39 A.D.2d 369 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1972
Lead Opinion
This is an appeal from a decision awarding benefits following a death by suicide. . The decedent, George Rein-stein, was a barber with a history of heart trouble dating back to 1951. On April 30,1965 he sustained a work connected incarcerated inguinal hernia that required immediate surgery. Following the surgery he developed severe chest pains and related symptoms of coronary insufficiency requiring several weeks hospitalization. An award was made for disability that causally related the heart condition to the hernia operation. He attempted to return to work in March of 1966 on a part-time basis, but suffered another work related injury. During this entire period he was under close medical care for his coronary insufficiency, a condition that caused him to become extremely nervous, anxious and depressed. On May 17, 1966 he died of barbiturate poisoning from an overdose of sleeping pills and a finding of death by suicide has been made. After numerous hearings and a multitude of medical witnesses, an award of death benefits resulted, the supplemental decision of August 5,1971 by a majority of the board modifying the prior decision by making a finding that decedent’s continued symptoms “ caused a psychosis
It is clear from the evidence that decedent suffered a personality change subsequent to his hernia operation and the
The decision should be reversed, and matter remitted to the Workmen’s Compensation Board for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
The decision of August 4, 1970 had found “an anxiety neurosis and depression”.
Concurrence Opinion
As noted by the majority in this case, it is no longer necessary to precisely find a mental illness to which a classic name might be given in order to estab
Medical science has made great progress in the study and diagnosis of mental illness since 1928 and the law and the courts have been guided by such progress.
Subdivision 15 of section 2 of the Mental Hygiene Law provides: “ Whenever * * * the words ‘ insane,’ ‘ insanity,’ ‘ lunacy,’ ‘ mentally sick,’ ‘ mental disease ’ or ‘ mental disorder,’ or any of them, are used, they shall have equal significance to the words ' mentally ill.’ ” (See Matter of Franzoni v. Loew’s Theatre & Realty Corp., 25 A D 2d 453, affd. 20 N Y 2d 889.)
The findings of the board in this case are adequate to indicate that it found a mental illness or irrationality causally related to the prior accident and of such a nature as to permit the inference that the decedent’s will to refrain from the commission of the deliberate act was overcome or impaired.
Dissenting Opinion
The majority concedes that the instant record does not contain substantial evidence to support the board’s finding in its decision of August 5, 1971 that the decedent suffered from a “ psychosis ”. However, the majority by its reversal, in effect, is directing the board to find an award for death benefits on the ground that the suicide was causally related to an “ anxiety neurosis and depression resulting from the accident ’ ’ without regard to brain derangement or psychosis. I cannot agree with this position. In Matter of Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co. (248 N. Y. 93, 96) the Court of Appeals stated: “ Death benefits are allowed if the injury results naturally and unavoidably in disease and the disease causes death. This is so if the injury causes insanity from gangrenous poisoning or otherwise, and the insanity causes suicide— in other words, if the suicide is not the result of discouragement, or melancholy, of other sane conditions, but of brain derangement. If that is the cause an award may be made. Death is then the proximate and direct result of the accident within the meaning of the statute. ’ ’ While as the majority notes we have equated “ psychosis ” with “ brain derangement ”, in no case have we, in fact, departed from the Delinousha test as proposed here. Despite some loose, irrelevant language in Matter of McIntosh v. Hauserman Co. (12 AD 2d 406, affd. 10 N Y 2d 892) the question was simply whether the medical evidence supported the presence of a brain derangement or psychosis. And in Matter of Maricle v. Glazier (283 App. Div. 402, affd. 307 N. Y. 738) solely the same issue was present.
Accordingly, I vote to reverse and dismiss the claim.
Greenblott and Simons, JJ., concur with Kane, J.; Herlihy, P. J., concurs in a separate opinion in which Greenblott and Simons, JJ., concur; Reynolds, J., dissents and votes to dismiss the claim in an opinion.
Decision reversed, and matter remitted to the Workmen’s Compensation Board for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith, without costs.