Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. New York State Public Employment Relations BoardCivil Service Employees Ass'n v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article
In 1999, the registered nurses employed by the Ichabod Crane Central School District (hereinafter District) formed respondent Ichabod Crane Registered Nurses Association an associаtion (hereinafter the Association) and filed a petition with respondent Public Employee Relations Board (hereinafter PERB) sеeking to fragment the title of registered nurse from the bargaining unit that comprises the District’s noninstruetional personnel and is represented by petitioner. Following a fact-finding hearing, an Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for the Association’s failure to establish the conflict of interest or inadequate representation that usually is a prerequisite to PERB’¶ fragmentation of an existing bargaining unit (see Matter of Ichabod Crane Registered Nurses Assn., 33 PERB U 4022 [2000]). Upоn review, PERB affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that the Association failed to prove inadequate representation, but nonethelеss found grounds for fragmentation in the nurses’ unique professional community of interest and inherent conflict of interest with the District’s other noninstruсtional personnel (id.). Petitioner then commenced this proceeding, transferred here by Supreme Court, seeking to annul PERB’s determination.
As a threshold matter, PERB takes issue with the transfer order. Inasmuch as PERB’s determination was not made following “a hearing held * * * pursuant to direction by law” (CPLR 7803 [4]; see 4 NYCRR 201.9 [a] [2]), and the standard by which it must be gauged is therefore one of rationality, not substantial evidence (see CPLR 7803 [3]; Matter of Colton v Berman,
Turning to the merits, petitioner primarily contends that PERB’s ruling should be annulled because PERB failed to follow its own precedents denying fragmentation where no actual confliсt of interest or inadequate representation of the existing bargaining unit is shown (see e.g. Matter of Deer Park Union Free School Dist., 22 PERB ¶ 3014 [1989]; Matter of Chautauqua County Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 15 PERB ¶ 3126 [1982]). PERB, on the other hand, cites an inconsistency between those precedents and its rulings in initial uniting cases where, based on a community of interest standard, it placed nurses with other professionals or in a separate bargaining unit exclusive of nonprofessional employees (see Matter of Union-Endicott Cent. School Dist., 28 PERB ¶ 3029 [1995]; Matter of Caledonia-Mumford Cent. School Dist., 25 PERB ¶ 4043 [1992]; Matter of Putnam Val. Cent. School Dist., 7 PERB ¶ 4025 [1974]; Matter of County of Putnam, 2 PERB ¶ 4012 [1969]). PERB argues that its determination here is a rational extension of its elimination of an inconsistency in its handling of fragmentation cases involving law enforcement personnel (see Matter of County of Erie, 29 PERB ¶ 3031 [1996]; Matter of Dutchess County Deputy Sheriffs Police Benevolent Assn., 26 PERB ¶ 3069 [1993]).
Until PERB’s determination here, only law enforcement personnеl were excepted from its general fragmentation standard requiring a conflict of interest or inadequate representаtion in addition to a unique community of interest. In Matter of County of Erie (supra), PERB departed from its prior determinations and fragmented road patrol deputy sheriffs frоm their departmental units based on their “separate and distinct law enforcement community of interest” (Matter of County of Erie v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd.,
We reach a similar conclusion here because there is a compelling, unique community of interest distinguishable from the District’s other noninstructional personnel, as well as a rational effort by PERB to reconcile its handling of initial uniting and fragmentation cases involving registered nurses. The evidence established that the Association consists оf nurses who are
PERB also maintains that its determination to permit rather than deny fragmentation here more closely conforms with the Taylor Law’s mandate that “the definition of the unit shall correspond to a community of interest among the employees to be included in the unit” (Civil Service Law § 207 [1] [a]), a standard which PERB has traditionally interpreted as the “most significant element” in making uniting determinations (Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Buffalo, 14 PERB ¶ 3051 [1981]). Since PERB is to be “accorded deference in matters falling within its area of expertise” (Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd.,
In regard to petitioner’s concern that PERB’s determination will lead to an undue proliferation of bargaining units, we note that PERB has not abandoned its long-standing policy of requiring compelling evidence of the need to fragment existing bargaining units (Matter of County of Steuben [CSEA], 34 PERB ¶ 3023 [2001]). Also, as the exception to the general fragmentation standard is extended here only to another situation where PERB had no occasion to сonsider upon initial uniting whether a job title would be more appropriately placed in a separate bargaining unit and whеre there is a clear basis in the employees’ responsibilities to fragment their job title from other unit personnel, undue proliferation should not result.
We have considered petitioner’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Peters and Spain, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.