History
  • No items yet
midpage
City of White House v. Whitley
979 S.W.2d 262
Tenn.
1998
Check Treatment

*1 HOUSE, The CITY OF WHITE

Appellant, Ray WHITLEY,

Lawrence District Attor

ney Eighteenth General for the Judicial Tennessee,

District of the State of John

Carney, Attorney District General for

the Nineteenth Judicial District of the

State of Tennessee and State of Tennes

see, Appellees, (Ted)

Taylor Emery, Sheriff for Robertson

County, Tennessee; Vandercook, J.D. County, Tennessee,

Sheriff for Sumner

Defendants. Tennessee,

Supreme Court of

at Nashville.

Oct. Amonette, Gallatin, appellant

David for City of White House. Jenkins,

Douglas Rogersville, T. W. Lewis Jenkins, Jr., Wilkerson, Hayes, Gauldin & Dyersburg, NonLawyer for curiae amicus Claiborne, Judges General Sessions Greene, Lake and Counties. Obion Walkup, Attorney John Knox General & Moore, Reporter, Michael E. Solicitor Gener- al, Smith, Gordon W. Associate Solicitor Gen- eral, Nashville, Whitley appellees & Car- ney. *2 office, matter of for the instead left the but

OPINION city’s govern- judge’s to a qualifications the DROWOTA, Justice. ing body. appeal, In this are confronted with the mayor and From 1973 until the of Article Section 8 of question whether appointed of of White House board aldermen precludes non- the Tennessee Constitution municipal judge. as lawyers to serve various judges attorney presiding over trials of serving municipal judge as When the offenses which are mayor of resigned in the and board determined that in- incarceration.1 We have aldermen, practice in following a common charged with a criminal offense dividuals state, requested gener- parts other the of the punishable incarceration are constitution- and Sum- attorney pre- al sessions from Robertson ally judge entitled to have an However, judge for the County municipal at the trial. ner to act as side provi- waived in a manner consistent with the City general of House. The sessions White 5(c), Rule R.Crim. P. The sions of County presided the judge from Sumner apply to principles announced herein part city in the of located arising eases the cases tried or retried after the date of this County, general and the sessions Sumner on opinion, and to all cases judge County presided over from Robertson has been which the due issue raised city part in the the arising the cases preserved in the trial court as a ground and County. Both these located in Robertson appeal. Accordingly, judgment for the of the general sessions court were licensed Court of is affirmed. attorneys. arrangement for This continued years, two but from 1990 to the

BACKGROUND as County of Sumner served City The City White House lies both Sum- municipal judge the sole for City ner and Robertson The Counties. was White House. incorporated mayor under a and aldermanie 1994, Mayor Upon resignation in her pursuant charter to state At law.2 Aldermen, pursuant state and Board time of its incorporation, enabling statutes,5 establishing a enacted an ordinance provide not a municipal statutes did popularly court with a elected fact,

judge, provided mayor judge. authorized the munici- The ordinance powers justice peace had “all the of a of the pal judge “to exercise concurrent municipality, within the purpose for the with courts of sessions in all cases keeping peace trying offenses involving law of the violation of the criminal against or the laws ordinance of the corporate within the limits of the Assembly state.”3 the General en- city_” age, The ordinance contained resi- empower a statute4 governing acted dence, requirements minimum education body municipality of a to establish office municipal judge by require municipal judge but did to be ordinance. The stat- not prescribe specific qualifications not law in ute did licensed to Tennessee.6 (1994 arguments §§ & 1. Oral were heard in case on Code Ann. 16-18-101 16-18-102 Shelbyville, County, April Tennessee, Repl.). Bedford part as of this Court’s S.C.A.L.E.S. (Supreme Legal Advancing Education for through §§ 5. Ann. 16-18- Tenn.Code 16-18-201 Students) project. (1994 Repl.). (1971 §§ & 2. Tenn.Code Ann. 6-101 6-134 qualification pro- 6. The section of the ordinance replaced Repl.) repealed Tenn. (1992 municipal judge vides follows: “The shall be through §§ Code Ann. 6 4 -402 City year resident White House one Repl. Supp.1997). & immediately years five resident of Tennessee years preceding election and at least 30 (1971 his/her Repl.). 3. Ann. 6-132 Tenn.Code addition, age. municipal judge shall be graduate, degree (Supp.1973). from an Ann. with Tenn.Code 17-123 These B.S./B.A. statutes, amended, higher are now codified at Tenn. accredited education.” institution August Following residents of White argument, oral and after consid- Bobbitt, Jr., House elected Charles R. to the eration of agreed upon by the facts as municipal judge. parties parties record, office of to this and the the trial court filed an appeal stipulated opinion concluding the trial court that Mr. that neither the Constitu- tion, Bobbitt meets all state nor constitutional and statutes mu- *3 nicipal statutory requirements judges to practice to be licensed to law hold the office of However, Therefore, or municipal judge. learned the law. the trial Mr. Bobbitt is court not a declared that attorney. “[concurrent licensed authority with courts of election, Following appellees, Dis as set forth in Title 40 all cases of the Attorneys trict Eighteenth General for the violation of criminal laws of the Districts, and Nineteenth Judicial declined to municipali- Tennessee within the limits of the prosecute in Municipal the White House ty exists in City the White House Court.” Court violations of state occurring statutes However, the trial court declined to issue a Instead, within the city White House limits. directing writ of mandamus the district attor- they prosecute chose to these cases neys general prosecute state warrant vio- General Sessions Courts of Robertson or Municipal Court, lations in the White House Sumner appellees’ Counties. The decision municipal judge and also declared that upon prosecuting based a concern that authority had to order the Sumner Coun- state warrants in the White House ty prisoners Sheriff to incarcerate might Court be a violation of due absence of a contract between House White Judge because Bobbitt was not a licensed County.7 and Sumner attorney. appellees The concerns of the attorneys appealed The district the trial Attorney were echoed the Tennessee Gen judgment, court’s and the Court of Reporter eral and who rendered a formal reversed, concluding that Article Section 8 16, 1994, that, opinion on stating June as a interpreted the Tennessee Constitution as non-attorney judge, Judge might Bobbitt Anglin this Court State ex rel. disqualified by disposing “from Mitchell, supra, prohibits non-attorney involving adults where such cases presiding from over the trial of a possibility involve the of incarceration or oth defendant for an offense incar- er liberty.” Op. Att’y Gen. Thereafter, granted City ceration. (June 16,1994). U94-91 Attorney The State permission appeal White House to decide opinion General’s in large part was based important issue constitutional law. prior decision of this Court stated, For the reasons herein we affirm the non-attorney judges may not consistent judgment Appeals. ly process preside juvenile with delinquency hearings juvenile where the DUE PROCESS possibility faces the of confinement or other addressing Before the central issue in liberty. loss State ex rel. v. Mitch briefly appeal, we will address the con ell, (Tenn.1980). tention of the amicus curiae that this present justiciable controversy. does not Preferring expense to avoid the time and Miller, This Court in Miller v. 149 Tenn. requiring city police their officers to travel (1924), explained concept S.W. 965 Gallatin, County, either in Sumner or justiciable controversy Declaratory under Springfield, County, prose- in Robertson Judgment Act as follows: occurring cute violations of state law limits, city city only controversy necessary White House officials to invoke attorneys asked the district to recon- the action of the court and have it to position. appellees rights declaratory judg sider their When the de- declare under our clined, City question of White must be House filed suit ment statute is that the theoretical; Chancery real, County seeking Court in Sumner rais and not interest, declaratory injunctive ing relief. it must real and there have a parties appeal. 7. The Sheriffs of Sumner and Robertson Coun- ties áre not to this trials of presiding over torney judges from real interest having one must be some by in punishable are offenses which may oppose who the declara- question necessary that It is not carceration. sought. tion committed, any be first breach should Court, City House of White In this invaded, pur- wrong done. Appeals erred that the Court asserts act, expressed in section pose of the court of the trial judgment reversing the thereof, relief and to afford is to ‘settle Municipal Judge House the White because insecurity with re- uncertainty and statutory re- all constitutional satisfies legal other rela- spect rights, status and office, do not which to hold the quirements tions; liberally construed and is to be law. The being licensed include administered.’ that no statute agreeing appellees, while 972; Cummings v. Beel at see also *4 261 S.W. requires the White provision constitutional 151, 156, er, 915 223 S.W.2d 189 Tenn. licensed at- Judge to be a House test, that we conclude Applying that office, holding none- of torney as a condition justiciable controver appeal presents a this I, 8 of that Article Section theless assert The is real not theoretical. sy. The issue a non-attor- prohibits Tennessee Constitution is not an att municipal judge White House a criminal presiding over ney judge him yet city grants to orney,8 ordinance in a citizen’s result proceeding which general jurisdiction with courts of concurrent incarceration. sessions, preside including jurisdiction to appellees. There is agree with the We criminal cases in which incarceration provision statutory or constitutional general Attorney punishment. The Gen possible a municipal judge be a which mandates that pro opined that due eral of this State stat- practice law.9 The relevant licensed to non-attorney judge may preclude a cess popularly elected requires a ute involving adults disposing “from of cases requirements established judge to “meet the possibility of where such eases involve VI, Ten- § 4 of the Constitution article liberty.” or other incarceration of inferior courts.” nessee Attorney relied opinion, In that General (1994Repl.). Article §Ann. Code published a decision of this Court. VI, provides that the Section City of White House has an interest Chancery Judges of the Circuit and directly appeal because it the outcome of Courts, Courts, shall and of other inferior scope of which can be de affects the cases of the by qualified voters be elected by municipal judge. The District cided its they are to be circuit to which district or in the Attorney Generals have an interest Every Judge of such Courts assigned. appeal as a result of their outcome of shall thirty years age, shall be prosecute statutory duty to violations election, have been a resident before his present, At it is not state criminal laws. years five and of the the State for circuit duty can constitution clear whether that be of service year. one His term or district in the ally by prosecuting cases fulfilled years. eight shall City all these rea White House Court. For Therefore, nor the Consti- neither the statute appeal presents a conclude that this sons we municipal judge be Therefore, tution that a will controversy. we justiciable holding attorney a condition of 8 of licensed whether Article Section now consider However, by appel- recognized office. precludes non-at the Tennessee Constitution (1945); Dockery Dockery, S.W.2d granted appel- v. Recently, the motion of the 1977). (Tenn. post-judgment App. facts fol lees to consider as Johnson, 6, 1998, August lowing: Susan On attorney, elected to the office of licensed municipal judges recognize of cities that 9. We City Judge. These facts do not White House 160,000 population under having a in excess of moot, appeal appeal This render this however. any subsequent cen- federal the 1980 census or importance question great public involves a in the law be authorized sus must likely in that a considerable which is to recur municipal §Ann. 17—1— Tenn.Code courts of Tennessee. general sessions number of 106(d) (1994 Repl.). non-lawyers. McCanless in Tennessee are Klein, 631, 637, v. 182 Tenn. lees, liberty issue this' is not whether a property, by judgment but municipal judge attorney peers must be a licensed or the law the land. Instead, as a condition of the office. Mitchell, supra, State ex rel. non-attorney municipal issue is whether a adjudication this Court concluded judge may constitutionally preside over the delinquency commitment m the De- trial of criminal punisha- offenses which are partment by a non-attorney Corrections ble incarceration. process guaranteed by violates the due portion the “law of the land” of this constitu- stated, previously As the White House Mu- provision. tional this Court em- nicipal jurisdiction Court has criminal “con- phasized of law is the “[d]ue current with courts sessions primary indispensable foundation of indi- involving the violation of the criminal freedom,” vidual and the “basic and essential corporate laws of the limits compact term the social which defines the city-” Courts of rights pow- of the individual and delimits the are vested with Id., ers which the state exercise.” try judg- and determine and render final Gault, (quoting S.W.2d at In re 387 U.S. ment brought all misdemeanor eases 1428, 1439-40, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 before the court warrant or information (1967)). very important As result of its wherein charged with such mis- *5 society, process role our is not a static demeanor plea guilty writing enters a but, legal principle, society, a free it is an requests or a trial the merits and advancing consisting standard of those basic expressly indictment, present- waives an rights which are deemed reasonable and ment, grand jury investigation jury Id., right. 785-86, (citing 596 S.W.2d at Wolf writing trial. Such waiver shall inbe as Colorado, 25, 27, 1359, v. 338 U.S. 69 S.Ct. provided in Rule 5 of the Tennessee Rules (1949)). 1361, 93 L.Ed. 1782 cases, of Criminal Procedure. In such that, recognizing Anglin AVhile histori- proceed trial shall before the court without cally, process right the due to a fair trial in a jury, the intervention aof and the court right fair tribunal not did include the to an and, judgment, shall enter such as an inci- attorney judge, emphasized this Court thereto, may punishment dent inflict such process right the due to a fair trial had provided by the limits law for the guarantee juvenile advanced to to adult and particular offense as the court deter- right representa- defendants the to proper peculiar mine under the circum- Id., by tion counsel. 596 S.W.2d at 786-88. stances of such case. concluding that due had also nec- (1997 Repl.). Tenn.Code Ann. essarily guarantee right advanced to statute, Except specifically provided by as attorney judge delinquency adjudica- in a punishable state misdemeanor offenses are tion, explained right this Court that “[t]he by incarceration. Tenn.Code Ann. 40-35- brass, sounding counsel becomes ‘as or a 111(e) (1997 Therefore, Repl.). virtually tinkling cymbal’ if there is not a concomitant every brought state misdemeanor case be- Id., right qualified judge.” to a trial a before Court, fore the White House commending 596 at 788. S.W.2d WTiile non- potential for incarceration of the defendant attorney juvenile judges for their conscien- exists. complex legal tious efforts to address the resolution, presented questions them for this determining a whether non-at torney may preside “good Court stated that intentions are of no over a criminal consequence” potentially resulting trial in a constitutional and concluded liberty, that due begin language of Article mandates law trained with judge preside delinquency proceeding over a 8 Section involving deprivation liberty. Id. imprisoned,

That no man shall be taken or freehold, juvenile or disseized liberties or While involved a court ad outlawed, exiled, privileges, judication delinquency, or or or in the rationale of life, destroyed deprived applies equal manner of his with force in the decision

267 non-attorney judges have made to the recog which appeal. As context of in this State. His- justice administration of nized in a criminal defendant has existed for torically, compelling reasons al- representation by right constitutional laypersons judges. Commu- lowing to act as attorney. legally Argersinger v. qualified settled, transportation sparsely nities were Hamlin, 2006, 407 U.S. 92 S.Ct. 32 difficult, slow, was few communication (1972); Wainwright, v. L.Ed.2d Gideon available, lawyers and the law was not were U.S. L.Ed.2d Comment, today. complex it is See To a lesser standard of a Process—-Permit- “Constitutional Law—Due judge presiding over the trial of a criminal Non-Attorney Judges to Preside ting Over punishable incarceration would de offense is Pun- the Offense Criminal Trials Which purpose of right feat the constitutional by a Violates ishable Sentence Defen- Jail respect importance to the counsel. With Trial,” a Fair Right to dants’ Fundamental counsel, the United Su States (1975); see also 28 Van.L.Rev. 423-34 Alabama, preme in Powell v. Court stated Yuba Judicial Gordon Justice Court for be, many would right to be heard County, 12 Cal.3d District Sutter cases, compre- if it of little avail did not (Cal.1974). Cal.Rptr. 525 P.2d hend the to be heard counsel. justifications permitting The initial non-attor- intelligent layman Even educated ney judges preside over trials of criminal no small and sometimes skill in the incarceration, howev- offenses crime, charged If science of law. with he er, society. longer in modern There exist is incapable, generally, determining has been a vast increase the number of good himself whether indictment is attorneys improvements in and tremendous bad. He is unfamiliar with rules of transportation and communication. Further- Left without the aid counsel evidence. more, perhaps importantly, in- most put proper he on trial without a *6 law and crimi- complexity creased of criminal charge, incompetent and convicted procedure greatly nal enhanced the evidence, or is- evidence irrelevant to the layperson judge probability that a will be sue or otherwise inadmissible. lacks He complexi- effectively unable to with the deal knowledge both adequately the skill and light ties inherent in a criminal trial. defense, prepare though even have a he changes, we hold legal these societal and perfect requires guiding one. He the hand process Article protections the due Sec- every step proceedings counsel at the guaran- tion 8 of the Constitution it, against though him. Without he be not a on trial for an tee to criminal defendant guilty, danger he faces the of conviction punishable by right incarceration the offense how because he does not know to establish attorney judge. to be tried an before See his innocence. Gordon, 632, Cal.Rptr. 525 also 115 P.2d at 523, 74; 45, 68-69, Dunkerley, State v. 134Vt. 365 287 A.2d U.S. 77 L.Ed. (Vt.1976). 131 Certainly, 158 recognized as we Anglin, inherently guar- it is inconsistent to reject In so the holding, we rationale giving antee without right the counsel also Russell, North v. 427 U.S. 96 S.Ct. right attorney to have defendant the an (1976), in which 49 534 L.Ed.2d judge proceeding may in a when result Supreme concluded that United States liberty. sys- legal Since our since, appeal, on novo trial a a de before regards tem denial of counsel as a denial of available, lawyer accused a an adult fairness, logically it fundamental follows that may impris be misdemeanor for which he provide judge qualified a failure process oned is not law under denied comprehend legal argu- and utilize counsel’s initially when he is the federal constitution ments process. likewise is a denial non-attorney judge. tried before a

By suggest stating, so we do not that a fan- tried and jurisdiction, an accused who is con impossible presided by trial is in a court over in a court exercis victed a criminal offense Indeed, non-attorney a has the judge. recognize ing general right we attorney judge novo an appeal commend the valuable contribution to de before 268 imposed, either the circuit or criminal court. Tenn. where incarceration a non- (1997 Supp.); attorney judge may long

Code Ann. 27-5- act so as the defen- (1980 5(c). Repl.); process right 108 Tenn. R.Crim. P. dant waives the due to have the view, resulting proceedings presided by attorney our the due violation over an Gordon, attorney judge. Cal.Rptr. the lack of an is not See State, by 79; statutory right cured to a de novo P.2d at Shoemaker v. 375 A.2d appeal. (Del.1977); State, As this Court stated Treiman v. (Fla.1977). classify cannot countenance “[w]e as con- So.2d The defendant any procedure whereby stitutional may voluntarily relinquish it is neces- to an waiver, sary that a attorney judge by executing citizen stand two trials in order to a written Id., 5(c), get provisions one fair trial.” 596 S.W.2d at 790. consistent with the of Rule view, P., In our of a governing accused criminal Tenn. R.Crim. waivers of the punishable by by jury grand jury offense incarceration enti- to a trial and to a investigation. tled to determination of his status with the panoply rights designed full to achieve

justice hearing at the earliest on merits. CONCLUSION appeal It is unreasonable to principles Applying foregoing to the safeguards order to obtain access to all the that, appeal, facts of this we in the conclude deemed essential for a fair trial. The second by a criminal absence of written waiver hearing only anxiety, will not re-create inse- provisions defendant consistent with the strain, curity, likely but is to be time 5(c), Pro., Rule the non-attor- R.Crim. consuming, expensive, and burdensome as ney municipal judge City of White Gordon, Anglin, supra; Cal.Rptr. well. authority preside trials House has no 632, 525 P.2d at 77-78. of criminal incarcera- offenses by interpretation While we are bound Accordingly, judgment of the tion. given to the United States Constitution principles Court of is affirmed. The States, Supreme Court of the United apply announced herein all cases tried Constitution, to Tennessee’s we sit as the opinion, or retried after the date of this court of Although last resort. we not to all in which the due cases on protections restrict afforded fed- in the trial issue has been raised constitution, may interpret eral appeal. the Ten- preserved ground court as a impose higher nessee Constitution to stan- *7 protections. ANDERSON, BIRCH, stronger C.J., J., dards and Miller v. and (Tenn.1979).

State, RUSSELL, Justice, In 584 S.W.2d Special concur. authority responsi- accordance with our HOLDER, J., separate dissenting opinion. State, bility as the court of last resort in this hereby that hold Article Section 8 of HOLDER, J., dissenting. guarantees the Tennessee cit- Constitution majority’s respectfully I dissent from the izens of this of a criminal State accused opinion. has forth the legislature The set offense incarceration the rule man- requirements judges. While a attorney judge. to a trial before an municipal judges may dating attorney be de- sirable, By provision either the state or stating, so we do not hold that attorney judges. municipal requires judges or sessions must be federal constitution attorneys disagreement legislative with mandate licensed to hold office or to exer Mere for this jurisdiction.10 is a sufficient reason Court cise other duties and Such neither a sufficient reason for judges may legislation still function in civil and in redraft nor Consti- involving potential to redefine the Tennessee criminal cases not incar Court Moreover, rejected unconstitu- policy in The ceration. even criminal cases tution. Advisory practice Municipal Ser- Approximately twenty-two general law. Technical Tennessee, vice, Directory University court in Tennessee are not licensed to Ten- addition, approximately (1996). law. seven- nessee Officials ty-five municipal judges are not licensed to court (Tenn.App. 409 S.W.2d 179 Tenn.App. majority only the norm 56 was not tional 1966)). drafted, but also when the constitution in muster passed has federal constitutional however, rejects the well- majority, The Russell, 96 S.Ct. v. U.S. North States Su- opinion of the United reasoned I Accordingly, would 49 L.Ed.2d Russell, 427 U.S. in North v. preme Court legislative purely this area is one of hold that (1976), 49 L.Ed.2d voting pub- prerogative and reserved for the now point with the case directly on which is majority’s with the disagree I further North, lic. Su- the United States us. before prac- designed that rules to eliminate question of preme Court addressed deprive of their funda- accused, tices which accused im- subject possible “whether an ap- right to fair trials should not be mental when tried prisonment, is denied retroactively. plied with a police court nonlawyer before a North, trial novo available.” later de or appearing before defendants CONSTITUTIONALITY (1) trial de to a “police court”: had majority’s holding premised on the The (2) novo; days which to thirty had 1, § Art. 8 which language of Tenn. Const. generally were perfect appeal; provides: laws; of traffic charged with violations imprisoned, man be taken or That no shall year. than one faced sentences less freehold, his liberties or or disseized of rejected Supreme Court The United States outlawed, exiled, privileges, or or that increased argument “the the defendants’ life, destroyed deprived manner of his procedural complexity of substantive property, judgment of liberty or but now be requires law that peers or the law the land. that lawyers.” Id. at 2712. The Court held majority “law of the land” The holds is not of a misdemeanor an adult accused provision requires of Article 8 now attor- process under the federal consti- denied due ney judges. majority’s The rationale for re- initially before a non-attor- tution when tried “[tjhere defining due is that has been ney judge. The Court reasoned attorneys a vast increase the number of to be opportunity was “afforded an defendant improvements transporta- and tremendous by a presided in a court tried de novo tion and communication.” automatically lawyer-judge since an police court.” Id. vacates the conviction consistently

This that the held process clause of the state constitution is reasoning in majority relies scope purpose "with that of Mitchell, identical ex rel. v. Hale, (Tenn.1980), federal constitution. See State and the doctrine of stare (Tenn.1992) (holding ‘“the 840 S.W.2d 307 Ang- despite this Court’s assertion decisis land,’ 1, § 8 of law of the used distinguishable [Article from and lin that North was Constitution], phrase, id. inapplicable Anglin.1 to the facts See *8 law,’ process of in federal [the ‘due used not view North v. (holding, at 791 “We do constitution], synonymous phrases being applicable are mean the case at Russell as to bar.”).2 ing thing.”) (citing juveniles charged Dear one and the same two State, (Tenn.1978); burglary profanity degree 575 S.W.2d 259 with third and borne v. State, lay judge tried before a and without Daugherty v. 393 were Kittrell, (Tenn.1965); Anglin counsel3. This Court Kittrell v. benefit of S.W.2d 739 Presumably, distinguished Appeals, addressing v. Russell was 2. North 1.The Court of Criminal us, provision that Su- “[t]he the issue now before noted the land” mirrors because the "law of Hale, Anglin great pains preme took to dis- process. due State v. federal tinguish application juvenile the of North to (Tenn.1992). proceedings proceedings.... adult The dif- and the ferences between North v. Russell and case that the to counsel 3. The lower court held glaring....” The Court of Criminal at bar are knowingly voluntarily and waived. had been adopted holding of the United Supreme v. Russell and States Court North held that the statute was constitutional. distinguished Anglin from North v. Russell PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION on the basis that: majority While the found that a rule allow- non-attorney judges preside ing to over mis- juveniles Anglin 1. did not have a cases is a denial of demeanor appeal;

de novo unfair, fundamentally majority and apply juveniles’ pro- 2. declined to its new constitutional sentences went into im- retroactively. agree I nouncement Were to effect; mediate I majority’s process analysis, with the juveniles felony charges car- 3. faced apply retroactively under would the new rule rying liberty “loss of for from seven to in Meadows Court’s standard enunciated eight years”; and (Tenn.1993). State, S.W.2d Meadows, juveniles days in which to this Court held that new had five applied constitutional rule shall be retroac- perfect opposed thirty to tively post-conviction proceedings if the days. “materially integrity new rule enhances the Id. at 790-91. This North to be Court found reliability finding process of the fact and inapplicable based on the above factors and questions the trial” and “raises serious about juvenile judges held that must be licensed past accuracy guilty verdicts trials.” lawyers disposition juve- “to make of a Clearly, Id. at 754. under the Meadows standard, operates deprive him designed nile that to confine a new rule to eliminate a prohibit a defendant from held liberty.” .to him of his Id. at 791. fair, trial obtaining a reliable and accurate us, majority’s In the case now before applied retroactively. should be non-attorney primary ability is the concern are pre- session of fact in cases before the exclusive finders side over cases “where incar- misdemeanor majority has that their courts. The held imposed.” ceration misdemean- non-attorney judges preside permitting (1) cases, defendants are: entitled de over criminal matters raises serious constitu- appeals; thirty days novo have accuracy questions concerning the tional perfect appeal; which to a de novo reliability majority of criminal trials. The face maximum sentence of eleven months that it “cannot and classi- states countenance would, therefore, twenty-nine days. I any procedure whereby it fy as constitutional necessary is that a citizen stand two trials to Anglin inapplicable ease hold I, therefore, get question the one fair trial.” now before us for the same reasons majority’s ap- retroactive decision refuse majority inap- held that North was plication the new constitutional rule when plicable I Anglin. would further hold majority holds that the “old rule” denies legislature it is for the and not for this Court right to a fair trial. a citizen the requirements to redraft the office opin- judge. majority’s The effect of the ion, however, is to redraft the constitution to majority’s notions of fundamental

reflect

fairness.5 55-8-152, (classifying majority non-attorney judges Ann. -154 vi-

4. The holds that Tenn.Code misdemeanors); constitutionally preside speed still "civil limit laws as olations involving potential and in criminal cases not (defining prohibit- §§ Tenn.Code Ann. Presumably, majority’s incarceration.” hold- misdemeanors). *9 parking C ed violations as Class prohibit non-attorney judges pre- ing front would siding over most traffic violations codified in the and non- 5. The distinction between incarceration Code Annotated. See Tenn.Code Ann. majority if the is declar- incarceration is tenuous ("Pedestrians Roadways” on defined incap- ing non-attorney judges generally are misdemeanor); C Tenn.Code Ann. Class conducting fair trials. An individual able of 55-8-146, (defining §§ -147 as misdemeanors wrong just compensation seeking for a civil crossings); stop failure the to at railroad a fair trial as an individual as much (stating C mis- Tenn.Code Ann. 55-8-149 Class of a minor traffic violation. accused stop stop sign); for failure to at a demeanor

Case Details

Case Name: City of White House v. Whitley
Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date Published: Oct 12, 1998
Citation: 979 S.W.2d 262
Docket Number: 01S01-9711-CH-00259
Court Abbreviation: Tenn.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.