484 N.E.2d 199 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1984
This appeal arises from a judgment of the Shaker Heights Municipal Court finding the appellant herein, Jerome M. Dachman, in violation of University Heights Codified Ordinances Section
As adduced from the record below, on July 1, 1982, at approximately 7:14 a.m., the appellant permitted his dog to defecate on a tree lawn located in University Heights. The appellant threw the feces into the street. At 1:30 p.m. on that same day, a complaint was filed in the Shaker Heights Municipal Court alleging appellant to be in violation of University Heights Codified Ordinances Section
"(a) No person shall keep or harbor any animal in the City so as to create offensive odors, excessive noise or unsanitary conditions which are a menace to the health, comfort or safety of the public.
"(b) Digging, urinating or defecating by any dog on any public or private property in the City is hereby declared to be a nuisance. No owner, keeper or person having custody or charge of any dog shall permit such dog to commit such nuisance on any public or private property other than the lot and land *27 where such owner, keeper or person having custody or charge of such dog resides, provided that the foregoing restriction shall not apply to private property onto which such owner, keeper or person having custody or charge of any dog has permission of the owner or resident to walk such dog. The owner, keeper or person having custody, charge or control of such dog shall immediately remove all feces deposited by such dog and dispose of the same in a sanitary manner."
Appellant was charged with violation of subsection (b) of this ordinance.
Upon trial of this matter, appellant was found guilty and fined $25. This instant appeal ensued.
It is initially argued that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss this action for not bringing the appellant to trial within the statutorily conferred period of R.C.
Appellant was arraigned on July 12, 1982, entering a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Trial was scheduled for July 26, 1982. On July 19, 1982, appellant filed a jury demand, and this matter was placed on the next jury docket. On July 26, 1982, appellant's jury demand was denied pursuant to R.C.
On August 9, 1982, appellant appeared in open court and filed a written motion for dismissal due to the trial court's failure to bring him to trial within the statutorily conferred period of thirty days. R.C.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied, and this matter proceeded to trial on September 13, 1982. R.C.
On July 26, 1982, appellant's jury demand was denied, and this action was rescheduled for trial on August 9, 1982, the next court date available for the city of University Heights.
In review of this matter, it is clear that the appellant extended his speedy trial time by the filing of a jury demand, thereby necessitating the trial court's ruling on the same. Accordingly, pursuant to R.C.
It is next argued that the trial court erred in failing to find Section
It is long established that the power given to municipalities by Section
Whether an exercise of the police power does bear a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public and whether it is unreasonable or arbitrary are questions which are committed in the first instance to the judgment and discretion of the legislative body, and, unless the decisions of the legislative body on those questions appear to be clearly erroneous, the courts will not invalidate them. Benjamin v. Columbus, supra.
Though legislation may be unconstitutional on its face, cf.Beldon v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1944),
Appellant argues that Section
We now turn to the second aspect of appellant's argument, wherein exception is taken to the word "sanitary."
The term "sanitary" is generally known and understood to refer or pertain to health, characterized by or readily kept in cleanliness. Webster's Second New International Dictionary (1956) 2214; Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1983) 1042. Though appellant contends that such term is unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to alert a person of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute, we are compelled to disagree.
Viewing Section
Though appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss this action due to the prosecutor's failure to make an opening statement, we note that appellant has failed to provide us with either a transcript of the contested proceedings or a statement of proceedings. App. R. 9(C). Appellant has therefore failed to exemplify the error presently raised and argued. We therefore overrule the same. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
CORRIGAN, P.J., and PARRINO, J., concur.