95 N.Y.S. 839 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1905
A consideration of the facts presented and of the statutory provisions applicable thereto leads us to the conclusion that plaintiff’s contention is the correct One and that it is entitled to the judgment which it seeks.
Pursuant to the provisions of the,Tax Law (General Laws, chap. 24, § 24; Laws of 1896, chap. 908, § 24), as amended by chapter 550 of the Laws of 1901, there was assessed in the year 1901 and collected upon shares of stock of banks located in the city of Utica the sum of $37,568.44. The board of supervisors, claiming to act under said statute providing for the distribution of this sum, apportioned to the county of Oneida the part thereof herein in dispute of $8,734.45. The statute which should have controlled its action and which, in our opinion, entitled the city of Utica, rather than the county of Oneida to these moneys, after providing for the assessment, levy and collection of taxes upon bank
It is stipulated that the city and town of TJtica shall be considered and_ treated as though there was no division of funds into city and town funds, and that a claim in regular form has been presented by plaintiff against defendant for the amount-here demanded.
Defendant’s assertion of right seems to rest upon the meaning and interpretation of the words “ tax districts in the provisions just quoted directing the collection and distribution of this kind of taxes in the proportion prescribed to each town, city, village, school and “ other tax district ” in which said shares of stock shall be taxable.
Subdivision 1 of section 2 of the Tax Law defines a “ tax district ” as “ a political subdivision of the State having a board ,of assessors authorized to assess property therein for State and county taxes.”
It is urged that village' and school districts do not come within,
If school and village districts are hot statutory “tax districts” it was not entirely accurate to follow their enumeration by the words “ other tax districts,” by the latter words meaning the statutory tax districts. Still, in construing the statute, it is doubtless our duty, if possible, to overlook this inaccuracy in order to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Except for the reference to the school and village districts, there would be no doubt that the latter by the general term “ tax district ” intended the one defined by statute, and taking into account the entire provision now under review, we think the only effect of coupling together school, village and “ other tax districts ” was to so modify the statutory definition of tile latter term in reference to school and village districts as to include these even though they did not strictly conform to that definition.
The proposition that we should interpret out of the statute the statutory definition of a tax district is weighed down by the supplementary one that we should then so construe the latter term as to include a county. It seems to us very clear that the entire scheme of the law would be violated by such an interpretation and disposition, and that it should not be made.
The plaintiff should have judgment as demanded for the sum of $8,734.45, with interest from November 1, 1903, together with costs. .
All concurred.
Judgment ordered on the submission, for the plaintiff for $8,734.45, with interest thereon from November 1, 1903, together with costs.