CITY OF TONTITOWN, Arkansas, Appellant v. FIRST SECURITY BANK, Appellee
No. CV-16-164
Court of Appeals of Arkansas, DIVISION IV.
Opinion Delivered May 24, 2017
2017 Ark. App. 333
Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., Fayetteville, by: Robert K. Rhoads and M. Scott Hall, for appellant.
Millar Jiles, LLP, Little Rock, by: Gary D. Jiles, and Matthew K. Brown, for appellee.
The City of Tontitown appeals from an order of the Washington County Circuit Court finding that it had failed to take substantial steps to provide requested municipal services to property owned by appellee First Security Bank (the Bank). On appeal, Tontitown argues that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in this matter, that the circuit court erred in granting judgment to the Bank, and that the circuit court erred in refusing to rule on Tontitown’s Rule 52(b) motion. We affirm.
The Bank owned property in Tontitown that bordered Springdale on its eastern boundary and Highway 412 on its northern boundary. The northern 15.64 acres was zoned commercial and partially developed; the southern 22.9 acres was zoned residential and was undeveloped. The Bank sought to detach its property from Tontitown and seek annexation into Springdale under the detachment-annexation statutes, codified at
Tontitown responded within thirty days with a letter reciting its commitment to take substantial steps toward providing the additional services as required by the statute. The letter then stated that Tontitown “has already made all of the requested services available to the referenced property.” The letter further stated in part that
[t]he City is fully committed to providing the requested services to the property. As such, it is requested that a more definite statement be filed with the City, specifically describing the nature and scope of each of the services mentioned in your statement, and which you are not currently receiving. Though all of the requested services are currently available to the property, the City requires more information to ensure that the services are properly provided and to correctly inform First Security Bank of the costs and duties associated with their provision, and for which it will be responsible. Lastly, if First Security Bank believes that any of the services provided are inadequate, please also include a more definite statement that specifically describes the nature and scope of each perceived inadequacy.
The Bank did not respond to the letter. In December 2014, the Bank filed a petition for declaratory judgment against Tontitown. The Bank detailed its difficulties in selling the property due to Tontitown‘s allegedly inadequate municipal services and claimed that Springdale was willing to annex the property and provide the requested services. The Bank claimed that Tontitown‘s contradictory letter did not constitute a commitment as required by
A bench trial was held in September 2015. Tonya Patrick, a vice president at the Bank, testified that the Bank obtained the property through a foreclosure action in 2011 and that responses from potential buyers indicated that it was a “dealbreaker” that the property was located in Tontitown. She said that some services were not provided by Tontitown and some were not up to the caliber of services provided by Springdale and that this detracted from the value of the property. Patrick said that Tontitown had not taken any steps to fulfill the commitment it had made. She testified that the Bank had obtained water and sewer services for the improved commercial portion of the property only after the Bank paid to have a sewer line installed along Highway 412 up to the property and then onto the property. She said that Tontitown had not been able to provide the sewer line up to the Bank‘s property.
Jack Beckford, the mayor of Tontitown when the Bank‘s request was made, testified that he did not think there were any services not being provided. He did not contact the city‘s department heads to discuss the services when he received the Bank‘s request. Paul Colvin, Tontitown‘s mayor since January 2015, testified that specific requests had not been made for work on the property. James Clark, public works director for Tontitown, testified that
The circuit court entered an order granting declaratory judgment to the Bank, finding that although Tontitown‘s letter constituted the required written commitment, Tontitown had thereafter failed to comply with
We first address Tontitown‘s argument that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties. Perroni v. Sachar, 2017 Ark. 59, 513 S.W.3d 239. It is well settled that subject-matter jurisdiction is a court‘s authority to hear and decide a particular type of case. Id. A court obtains subject-matter jurisdiction under the Arkansas Constitution or by means of constitutionally authorized statutes or court rules. Id. An Arkansas court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction if it cannot hear a matter under any circumstances and is wholly incompetent to grant the relief sought. Id. Circuit courts have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters not otherwise assigned pursuant to the constitution.
We determine whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction based on the pleadings. Perroni, supra. The first paragraph of the Bank‘s pleading states that “[t]his Court has jurisdiction over this matter, and venue is properly in the Court pursuant to
Tontitown next argues that the circuit court erred in granting declaratory judgment to the Bank. The standard of review on appeal from a bench trial is not whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the circuit court, but whether the circuit court‘s findings were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 2010 Ark. 449, 374 S.W.3d 660. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a firm conviction that an error has been committed. Id. Facts in dispute and determinations of credibility are solely within the province of the fact-finder. Id.
Tontitown contends that it complied with its obligations under the statute because the services were already available to the property. We disagree. The evidence established that while water and sewer services
Tontitown further claims that the Bank failed to comply with its reasonable request for a more definite statement. We agree with the circuit court, however, that Tontitown‘s request did not shift the onus back to the Bank. The statute requires Tontitown to go beyond its commitment letter. The evidence fails to show that Tontitown attempted to work with the Bank toward providing the services by inquiring about development plans or explaining what it needed from the Bank. Regardless of whether the other requested services were provided or came within the statute‘s provisions, we affirm due to the failure to take substantial steps toward providing water and sewer services to the majority of the property.
As a final point, Tontitown argues that the circuit court erred in failing to rule on its Rule 52(b) motion requesting rulings on specific issues.
Affirmed.
Gruber, C.J., and Hixson, J., agree.