrial Commission.
The facts, so far as necessary upon this appeal, are as follows: The deceased, Charles Riedel, was a watchman on pier 38, North river, in the employ of the Mallory Steamship Company, a Maine corporation, whose ships were engaged in the coast-wise trade. Pier 38 was an open or uncovered pier, the outer end of which was being extended, or repaired, at the time of the death. . The deceased fell from the pier and was drowned. There is no definite proof showing the work the deceased was hired to perform, but the duties of a watchman, such as he, generally were to see that any of the vessels or lighters along the pier were not approached, to protect them from the longshoremen, and, in case of fire, to send out an alarm, to watch the pier and goods thereon. He was not to watch any cargo upon the ships, or to go upon the ships. He had no duty whatever upon the ships and was not subject to the orders of any officer of any ship at the
It is now settled that Congress and the Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty. This is not only jurisdiction to determine actions arising in admiralty, but also to determine, within the limits of admiralty affairs, what shall constitute a liability, and no further liability can exist, or penalty be imposed, than such as Congress, or the general maritime law, fixes or imposes. In the absence of a rule of maritime law, or an act of Congréss, one engaged in maritime affairs is free from liability; and a State Legislature, or a State court, cannot add a new liability or a new cause for relief. (Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 id. 149; Butler v. Boston Steamship Co., 130 id. 527; Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 id. 372; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 574, 575.) The jurisdiction of the State Industrial Commission over a claim for an award does not depend upon whether the facts would justify a recovery in an admiralty court, but whether the facts on which the claim is based are maritime. An action in admiralty by an employee against his employer for personal injuries suffered on navigable waters is grounded in negligence; still, though no negligence exists, the State Industrial Commission has not jurisdiction of a claim by such employee for compensation. (Matter of Winfield v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 216 N. Y. 284; revd., 244 U. S. 147.) This was the case of an employee in interstate commerce, but the principle involved is the same, and the rule laid down in admiralty cases is the same. (Cases supra.) Jurisdiction in admiralty in tort cases depends entirely upon the locus, which must be, in this country, upon navigable waters; in England, upon the high seas, or where the tide ebbs and flows. (Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 59; Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1.) Personal injury cases arising upon
The services contracted for in this case were not generally maritime in character. The deceased was to watch any goods which might be delivered at the pier to be loaded on ships. We are not informed that any goods were on the dock, but, if there were goods there, we are not informed that delivery had been made. If not delivered, an action concerning them would not come within admiralty jurisdiction. In O’Brien v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (187 App. Div. 839) the question was whether the employee was engaged in interstate commerce. The goods had been brought in by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and deposited at the dock. The consignee was entitled to forty-eight hours’ notice before' removing the consignment. This period not having elapsed since the goods were deposited, it was held that the shipment was not complete, and that the employee was still engaged in interstate commerce.
Also the deceased was to watch goods delivered on the dock from ships. Any goods that were placed on the pier from a ship had been delivered and were no longer cargo goods. It is the general rule that delivery on the wharf in the case of goods transported by ships is a completed delivery, if due notice be given to the consignee and he has free access to them. An actual delivery of goods so transported into the possession of the owner or consignee or at his warehouse, is not required in order to discharge the carrier from his liability.
The contract of employment here was not to be performed concerning a ship during navigation, or in preparation for navigation, or upon navigable waters and involved other than maritime matters. The deceased was simply a watchman; his services were not to be helpful in any matter of navigation. None of his services were directly in maritime matters and an important part of them was not even indirectly connected therewith; and none of them relate to navigation further than to protect a ship, or goods for shipping, during intervals between voyages.
The award should be affirmed.
Award unanimously affirmed.