58 Conn. 522 | Conn. | 1890
This is a suit to foreclose a lien for benefits assessed against the defendant for sewer improvements.
The first paragraph of the complaint alleges that “the board of sewer commissioners of said city of Waterbury, under and by authority of the charter and ordinances of said city, did, on the 22d day of December, 1886, make an assessment for seWer purposes in the sum of seventy-five dollars and twentj^-two cents upon the defendant by reason of his owning certain lands fronting on Jeffrey Alley in said city, to wit: (describing the land). Paragraph four alleges another assessment of ninety-three dollars against the defendant upon the same property in substantially the same language.
The complaint is demurred to. The District Court of Waterbury sustained the demurrer, and the plaintiff appealed.
The charter prescribes in detail the steps and proceedings in making an assessment, and provides that “all assessments of benefits, made under the provisions of this act, shall, when completed, become a debt due to said city from the owner or owners of property specially benefited by the public work or improvement in view of which such assessments were made, and shall remain a lien upon such property, * * * and the lands, buildings or other property on which any such lien may exist, may be foreclosed in the same manner as if said lien were a mortgage thereon in favor of said city to secure said debt, etc.”
The difference between the parties is this:—the defend
In analogy to those cases perhaps it will be sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the assessment by the record, relying upon the presumption that the requisite preceding steps were regularly taken, and then leave it to the defendant to show any defect or omission in those proceedings. On the other hand the better view may be that it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove, what he has alleged generally, that all the proceedings were according to the charter. In either case the defendant’s rights are preserved, and we cannot see that he will suffer any inconvenience of which he can legally complain.
Again. The charter says the premises “ may be foreclosed in the same manner as if said lien were a mortgage.” That
The defendant cites Moore v. Cline, 61 Ind., 113, and Overshiner v. Jones, 66 Ind., 452. In that state a statute authorizes an assessment, and gives to the contractor, who does the work on an improvement, a right of action in his own name to collect the assessment. It does not appear that the assessment is made a debt and collectible as such, but a right of action is given by statute against one who sustains no contract relation in fact or in law to the plaintiff. In such a case it may well be held that the plaintiff must allege and prove every fact necessary to show that his case is within the purview of the statute. In this case the statute goes further and declares that the relation between the parties shall be that of creditor and debtor. Here the rules of pleading in actions for the collection of debts prevail; there, the principles applicable to actions founded on statutes prevail. While there are some analogies between those cases and this, yet in some respects they are quite dissimilar; so much so that we do not consider them as entitled to great weight.
We have hesitated somewhat from the fact that in the analogous case of a tax to foreclose a tax lien, the form prescribed under the Practice Act states with great particularity the proceedings in levying the tax. That form is doubtless an authority for holding good a complaint which follows it, but it does not necessarily preclude the court from sustaining a simpler and shorter complaint. However that may be, since the Practice Act went into operation in 1881 a statute was enacted providing that “all taxes, properly assessed, shall become a debt, * * * and may be, in addition to the
The judgment of the District Court is erroneous and is reversed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.