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City of Valdez v. Valdez Development Company
523 P.2d 177
Alaska
1974
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*1 rеntal doubling over automatic automatically doubledthe has [The State] however, period appeal, is not rea- appeal an a tenant seeks stakes when sonably these ends. tailored to achieve entry forcible judgment adverse [a discrimina- action. The and detainer] appeal his and this rehear- Throughout pay could poor, who against tion objection ing, has made no Modrok cannot appeal an hut pending rent their posted requirement that a be double bond bond, obvi- post particularly is double apрeal. a Because condition matter, ap- them, practical For as a ous. raised, rul- we limit our has not been issue foreclosed, matter how meri- peal is no payment pro- ing case the double may The non- be. torious their visions of AS 09.45.080. Our decision entry and indigent modified, detainer] Opinion [forcible No. 1002 is by a substan- appellant is confronted also case is remanded by no other appeal faced tial barrier to owing of the amount a determination Oregon. The discrimi- litigant in civil pre- deducted from the bond appellees en- against the nation class appeal. [forcible viously filed arbitrary appellants is try and detainer] irrational, the double-bond Equal . . . violates quirement 78-79, at U.S.

Protection Clause. 876, 31 L.Ed.2d at 53-54.

S.Ct. was the precise Lindsey issue but, bond,

validity of double under decision, rent payment of double the Appellant, VALDEZ, CITY OF judgment is also appealed affirmance of v. parties urge us to avoid foreclosed. Both COMPANY, a VALDEZ DEVELOPMENT construing the ruling by a constitutional partnership consisting Jerry J. a award to not demand double statute McCutcheon, al., Appellees. et require only payment of reasonable rent- However, plain reading als and costs. COMPANY, а VALDEZ DEVELOPMENT than that permits other conclusion partnership consisting Jerry J. Mc al., Cross-Appellants, Cutcheon, et payment required, double because creates, statute with affirmance below, duty bond sure-

judgment on the VALDEZ, Cross-Appellee. CITY OF pay ties to the rental value over twice 1905, Nos. 1922. appeal.5 Supreme of Alaska. Court therefore ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍hold that com 5, June 1974. rental manding payment of twice the value property occupied ap a defendant pealing judgment an forcible adverse

entry and detainer action AS 09.45.080 protection guarantees equal

violates Alaska Constitut United States may protect a property

ions.6 The state appeal by during loss against

owner payment on

requiring an bond actual rent are related to

affirmance which An damage suffered. specific

accrued XIV; Oregon Supreme art. amend. Alaska Const. held U.S.Const. 5. The Court Ore. ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍ pay required double 1, § Rev.Stat. 105.160 § Spencer, Or. ment. Scales v. (1967). *2 plan and further providing a completion deadline for The four addi- construction. tional lots bid this time were claimed previously to have been sold, they form another litigation. *3 Development placed

Valdez later bids on city 15 more lots which the accepted, sub- ject to the determination that no conflict Subsequently, city existed. de- when termined that the previously lots had been sold, Development Valdez was notified that rejected. Asserting bids were it was defrauded, Development Valdez filed a complaint alleging wrongful withhold- ing of contracts for the 15 lots in question.1 City of Valdez counterclaimed requesting the immediate of the forfeiture previously conveyed by city lots Development, Valdez alleging bad faith and anticipatory breach Valdez Devel- opment. Development Valdez sepa- then filed a Thorsness, Jacobus, Hughes, Kenneth P. complaint alleged rate it in which it had

Lowe, Clark, Anchorage, Gantz & for damaged by city’s beеn counterclaim. appellant cross-appellee. and specifically, Development More Valdez al- Cranston, Anchorage, ap- Charles K. for leged that the counterclaim constituted a pellees cross-appellants. titles, prevented cloud on its it from ob- taining financing, and constituted an act of RABINOWITZ, Before J., and C. CON- prosecution malicious on the of the NOR, BOOCHEVER, and FITZGER- city. The eventually counterclaim was dis- ALD, JJ. prejudice missed without in January of but this time the weather made OPINION impossible. construction Valdez Con- RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice. struction of the Trans-Alaska The issues arise from a enjoined April 1970,-prior to the next realty contract for sale of which was season, as a construction result of which city entered into between the market de- Valdez was Development Company. stroyed, financing ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍became unavailable carrying Proj- again, In out an Urban Renewal Valdez Devel- opment auspices delayed. ect under the Alaska State further In December Housing Authority, city city of Valdez ac- of 1971the title to moved have cepted bids on 40 lots from Valdez 36 lots revested in it to the company’s Devel- due opment and company then sold to the 36 failure to meet its contractual construction May city In city’s lots. 1969 the executed deadlines. Trial was on the held suit contracts Development’s 36 lots which contained to foreclose and Valdez suit stipulations providing prosecution. superior to when Valdez for malicious development Development grant had submit a city court refused to agreed question 1. Valdez dismiss of these from this suit at the lots time of trial. IgO enemy, acts the Federal foreclosure, the public extended the Gоvernment, party,

deadlines, acts of the other denied Valdez floods, fires, epidemics, quarantine In ad- prosecution. damages for malicious strictions, strikes, freight embargoes, dition, court ordered the lower unusually delays of last severe weather or convey Development the to Valdez causes; due to such bid subcontractors original of the 40 lots lots four pro- and intent being had Development as the now that in the vision event occurrence title to these lots. Neither regained time or delay, such Both attorney’s fees. was awarded оbligations times appealed from the court’s have prepa- Agency respect with judgment. redevelopment Property ration of the first as reach the of Valdez’s Redeveloper respect to con- that it was for the sertion error *4 as the Improvements, of the struction deny it as to of foreclosure 33 be, may shall be extended for original undisputed 40 lots.2 It is deter- delay as period of enforced on these not com lots was Provided, That by the Agency: mined completed or menced within the contractual pro- party seeking thе benefit of Nevertheless, superior court deadline. shall, ten within visions Section Development’s perform held that Valdez any days of beginning after the (10) ance was excused. delay, first notified enforced have such Throughout writing, litigation party thereof Valdez Devel- other opment thereof, has and re- delay contended that cause or its of the causes performance is quested period excused under Section an extension 707 of for added) (emphasis delay, of Valdez, its contract with the of enforced reads which as follows: specifically, Develop- More it is Valdez period ment’s that the for which contention purposes For the any provi- of the pro- injunction the federal district court’s agreement, sions neither Secretary hibiting the of the Interior from Agency nor the as Redeveloper, the case permit issuing for of the be, may any interest, nor successor pipeline consti- Trans-Alaska was in effect of, shall be considered in breach or de- delay tutes a of enforced under in, its obligations fault respect provisions of Section 707.3 preparation Property of the for rede- velopment, or the beginning and comple- responds The this con- tion of construction Improve- by arguing tention con- Section ments, progress thereto, in respect language justify tains no which would the event per- characterization of non-issuance of enforced such obligations due to un- pipeline permit delay, formance an enforced beyond causes its control and simply provide foreseeable Section 707 does without its including, negligence, contingency. such argues The fault to, but not God, restricted act of acts of it housing wanted constructed regardless original longer Three lots of the bid are no Sons, State, in Merl F. Thomas Inc. v. dispute because (Alaska recently has 1964), P.2d 76 and more completed since some Corp. construction on Chugach Ass’n, those lots. in Northern Elec. remaining subject The (Alaska four remedy lots are the 1974). P.2d 76 The usual aspect city’s appeal. another impossibility performance when is dem- onstrated to a is rescis- contract In its brief Valdez characterizes sion of contract. how- Section 707 recognition Sectiоn provides 707 as a contractual remedy ever for a contractual of ex- impossibility the doctrine of tending performance timely or commercial the time for when frustration contracts. temporarily impos- The doctrine is rendered impossibility recognized by has been this court sible under terms of the section. pipeline permit delays whether the Trans-Alaska due to resulting from such was issued. “including, causes not restricted to but acts of the government federal agreed The with the con- . embargoes . . . strikes . . ...” Development. tention of The low- er сourt noted that at the time the The section is formed, provide contract was commencement extensions of construction dead- pipeline construction of the lines delays Trans-Alaska when enforced make construc- antic- tion impossible. events, was believed to be imminent. It was lists section ipated start construc- occurrence of which are not attributa- approximately any bring tion would new ble to shortcoming fault or of the de- veloper families prevent to Valdez whom there was which would de- housing. Subsequently, veloper аvailable fed- timely compliance from with the n contract provisions.5 barring pipeline eral construc- issued, thereby po- tion was destroying this specific clause refer- making tential market for new to acts of ring government the federal virtually impossible any company plain meaning of language includes obtain financing for construction.4 injunctions.6 judicial However, decisions superior court considered these facts that we have which per- discovered concluded that Section 707 was intended formance under a on this ground contract timely performance excuse a generally involved situations which the resulting from *5 injunction judicial or itself is order the di- government, acts of the federal of acts performance.7 rect cause of in delay the the other party, emergency and other The injunction district court’s did not di- type exigencies matters or which could rectly prohibit housing in construction Val- not reasonably anticipated have been as dez, injunction and so the standing alone specific I occurrence thereof. would not timely performance by feel Judge that Hart’s decision [enjoin- Development Valdez under Section 707. ing the falls pipeline] construction contemplat- within category the that was While the referring clause by ed the at the . time. . . acts of the federal government does not directly apply seem to to the circumstances above, provides, Section as stated bar, of the case at think that the we timely performance will be excused required Develop- 6. An of a financing by act federal is also an of act 4. The Valdez government. the $1,200,000 federal The Restatement of ment be was stated to part: (1932) provides impossible Contracts § fol- shown at trial to be to obtain duty duty lowing injunction. A contractual or a to make com- the issuance of federal pensation discharged, is the absence of showing contrary circumstance either a in- 5. Sections 704 and 705 of the between contract contributing city or tention fault on the of of Valdez Valdez subject person duty, per- provide system where a title in revestiture of prevented subsequently pro- city by formance is resale devel- followed to a second (b) by judiciаl, oper . a hibited . . ex- should Valdez default order obligation. ecutive administrative made with are construction The sections authority by judge due a or other officer premise in- founded on the while (emphasis may developer United States. . . . there dividual be in default added) step developers are are other who able is, course, agreement. the issue addressed to Section in and continue the construction impossibility a hand, contract. Section other concerned on the is relationship impossibility doc- between an which there is with thоse situations supra is discussed trine and is not which attributable note 3. pre- particular generally developer, and which ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍development any developer g., See, cludes for the e. Kuhl v. Dist. No. 76 of School period Wayne County, delay. 155 Neb. N.W.2d 746 (teacher’s (1952) in- followed an operation school). junction prohibiting dispute it had encompassed does actual are present circumstances pipeline injunction, knowledge of the but gener- restricted to” .not “including,-but knowledge asserts that it did not have 707.8 The federal language of Section al consequences injunction had prevent construction injunction did any Development, and that in made which turn pipeline, Trans-Alaska hous- formal written financing requires Section 707 construct securing financing from all found impossible. With notice. ing in Valdez put on un- unavailable, Development was the circumstances that injunction requirements time notice that one effect of the comply with able to causation, the was to prohibiting pipeline In terms in the contract. by Judge Hart impossible the financ- issued render attainment of injunction federal prox- by potential actual and in the ing developers both an can be viewed fail- Development’s developers other who ob- imate area. Numerous cause The situ- the contract. participate tained land in 1969 to comply ure to type the effect of similar in development program ation is Valdez urban were deadlines, embargo prevents which strike or an unable to meet the construction con- materials acquisition place of labor or took on other and no construction type similar also city during struction. It is lands owned construc- prohibiting judicial injunction represent- direct order A was in effect. each of the enumerated In tion Valdez. Housing ative of the Alaska State Author- en- unanticipated there is situations ity of the in- testified after issuance not attributable cause develop- forced whose junction, impossible for it became each developer. In any fault of financing ers to obtain for construction effectively situation facilities Valdez. We find that su- the dura- developer for impossible for perior clearly court was not erroneous order, strike, judiсial embargo, tion of the determining impact that the economic affirm therefore etc. We on the of Val- periods court’s determination specific readily apparent dez was without *6 in 707 delay provided regard requirement to the With notice. to ex- found encompass the circumstances notice, formal we note the inist the case at bar.9 provision notice was to insure that city not contin- delay knew of the and did argues that city Val The further rely expectations ue to on their that the relying on from Development barred dez housing completed. be Once noti- would during to excuse Section 707 fied, city go to could to court seek in force was that the delay city unjustifia- re some action if the seemed give to because it failed days.10 10 quired within written notice city The did ble. know of general interpreting quire are words When intent the trial court to find that subjects, specified description city followed was the same contract between general meaning Development. limited to words is and Valdez See McCormick subjects special ; (2d 1962) and those the enumerated McKee v. § Evidenсe 198 ed. things State, Cal.App.2d 560, Farm & nature. State Fire of the same Ga.App. 743, Rowland, (1959). v. Cas. Co. 957-958 (1965). S.E.2d provision 10.Section 707 contains a that: city attempts party seeking provi- refute the to The the benefit of the days finding shall, excuse was meant to Section 707 sions section within 10 resulting beginning the failure of the from such enforced de- after the demonstrating lay, it had be to constructed there- have first notified the other specifically providing writing, excluded a clause and of the cause or causes request pe- thereof, another de- such an in a contraсt with and an extension for the city’s veloper. However, delay. in- evidence of the riod of the enforced dealing tent does not with third notice, there is and its decision extend the con- to formal without any way preju- struction deadlines was erroneous not that it was evidence no formal no- circumstances of this case. to receive by the failure diced court that the trial agree with tice. We A further in this re issue and lack of actual notice this combination superior lates order court’s city excused Section prejudice to the prоp remaining pieces three of the four requirement of written notice. 707’s erty Development’s involved original conveyed bid on 40 be lots should determining Furthermore, company’s it.15 The had been ac bid a forfeiture to enforce whether or not cepted by city subject the determina correctly clause, consid keep tion that no conflict Record existed. ultimate principles. The equitable ered ing disorganized the time Valdez was at equity is to save proceedings aim of the and it was difficult to ascertain whether from loss parties harmlеss respective any particular lot in fact available. was permit them each to damage city parcels in determined that the four bargains entered have the benefit of their sold, question though previously had been voluntarily.11 pointed out As we into recorded, yet and therefore did not exe pro Holman,12 has not Moran this court cute for these lots with Valdez contracts rule in de purely quantitative pounded a Development. forfeiture, but termining when to invoke lan- court found that the for consideration instead a rule that allows guage acceptance ambiguous in the bid was compensation be made of whether can interpretation. interpreted It required discharged.13 In this the forfeiture city of language mean that if the be able company will both the time Valdez within a reasonable became housing con to obtain the benefits of ready convey properties and able to those subject of the bar struction that was bidding par- as the to Valdez interpreted Section gain. The trial court ty, convey land to then the delay. provide for a reasonable 707 to Development. properties Since examining After the circumstances city, had been returned the court trial, determined time of longer found that a existed and conflict pipeline permit likely Trans-Alaska conveyance the three lots ordered future, and con granted in the near Development. this inter- find The court struction then commence. could pretation be erroneous. set an deadline for commencement absolute view, acceptance in order to avoid In our a conditional deci trial court’s was extended open-endedness.14 The counter-offer *7 De- prejudice the bid submitted Valdez to be without Valdez to sion was stated subsequent velopment. arise which a conflict to contract events When should city, be city’s interests were formation was indicate the discovered if re- city’s a contract was city could foreclose offer to enter into ing jeopardized. The ‍‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍at is no proceed where there Development declined voked. In circumstances Valdez offer, change longer open that the su in the situ- project. hold an all We pаrties, such as the perior grant forfeiture ation one court’s refusal of of Co., Company after F. have until six months Trust 243 shall 11. Union Bond & Ward v. 1957). is (9th the Trans-Alaska the date 2d Cir. 476 by unappealed finally approved decision of 1972). (Alaska 12. 771 appeals, decision of the United of proc- Court, presidential Supreme States Norton, 13. See Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. lamation, all lots not later to commence on (1878). 234, 24 L.Ed. 689 96 U.S. from October than six months part: in ordered The trial court specified regard another That, the lots was still owned 15.One lots with party Development сounterclaim, the order. therefore not and was in the Valdez property city, paid, turn of the to the does and a letter of financing was ob- being then a contract formed.16 only result tained. The presented evidence at Thus, the title these three lots should be trial on the damages issue of was the testi- city.17 mony revested partners one of the De- Valdez velopment $10,000 approximately was Development Valdez asserts profit expected to be made each on cross-appeal that the filed counterclaim house. hоld that supports We the record regain title to of 1969 June superior court’s conclusion that the 36 lots caused a its title and cloud on company’s damages sufficiently were not prevented obtaining necessary it from established. are not left with a defi- financing to commence construc nite and firm conviction that a mistake has Development tion. asserts committed, been affirm the therefore counterclaim should be characterized as superior court’s finding damages that no act compa prosecution. malicious Abbott, were shown. State v. 498 P.2d 712 ny estimated that were it not coun (Alaska 1972). terclaim, 15 houses could have been at built court also found profit $10,000 house, per and there party prevailed each on a main issue prayed damages $255,000. fore party and therefore awarded neither at superior court held that while the counter torney’s Development pre fees. Valdez claim “could retaliatory, have been issue, property vailed on the forfeiture damages were shown.” of Valdez won on the cross- superi- Since we have concluded that thе damages. awards are of Both finding damages or court’s that no were approximately equal value.18 The amount affirmed, shown should be we need not attorney’s awarded fees is com reach question prima fa- whether mitted to the of the trial sound discretion cie case prosecution of malicious es- was review “in matters of limited prior tablished. The record shows question this kind to the whether filing counterclaim, court exceeded the bounds broad yet- had not begun, discretion vested it.”19 The season in long, Valdez is months about five Civil Rule 82 for the al prоviding passed that almost two of these had attorney’s partially lowance is to fees prior filing city’s counter- compensate a prevailing party for the costs claim. still litigation to which he has been put process of assembling plans and had in which he was In the case involved. engaged negotiations only tentative bar, where neither can be charac possible one purchaser. After the counter- terized as the prevailing party, we have filed, claim was development plans were concluded that the court did not aрproved obtained and by the Alaska State refusing abuse its discretion award Housing Authority, purchase price party attorney’s either fees.20 Lexington Housing Authority 16. See properties equals $50,000. v. Conti these about Co., F.Supp. (W.D.Tenn. property nental Cas. therefore retained worth g. ; 1962) Williston, (3d $230,000 against Contracts ed. § 77 in its successful defense about *8 1957). $255,- foreclosure. The of Valdez retained against its successful defense the conjunction title, 17. In the if return of prosecution charge. malicious upon is found remand that the retained purchase price paid Agеncy Alaska, and taxes for these 19. Preferred Inc. v. Gen. lots, money Raffetto, 951, (Alaska 1964) ; this should be refunded to Valdez 391 P.2d (Alaska Palfy Rice, 606, with accrued interest. 1970). by 18. The 36 lots retained by approxi- are claimed to be worth 20. Remand for correction of trial court error mately $5,000 piece, company’s awarding a and the ex- the additional three lots shall have penses attorney’s incurred related to construction on no effect on the fees issue. part, part, Affirmed reversed I do not see this coming occurrence as proceedings fоr consist- with the remanded further “unforeseeable causes” of en opinion.21 this ent with forced mentioned in Section Rather, the contract. this case strikes me ERWIN, J., participating. as being analogous to Glidden Co. v. Hel Lines, Ltd., lenic 275 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1960). There a charter trans- for CONNOR, (dissenting). Justice porting ores between India and the United recogniz- opinion properly majority ambiguous States was precise about the federal by the injunction issued es that the route intended. When the contract was by appel- performance court cannot formed parties werе aware that directly lee, did not injunction for that Suez might Canal be closed because Valdez, housing in prohibit Israeli-Egyptian war. As a result of the majority Alaska, anywhere else. closure of the Suez Canal it neces- became however, concludes, that because opinion sary for operator of the chartered ves- prevent con- injunction did the federal sels transport the ore via the Panama pipeline, and the trans-Alaska struction of Canal or Cape Hope. around the of Good sources up available bеcause this dried occurrence, court held that this perform- financing, appellee’s possibility of which had equally ap- been this conclu- With ance should be excused. parent parties to both at the respectfully disagree. sion I must they it, time entered into did not excuse formed At time the contract was primary contractual pipeline permit for the construction obligation transport the ore. then uncertain as had been It was issued. my opinion In gov- case should be forthcoming. permit to when would erned principle occurring that facts governmental national The vicissitudes of after bargain made, a per- which render project part were pipeline action on formance more expensive difficult or than parties background against which parties anticipated, discharge do not a nothing bargain. made But their duty perform. Contracts, Restatement, reference to contract documents makes hold, If we were to so we withholding of the granting or merely place in the status hold parties desired to permit. Had the ante, quo development the lots suspense in event that project subject project which were the pipe- against issuance begin anew, could on a fresh basis. federal permit granted line were would, therefore, I court, simple matter reverse remand have been a it would entry for the judgment of a in the writ- favor contingency to include such City of Valdez. done. agreement. ten But this was not Consequently, necessary tion. it will be later than six deadline “not The absolute impose remand commence- months from October 1973” deadline, guided by second considerations the lower of construction set ment reasonableness, disposition has ex- the commencement of con- this case Development. pired struction under considera- while

Case Details

Case Name: City of Valdez v. Valdez Development Company
Court Name: Alaska Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 5, 1974
Citation: 523 P.2d 177
Docket Number: 1905, 1922
Court Abbreviation: Alaska
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