156 Ga. 490 | Ga. | 1923
1. The act of 1901 (Acts 1901, p. 670), creating the charter of the City of Valdosta and containing provisions for pavement of streets on the basis of assessment of abutting property for a portion of the cost of the improvement, is not a general law having operation throughout the State, and does not render invalid the special enactment of 1921 (Acts 1921, p. 1106) providing for pavement of streets in the City of Valdosta on the basis of assessment of the entire cost of the improvement against the abutting property, on the ground that such latter act is violative of article 2, section 4, paragraph 1, of the constitution of this State (Civil Code, § 6391), which prohibits enactment of a special law in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law, or the varying of general laws affecting private rights in any particular case except with the free consent in writing of all persons to be affected. Lorentz v. Alexander, 87 Ga. 444 (13 S. E. 632); City of Cochran v. Lanfair, 139 Ga. 249 (77 S. E. 95).
2. The act of 1921 referred to in the preceding note does not conflict with the provision of article 1, section 1, paragraph 2, of the constitution of this State (Civil Code, § 6358), which declares that “protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government,'and shall be impartial and complete;” nor with the provision of article 1, section 1, paragraph 3, of the constitution of this State (Civil Code, § 6359), which declares that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law,” on the ground that the act does not provide for notice and opportunity to be heard by the abutting property owners upon the question of the necessity for such street improvement, the determination of such question being legislative in character. Speer v. Athens, 85 Ga. 49 (11 S. E. 802, 9 L. R. A. 402); City of Atlanta v. Hanlein, 96 Ga. 381 (2) (23 S. E. 408) ; Georgia R. &c. Co. v. Decatur, 137 Ga. 537 (73 S. E. 830, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 935) ; Georgia Railway & Electric Co. v. Atlanta, 144 Ga. 722 (87 S. E. 1058); French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 181 U. S. 324 (21 Sup. Ct. 625, 45 L. ed. 879); L. & N. R. Co. v. Barber &c. Co., 197 U. S. 430 (25 Sup. Ct. 466, 49 L. ed. 819).
(a.) The ruling in City of Sandersville v. Bell, 146 Ga. 737 (92 S. E. 218), decided by five Justices, is not binding on this court as a prec
3. Neither does the act of 1921 conflict with the above-mentioned provisions of the constitution because it does not provide for like notice and opportunity to be heard upon the question of whether a majority of the owners of abutting property on the street to be improved had filed protests against the improvement as provided in the act. That question is also one for legislative determination.
4. The act does not violate the provisions of article 1, section 1, paragraph 2, of the constitution of this State (Civil Code, § 6358), quoted above, on the ground that it denies to owners of abutting lots on a street to be improved the equal protection of the law, in that designated streets had been previously improved under the charter of 1901, supra, providing that abutting owners should be assessed for only a portion of the cost of the improvement, and that such charter provision is still in existence. There may be different circumstances which would render it reasonable and just that particular streets be paved under one plan or the other. It is only in cases where different assessments are levied against abutting owners under the same or similar circumstances that the equal protection of the law is denied. Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827 (92 S. E. 637); L. & N. R. Co. v. Barber &c. Co., supra.
5. Section 10 of the act, which authorizes the mayor and council to issue bonds for street improvements based upon assessments against the lot of abutting owners, “ payable solely ” from such assessments, and in no event to “ become a liability of the ” city, does not render issuance of bonds the creation of a debt by the city (Monk v. City of Moultrie, 145 Ga. 843, 90 S. E. 71; City of Waycross v. Tomberlin, 146 Ga. 504 (5), 91 S. E. 560; Mayor &c. of Washington v. Faver, 155 Ga. 680 (6), (117 S. E. 653), and is not violative of the following provisions of the constitution: (a) That part of article 7, section 7, paragraph 1 (Civil Code, § 6563), which provides: “no such county, municipality, or division shall incur any new debt, except for a temporary loan or loans to supply casual deficiencies of revenue, not to exceed one fifth of one per centum of the assessed value of taxable property therein, without the assent of two thirds of the qualified voters thereof at an election for that purpose, to be held as may be prescribed by law.” (6) Article 7, section 10, paragraph 1 (Civil Code, § 6567), which provides that municipal corporations shall not incur any debt until provision therefor shall have been made by the municipal government.
6. Section ten of the act is not violative of that part of article 7, section 6, paragraph 1, of the constitution of this State (Civil Code, § 6561), which declares: “ The General Assembly shall not authorize any . . municipal corporation . . to become a stockholder in any company, corporation, or association, or to appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to, any corporation, company, association, institution, or individual, except for purely charitable purposes,” on
7. For similar reasons section 8 of the act, which provides for payment of assessments in ten annual payments, does not violate the provisions of the constitution quoted in the preceding note, on the ground that it is an extension of credit by the municipality for other than a charitable purpose.
8. The act of 1921 (Acts 1921, p. 1106) does not violate article 3, section 7, paragraph 17, of the constitution of this State (Civil Code, § 6445), which provides that “no law, or section of the Code, shall be amended or repealed by mere reference to its title, or'to the number of the section of the Code, but the amending or repealing act shall distinctly describe the law to be amended or repealed, as well as the alteration to be made,” on the ground that the act does not describe the law to be amended.
9. At the inception 'of proceedings to make a contract for a given improvement the mayor and council must publish, for a stated period, a resolution declaring that the improvement is necessary. The owners of property liable to be assessed for the improvement are required to be given notice of the resolution by publication, and may file with the clerk of council written protests against the improvement. If a majority of such owners do not file protests within fifteen days from the date of the last publication of the resolution, the mayor and "council shall after such date pass a second resolution expressing a determination to proceed with the improvement and proceed further in the matter of making contracts and causing the improvement to be made. After publication of the first resolution a majority of the property owners filed protests against making • the improvement, but before the expiration of the prescribed time protests were withdrawn in sufficient numbers to reduce the number to less than a majority. Held, that it was the right of the protestants, at any time within the period in which they were authorized to file protests, to withdraw their protests and thereby prevent them from being counted against the improvement. A sufficient number having been duly withdrawn to reduce the number of protestants to less than a majority, the mayor and council wei’e authorized to proceed as if a majority of the property owners had never filed protests. Wilson v. Borough of Collingswood, 80 N. J. L. 626 (77 Atl. 1033) ; City of Sedalia &c. v. Montgomery, 227 Mo. 1 (88 S. W. 1014, 127 S. W. 50) ; Rodgers v. City of Ottawa, 83 Kan. 176 (109 Pac. 765) ; City of New Orleans v. Stewart, 18 La. Ann. 710.
(a) No «limit of time after expiration of the period for filing protests was specified in which the mayor and council should take further action under the statute, preparatory to making the improvement. Jurisdiction of the mayor and council was not lost by failure to act, for a term of four months after the time for filing protests had expired.
10. The act provided for letting contracts by competitive bidding. The
11. It was further provided, in section 6, that the second resolution should state the material to be used and the manner of construction, and define the extent, character, and width of the improvement, and should state such other matters as may be necessary to instruct the city engineer in the performance of his duties in preparing for such • improvement the necessary plans, plots, profiles, specifications, and estimates; also that the resolution should state any,other reasonable terms and conditions which the mayor and council shall deem proper to impose; also that the resolution shall provide that the contractor shall execute to the city a good and sufficient bond in an amount to be stated in the resolution, conditioned for the full and faithful performance of the contract and for the protection of the city and all property owners interested against any loss or damage by reason of the negligent or improper construction of the work; and that the city may also require bond in an amount to be stated in the resolution, for the maintenance of the improvement for a period of not less than five years, in the discretion of the mayor and council. It was also provided in section 6, that the resolution above mentioned shall direct the city engineer to advertise for sealed proposals for furnishing the materials and performing the work necessary in making such improvements; that the notice of such proposals shall state the street or other public place to be improved, the kinds of improvements proposed, and what, if any, bond or bonds will be required to be executed by the contractor. It was further provided that the notice above referred to should be published in a specified manner and for a stated length of time; and after publication of the notice the mayor and council shall examine all bids and award the • contract to the lowest and best bidder, which contract shall in no case exceed the estimate of cost submitted by the engineer, with the plans and specifications; also that the mayor and council shall have the right to reject any and all bids and readvertise for other bids when any such, bids are not
{a) The city was not proceeding illegally, as contended, on the ground that the second resolution failed to describe the material with which it had been determined by the first resolution to pave the stre.ej;, or upon the ground that the resolution did not state the “manner of construction,” but left the manner of construction to be determined by the city engineer and the successful bidder.
'(h) Nor was the city proceeding illegally on the ground, as contended, that the advertisement for bids did not definitely state the material to be used, or state the manner of construction.
(d) Nor was the city proceeding illegally, as contended, on the'ground that the bid of the Dixon Contracting Company was not accepted; that the bid was accepted only in so far as it related to material and work of the paving of the street proper, and this did not amount to an acceptance of the bid for paving the sidewalks, installation of granite curbing or concrete gutter, which were included in the plans and specifications made by the engineer; and notwithstanding the bid was not accepted for these, they were included in the contract.
(e) Nor was the city proceeding illegally on the ground, as contended, that the contract provided for the installation of a concrete gutter to the extent of approximately thirty-eight hundred feet at a cost of 40 cents per lineal foot, whereas the antecedent resolution did not provide for the installation or laying of concrete gutters.
(f) Nor was the city proceeding illegally, as contended, on the ground that the engineer’s specifications and estimate of cost of granite curbing 4 inches by 18 inches was 60 cents per lineal foot, whereas the contract entered into was 66 cents per lineal foot, the contract price of the whole improvement not exceeding the city engineer’s estimated cost thereof.
(g) Nor was the city proceeding illegally, as contended, on the ground that the advertisement for sealed proposals made by the city engineer-under the provisions of the act did not state the names of the streets to be paved nor the extent of the paving; nor on the further ground that the notice for sealed proposals published by the city engineer required a deposit of $500 on each bid, payable to the city, to guarantee the execution of the contract, and required bond as a condition to acceptance of a proposal, and required a deposit of $5 for each set of plans and specifications.
12. Section 7 of the act (Acts 1921, p. 1106) provides: “As soon as the said contract is let, and the cost of such improvement, which shall also include all other expenses incurred by the city incident to said improvements in addition to the contract price for the work and materials, is ascertained, the said mayor and council shall by resolution appoint a board of appraisers, consisting of the city engineer of said city, clerk of the city council, and the chairman of the board of tax-assessors, to appraise and apportion the cost and expenses of the same to the several tracts of land abutting on said improvement as hereinbefore provided. Within ten days from the date of the resolution appointing said board, the said board shall file a written ■ report of the appraisal and assessment and apportionment of such expense and cost to the several lots and tracts of land abutting on said street, alley, lane, or avenue ■ or other public places so improved, with the clerk of council of said city, in the manner and on the basis herein provided. When said report shall have been returned and filed, the said mayor and council shall appoint a time for the holding of
14. In determining whether an improvement does, or does not, benefit property within the assessment district, the land should be ponsidered simply in its general relations and apart from its particular use at the time; and an assessment, otherwise legal, for. grading, paving, and curbing an adjoining street is not void under the due-process clause of our State constitution because the lot is not benefited by the improvement, owing to its present particular use. Georgia Railroad &c. Co. v. Decatur, 137 Ga, 537 (8) (supra); City of Atlanta v. Seaboard Air-Line Railway, 137 Ga. 805 (74 S. E. 268) ; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Barber &c. Co., 197 U. S., 430 (supra). In City of Atlanta v. Hanlein, 96 Ga. 381 (supra), s. c. 101 Ga. 697 (29 S. E. 14), the property against which the paving assessment was made was, in consequence of its peculiar shape and situation, not worth more after than before the improvement, and the cost of the improvement largely exceeded the value of the lot; and the assessment was enjoined because it virtually amounted to a confiscation of the property.
(a) Applying the above principles, certain of the plaintiffs whose property fronted on a different street which was already paved did not made a case which authorized them to enjoin the enforcement of the assessment levied for improving a side street, on' the ground that it amounted to a confiscation of their property, and therefore violated the above clause of the State constitution.
15. Other grounds of attack upon the legality of the proceedings by the mayor and council, not specifically ruled upon, are without merit and not of such character as to require elaboration.
Judgment reversed.