82 W. Va. 208 | W. Va. | 1918
On fifteen stated grounds, some of which do not differ materially, the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company-
The bill represents and shows that, for a long time prior to April 10, 1900, the Central District and Printing Telegraph Company, a corporation, owned and operated a complete telephone system throughout the City of Wheeling, under a franchise granted by the city, and for some distance beyond its limits, without any - competition whatever. On that date, the council of the city passed an ordinance granting a franchise to the National Telephone Company of West
The provisions of the National Telephone Company’s franchise, granted April 10, 19100, upon which the city founds its claim of a contractual right or interest in the Consolidated Telephone Company’s poles and underground system, the use of its plant and right to prevent merger and consolidation of its system with that of any other telephone company operating in the city, as well as its claim of title to the company’s property by forfeiture, are secs. 6, 8 and 13 of the ordinance, reading as follows :
‘ ‘ Section 6. Said grant is upon the further condition that the City of Wheeling shall have the right to place on the poles and within any underground system of said first named*213 company, and to use and operate all the wires, cables, devices and apparatus necessary to or used by said city for fire alarm, police, electric light wires or call system purposes, and at any and all times to place, replace, alter, repair and replenish the same.”
“Section 8. In consideration of the grant mentioned in the first section of this ordinance, said first named company agrees to furnish free of cost to said city, so long as said company uses the franchise hereby granted, forty-five telephones for municipal governmental purposes within said city. The said company also hereby agrees to furnish said city, so long as said company uses such franchise, additional telephones in said city, for such purposes, whenever ordered by the council, at a cost to said city of fifteen dollars per an-num for each of said additional telephones.”
“Section 13. This grant is upon the further condition that should the said National Telephone Company of West Virginia at any time combine or sell out in any manner whatsoever to the Central District and Printing Telephone Company or any other telephone or telegraph company, then and in that event all rights and privileges hereby granted shall immediately be forfeited, and the whole plant, system and property of the said National Telephone Company of West Virginia shall be forfeited to and confiscated by the City of Wheeling and shall cease in every respect to be the property of the said National Telephone Company of West Virginia. ’ ’
Although the demurrer is joint in form, it is joint and several in effect. If, therefore, the bill is good as to one of the defendants and bad as to the other, the demurrer is separable and may be overruled as to one of them, and sustained as to the other. Mayor of London v. Levy, 8 Ves. 403, 404; Story’s Eq. Pl. sec. 445. If there is any sufficient ground of relief in the bill as to either defendant, the demurrer was properly overruled as to him. Trough v. Trough, 59 W. Va. 464; Miller v. Hare, 43 W. Va. 647; Shoe Co. v. Haught, 41 W. Va. 279; Gay v. Skeen, 36 W. Va. 582. Although the court certifies the general demurrer was based upon numerous grounds, it must stand or fall as a whole ex
Jurisdiction in equity to cancel the franchise granted to-the National Telephone Company, by way of rescission, is fully sustained by well considered decisions of courts of the highest standing and character. 'It was the duty of that company and its successor, the Consolidated Telephone Company, to prosecute the business authorized by its franchise and render the public the service it undertook by its acceptance of the provisions of the ordinance. That duty was a continuing obligation, performance of which from day to day and time, to time constituted a condition precedent to its right to hold and enjoy the privilege granted. Failure or refusal to perform it terminated the privilege or franchise, not by way of forfeiture, but by expiration, agreeably to the intent and purpose of the grant and acceptance. Farmer’s Loan and Trust Co. v. Galesburg, 133 U. S. 156, 179; City of Columbus v. Trust and Deposit Co., 218 U. S. 645; City of St. Cloud v. Water etc. Co., 88 Minn. 329. Failure of the Consolidated Telephone Company to discharge any of the duties it assumed and to exercise any of the lights conferred upon it, after the sale and conveyance of its property as aforesaid, specifically alleged in the bill, terminated its franchise and gave the city right to have the termination thereof judicially declared.
The National Telephone Company was not a necessary party to the bill seeking such cancellation, because its interest in the franchise had wholly ceased and it was no party to the transaction constituting the ground of the procedure. It had a clear right to assign its franchise and sell and transfer its property to the Consolidated Telephone Company, for the ordinance imposed no restriction upon the right of sale to any non-competing company. On the eon-
Jurisdiction by injunction to limit the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company to the exercise of rights and privileges in the streets of the city, lawfully acquired by it from the Central District Telephone Company, whose franchise it has acquired, and rights and privileges therein, conferred by that franchise, and to restrain it from the exercise of rights in the streets not so acquired or conferred, is beyond question. Landis Tp. v. Gas Light Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 347: Franklin v. Nutley Water Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 601; Somerville Water Co. v. Somerville Borough, 78 N. J. Eq. 199. There is an allegation in the bill, which makes out a case within this jurisdiction. Under the franchise acquired from the Central District Telephone Company by the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, authorizing the maintenance and operation of a certain telephone system installed by the former, the latter cannot maintain and operate another system installed by another company whose franchise it has not acquired, without the consent of the city. If the acquired franchise authorizes maintenance of only one system, the holder thereof cannot operate two and thus subject the streets to a double burden for its purposes. In other words, the city may be willing to give space for two systems operated by different companies, but unwilling to permit space on its streets to be used by one company for the operation of two systems. The difference may or may not be very material in a practical sense, but it obviously constitutes a sufficient ground for denial of the privilege. Two separate systems take twice the space on the street, required for one. Moreover, the expense incident to the maintenance and operation of two systems by one company, if authorized, might necessitate higher rates for service. All expenses rightfully incurred enter into the matter of rates, for the company is entitled to charge enough to cover proper expenses
The bill contains no prayer for an injunction restraining the maintenance of both systems, but sets forth facts constituting ground for the award of such relief by a final decree, under the prayer for general relief, and by the award of a temporary injunction under a mere amendment of the prayer.
Although somewhat indefinite, the bill sufficiently alleges purpose and intention on the part of the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, to use street locations acquired by the Consolidated Telephone Company, in the merger of the two systems. According to its allegations, the purpose is to connect the wires of the two systems, possibly not throughout the city, but in portions thereof, at least, and thus effect a transfer of the Central District Telephone Company system to poles and subways of the consolidated system. Though the franchise under which the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company operates is not exhibited with the bill, so as to enable the court to see just what rights it confers, it may be assumed that the company has no right to set its poles where it pleases, and it has never acquired right to occupy the ground used by the Consolidated Telephone Company. Indeed, lack of such right is impliedly alleged by the bill. While its allegation as to the intention respecting use of the Consolidated Company locations, polos and subways are indefinite, they constitute a sufficient basis for admission of evidence defining occupations and use of such locations, which could be enjoined by a final decree.
The two grounds of jurisdiction noted are rendered more or less obscure by the main purposes of the bill, forfeiture of the title to the property of the Consolidated Company, prevention of the merger of the two systems and maintenance of competition in the telephone service of the city. Whether there is right of relief as to these matters or any of them, it is neither necessary nor proper to inquire. The general demurrer does not liaise them. To examine and pass upon all the different grounds set up would amount to the giving of directions as to the relief which might be awarded
For the reasons stated, the decree complained of will be affirmed and the cause remanded.
Decrea affirmed and cause remanded.